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Introduction 
 
Ever since the days of the early pioneers, journalists have battled with governmental and 
military restrictions when searching for, gathering, or publishing information about American 
military operations. When the colonies were under British rule, newspapers were under heavy 
restrictions and were constantly monitored by officials employed by the British throne. The 
first multi-paged newspaper published in the colonies was Publick Occurrences, Both 
Forreign and Domestick in Massachusetts. In its first issue, published on September 25 1690, 
the editor, Benjamin Harris, labelled Great Britain’s ally, the Native Americans, “miserable 
savages”. Harris’ negative remark was perceived as criticism of Massachusetts’ colonial 
policy which, as Michael Emery explains, focused in 1690 on winning and not alienating the 
Native Americans.1 The newspaper was shut down by the Governor and Council of 
Massachusetts.2  
At the beginning of the sixteenth century, a wave of liberalism had taken root in the 
colonies. Jeffrey A. Smith cites Bernard Bailyn’s work on the American Revolution.3 Bailyn 
argues that Cato’s Letters, published in British newspapers in the 1720’s, greatly influenced 
the way in which people living in the colonies regarded governmental power. The letters 
stated that the government only existed to serve the people and that freedom of expression 
gave the people the information they needed to evaluate the performance of people elected to 
official governing positions.4 This idea of considering the government a servant of the people 
was put into action when the colonies declared their independence from Great Britain in 1776, 
but when the U.S. Constitution was adopted by the Constitutional Convention in 1787, there 
was no mention of freedom of expression.  Richard Davis states that the Founding Fathers had 
deemed a freedom of expression clause unnecessary because the enumerated powers of the 
central government did not include powers to violate rights such as freedom of the press. In 
1787, freedom of expression clauses had already been incorporated into nine of the fourteen 
state constitutions. For example, the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776 stated, “That freedom of 
the press is one of the great bulwarks of liberty, and can never be restrained but by despotic 
governments.”5 It soon became apparent that many of the states would refuse to ratify the 
Constitution if it did not include a freedom of expression clause. The state of Virginia could 
not gather enough votes for ratification until Governor Edmund Randolph asked the Founding 
Fathers to add a Bill of Rights.6 As a result, freedom of speech and of the press were included 
in the First Amendment in the American Constitution’s Bill of Rights.7 
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 The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom 
of speech or of the press.”8 The press was therefore able to scrutinize governmental officials 
and their actions without being censored or shut down as Benjamin Harris was in 1690. 
Christopher Paul cites Herbert N. Foerstel’s book, Freedom of Information and the Right to 
Know: The Origins and Applications of the Freedom of Information Act, which quotes 
Wallace Parks. Parks believes that the First Amendment made the press a watchdog and a 
check on the three branches of the government. He also argues that journalists have to act as a 
check on the government because the American people have a “right to know” what their own 
government is involved in at all times.9 The press can influence people’s perceptions of a 
range of topics, and many regards it as “an accessory to the political process.” Subsequently, 
many have nick-named the press a “fourth estate”.10 A free press is one of the cornerstones in 
a democracy. If people can raise their voice and criticize an elected government’s 
achievements and way of governing without being subjected to reprimands, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to abuse governmental power. If an elected official does something his 
or her electors disapprove of, that official might not be re-elected. Newspapers also play an 
important role in informing people about the state of their country. A poll by the Pew 
Research Center reveals that in 2000, sixty-three percent of people active in politics learned 
about presidential election campaigns and candidates by reading newspapers.11 
Especially during wartime it is very important to be informed about what one’s 
government is doing. When a government declares war, it wages war literally in the name of 
its electors. If the press is placed under restrictions during military operations it cannot, for 
example, inform citizens about how the operation is progressing, what types of challenges are 
faced on the battlefield, or how many casualties the operation has produced. If not informed 
about the true picture of military engagement, citizens might condone further military activity 
which they might otherwise have objected to if fully informed. Fully informed citizens are 
better equipped to debate issues and thus better quipped to make decisions which suits their 
own personal perception and believes.   
Jonathan Mermin argues in Debating War and Peace that it is often assumed that the 
ideal of the First Amendment is fulfilled in the U.S.12 Despite the constitutionally protected 
right of a free and independent press, various presidents and military bureaucracies have 
continued to impose different restrictions on the press at wartime. In addition to ensuring a 
free and independent press, the U.S. Constitution also established a national military to 
“provide for the common defense” of the newly created republic and Article II, section 8a of 
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the American Constitution states that “The President shall be the commander in chief of the 
army and navy of the United States.”13  
Since 1791, the press and the military have thus shared a common goal in that they 
both seek to protect the U.S. Constitution, but for different reasons and through different 
means. The press can be regarded as a protector of the American democratic value-system. By 
evaluating and criticizing governmental actions and decisions, the press ensures that the 
American people are informed about what their elected governmental officials are doing. The 
military, on the other hand, protects physical values such as material interests, American soil, 
and the nation’s citizens. Based on this mutual goal of protecting America and all the country 
entails, it may seem logical for the press and the military to cooperate in a positive 
environment to ensure the best protection of America as possible. However, even after the 
incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the American Constitution, this has not been the case at 
times of military activity. 
Since the American Civil War (1861-1865), the government and the military have 
imposed severe restrictions on the press out on the battlefield. Doris A. Graber and Major 
Raymond R. Hill Jr. argue that the Civil War can be regarded as the first military engagement 
during which the press was prevented from collecting and publishing information about the 
war. President Abraham Lincoln blocked the distribution of newspapers and took control over 
the telegraph lines transmitting news of the war across the country.14 In World War I, 
Congress enacted the Espionage Act which made it illegal to utter, print, write, or publish 
anything that would cast contempt on or bring the American government and Constitution 
into disrepute or which demonstrated support for Germany.15 Graber writes that more than 
2000 people, including journalists, were taken to court suspected of having disregarded the 
Act.16 Furthermore, during World War II, the press was restricted by both formal government 
and military censorship, exemplified by President Franklin Roosevelt’s decision to establish 
in December 1941 the Office of Censorship under the First War Powers Act. Up until 1945, 
the office was authorized to censor mail, cables, newspapers, magazines, films, and 
broadcasts while the military was authorized to censor news reports. Journalists accepted 
being censored because if they refused their access to the battlefields would be severely 
limited.17 The controversial nature of the Korean War in 1950 made it difficult for the press to 
write supportive or positive stories about U.S. military involvement. President Harry S. 
Truman and General Douglas MacArthur (U.S. Army) feared that negative press coverage 
would influence public opinion about U.S. military engagement in the war and endanger the 
military’s war efforts. All news reports written out on the battlefield had to be cleared by 
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Army headquarters before being released to the civilian public.18 As the Vietnam War 
progressively deteriorated, news reports were highly managed by the Johnson and Nixon 
administrations. Journalists were not placed under formal censorship, but information about 
the true state of the war was witheld from the public sphere.19 
 Since Vietnam, journalists seeking to cover U.S. military operations have in varying 
degrees been subjected to military ground rules and censorship. During the Grenada Invasion 
(1993), the Panama intervention (1989), the Persian Gulf War (1990-1991), the Somalia 
intervention (1992-1993), the Haiti intervention (1994), the Bosnia intervention (1995), the 
Kosovo War (1991), and the Afghanistan War (2001-present), journalists had, to various 
degrees, a hard time gaining access to newsworthy information. But during the Iraq War in 
2003, the Pentagon and the Bush administration, instead of regarding news coverage a 
liability, allowed journalists to embed with different military units for weeks and months at a 
time. Being embedded meant that journalists were stationed with a military unit out on the 
battlefield. For weeks, sometimes for months at a time, journalists lived, slept, and traveled 
with a particular military unit. Staying out with the units around the clock meant that embeds 
were stationed at the front lines of battles and could thus report live from the scene or write 
very detailed articles about the battles. With the help of satellite-telephones, news reports 
were sent back to the news bureaus in the U.S. within a few minutes.   
 
Hypothesis and Method 
Because a free press is one of the cornerstones in a democratic country such as the U.S., this 
research paper aims to test the following hypothesis: that compared to earlier post-Vietnam 
military public-affairs strategies, the public-affairs strategy in the invasion phase of the Iraq 
War allowed the American press at a time of armed conflict to serve as a check on the 
government and inform the American people about military progress without endangering 
military operational strategy and security. The paper will also examine why public-affairs 
strategies have been implemented and what factors have influenced the decision to use the 
various strategies. 
Although the paper examines how the press has experienced and reacted to various 
military public-affairs strategies, the term “media” will be used whenever covering topics 
dealing with the media-business as a whole, which in addition to the press includes television 
and radio broadcasting. For example, when the paper describes the attitude of military 
personnels to journalists, no distinction will be made between journalists working for 
newspapers and those working for television. When examining the procedure of embedding 
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journalists, the term “press embeds” will be used when examining press journalists’ 
experiences. Whenever the paper focuses on a variety of embedded journalists, the term 
“media embeds” will be used. The first reason for using two terms to describe embeds is that 
doing so will separate embedded press journalists from embedded journalists working for 
television or radio stations, which are not the focus of this paper. Second, because the paper 
seeks to balance the military’s view of public-affairs strategy as well as the view of the press, 
using the term “embeds” alone would create an imbalance between the two points of views, 
since “embed” is usually regarded as a militaristic term when discussing media-military 
relations.  
To obtain a complete picture of how various military public-affair strategies have 
influenced news coverage since the Vietnam War, the best solution would unquestionably be 
to analyze all U.S. military operations between 1975 and 2003. However, due restricition in 
terms of the length, this research paper will focus on five military operations: the Grenada 
Invasion (1983), the Persian Gulf War (1990-1991), the Bosnia intervention (1995), the 
Afghanistan War (2001), and the invasion phase of the Iraq War (2003).  
This paper relies on a comparative historical case-study method. The main reason for 
choosing a comparative case-study as the method applied is that this allows one to follow a 
theoretical replication design throughout multiple cases.20 By using theoretical replication, the 
paper will be able to systematically compare and contrast levels of journalistic access to the 
battlefields and how various levels have affected the military’s operational strategy and 
security. At the same time, it will be possible to examine how various public-affairs strategies 
have affected the press’s ability to access information and serve as a check on the government 
during armed conflict. In analyzing various levels of access, the paper will be able explain 
why the press in some of the five military operations was subjected to restrictive public-
affairs strategies while it was less restricted in other operations.21 A range of different sources 
can be applied when using a comparative case-study method. Because the five cases cover a 
time span of twenty years, it will be possible to extract broad and varied points of views 
regarding how public-affairs strategy affects press coverage and military operational strategy 
and security.   
The paper will rely on a variety of sources from within the media-business, with most 
emphasis on the press, especially journalists working for The New York Times and 
Washington Post. Both newspapers have extensive coverage of foreign affairs and are 
considered by the world of academia to be newspapers of repute. Newspaper articles, essays, 
autobiographies, and historical accounts and assessments written by journalists and editors 
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will serve as primary sources. Individual research-projects, surveys and old interviews will 
serve as secondary sources when discussing levels of journalistic access and the quality of 
press coverage. In addition, autobiographies, personal accounts, after action- and lessons 
learned reports, and articles written by military personnel serve as primary sources when 
examining military justifications for implementing various public-affairs strategies. 
Unclassified military documents such as military doctrines and ground rules will also be given 
extensive attention. Individual military research projects, interviews and surveys will serve as 
secondary sources. 
 
Structure 
Military public-affairs strategies and their effect on operational strategy and security and press 
coverage is a complex and constantly evolving research area. As this research-paper will 
show, whenever a new military operation is launched, both journalists and the military face 
new challenges that need to be solved. Due to the choice of method, the research-paper is 
divided into five chapters. Chapters 1-4 are written chronologically and each chapter attempts 
to balanced equally the points of view of the media and military. Chapters 2-4 present three 
different military public-affairs strategies.  
The public-affairs strategy classification-system used in this research-paper has been 
borrowed from Thomas Rid’s excellent book War and Media Operations whose main focus is 
American military strategic innovation. The book outlines a military public-affairs learning 
curve from Vietnam to Afghanistan and examines whether or not public-affairs lessons 
learned were implemented in the Iraq War. This research-paper will also examine military 
public-affairs strategies in post-Vietnam military operations, although on a smaller scale. 
Instead of focusing solely on strategic innovation in public-affairs as Rid does, this research-
paper will also examine how various public-affairs strategies have influenced the press’ 
ability to serve as a check on the government during military engagements. Currently, several 
works about journalistic restrictions during wartime exists. Christopher Paul’s book Reporters 
on the Battlefield, Greg McLaughlin’s The War Correspondent and Frank Aukofer’s 
America’s Team are just a few of the works that have been written about the subject. Because 
this research-paper examines how three explicit military public-affairs strategies have 
influenced military operational strategy and security and The New York Times and the 
Washington Post journalists’ ability to serve as a check on the government as well as inform 
the American people about American war engagements, it does not replicate any other 
previous works.  
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The first chapter serves as a background chapter. It demonstates the way in which the 
media and the military came to regard one another as the U.S. gradually became more 
involved in the Vietnam War during the Johnson presidency. The outcome, a very negative 
and soured relationship, has served as a foundation for how journalists and military personnel 
have regarded one another in post-Vietnam military operations in terms of journalistic access 
to both information and units deployed out in the fields. Part one of the chapter focuses on 
media-military relations in the years 1950-1967, while part two identifies a negative shift in 
media-military relations, epitomized by the Tet Offensive in January 1968. Military 
personnels’ perception of media news coverage and journalistic response to an escalating war 
is presented. The chapter relies heavily on works written by political science professor Daniel 
C. Hallin, senior historian William M. Hammond, history professor Clarence R. Wyatt, and 
former war correspondent for The New York Times and the Washington Post Peter Braestrup.  
 Chapter two examines restrictive military public-affairs strategy. Part one of the 
chapter focuses on the news blackout imposed by the military during the American-led 
invasion of Grenada. Five military justifications for imposing the news blackout are 
presented. The reaction of the press to the blackout and how the blackout affected the 
American people’s “right to know” are extensively discussed. Part two of the chapter show 
how military public-affairs lessons learned in the Grenada Invasion and a new type of war 
environment influenced public-affairs strategy and press coverage in the the Persian Gulf 
War. The chapter relies on works written by researchers Marcia Block and Geoff Mungham, 
Tapir-fellow Thomas Rid, journalists Peter Braestrup and John J. Fialka, and associate 
professor of political science and independent defense analyst Pascale Combelles-Siegel. 
Chapter three provides an evaluation of experimental military public-affairs strategy in 
the Bosnia intervention and the Afghanistan War. The first part of the chapter focuses on the 
Bosnia intervention which was the first U.S. military operations in which the term 
“embedded” was used in military public-affairs guidelines dealing with the procedure of 
attaching journalists to military units during war operations. Part two of the chapter discuss 
the Pentagon’s two-fold public-affairs strategy in the Afghanistan War and an evaluation of 
the way in which journalists and military personnel experienced the embedding-procedure is 
provided. This evaluation is two-fold as both military personnel and embeds from the 
Washington Post and The New York Times do not agree about whether embedding can be 
considered a success or a failure. Main contributors in the chapter are senior editor Richard J. 
Newman, Lieutenant Commander Raymundo Villarreal Jr., Washington Post journalists Peter 
Baker, Susan Glasser and Carol Morello, and The New York Times journalist Michael Gordon.  
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 Chapter four provides an analysis of the Pentagon’s strategic public-affairs strategy in 
the invasion-phase of the Iraq War. Military strategist and historian Carl Von Clausewitz’s 
“center of gravity”-theory serves as the foundation when discussing the U.S. Department of 
Defense’s Embedded Media Program. Both political and military justifications for 
implementing the program, as well as the program’s design, are examined. The chapter also 
provides an extensive evaluation of the program’s successes and failures with regard to press 
coverage and military operational security and strategy. The terms “in bed” and “Stockholm 
Syndrome” will serve as a basis for the evaluation. Furthermore, the chapter relies on a wide 
range of sources, but the following are particularly important: independent researcher Richard 
K. Wright, Washington Post journalists William Branigin and Peter Baker, Thomas Rid, the 
Pew Research Center, and U.S Army and U.S. Marine after action reports.   
 Chapter five analyzes how a clash between the cultures of the media and the military 
makes it difficult for journalists and the military to cooperate during a military operation. The 
clash of cultures serves as a basis for evaluating how restrictive, experimental, and strategic 
public-affairs strategies have influenced military operational strategy and security and the 
press’ ability to cover the five cases. Two analyses examine how the Pentagon, military 
commanders, and presidents have used military public-affairs strategies as instruments for 
improving military reputation and securing political agendas and goals. 
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Chapter 1 
 
The Foundation: 
 The Vietnam War 
 
1.0  Early Media Coverage of the Vietnam War 
According to Clarence R. Wyatt, American media was not particularly interested in U.S. 
involvement in the continuously escalating conflict in Vietnam between the years 1955-
1960.22 Large American news organizations had few resources invested in the country23 and 
news articles that were written from or about Vietnam appeared as rarely “as a cold day hit 
Saigon.”24 The first American bureau staffed by a correspondent with full-time responsibility 
for covering Vietnam was established in Saigon in November 1961. By November 1962, the 
Associated Press, United Press International and The New York Times had established 
permanent news bureaus in South Vietnam.25 Due to a minimal media presence in Vietnam, 
journalists had to rely on information provided by the U.S. government when reporting on the 
escalating conflict. Daniel C. Hallin, Major Paul Ambrose, and Clarence R. Wyatt argue that 
due to this dependency on government-provided information, most news coverage was very 
supportive of American intervention in Vietnam up to the mid-1960s because President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower and President John F. Kennedy wanted to portay American 
involvement in the war in a positive fashion.26 
 It is easy to criticize journalists for bluntly relying on government-provided 
information without being critical of its content. What is important to take into consideration 
when analyzing journalists’ largely uncritical view is the very nature of the relationship that 
existed between journalists and the government during the early stages of the war. In the 
1950s, journalists and the government had developed a dependency-relationship with each 
other. The government used radio broadcasts and the press to communicate with the public, 
both nationally and internationally. In order to serve as a check on the government as well 
educating the public about governmental decisions and actions, journalists depended on 
information covering various issues affecting the American public. They depended on 
government information in order to write objective professional journalism27, “journalists 
depended on their relations with the state to make objectivity work as a practical form of 
journalism, and objectivity, in turn, was essential to the new role the press was playing as a 
‘fourth branch of government’.”28 The combination of serving as an objective check on the 
government while being dependent on the same government for information is not ideal when 
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covering a war. Not having the ability to provide a breadth of information made it difficult to 
report about the gradual American involvement in South Vietnam. 
 
1.1 “Maximum Candor” 
President Lyndon Baines Johnson, adhering to President Eisenhower’s “domino-theory”, 
believed that if South Vietnam fell to communism, other countries would soon follow. Pauline 
Maier argues that Johnson was determined not “to be the president who saw Southeast Asia 
go the way China went,” believing an American withdrawal from South Vietnam would 
eventually damage his reputation and chances for a re-election in 1969.29 If the U.S withdrew, 
Johnson also feared that American commitment to defend freedom against communist 
aggression in other places around the world might loose credibility.30 
 As American commitment to the war persisted, more and more journalists covered the 
war which was getting worse by the month. An increase in the number of journalists made it 
difficult for the Johnson administration to sell American military commitment in a county 
most Americans had no cultural or political affiliation with. Wyatt argues that President 
Johnson took massive advantage media’s need for information. The Johnson administration 
believed that they would get across its own view of the war and the war’s progress more 
easily if journalists were provided with the kind of information needed to satisfy their editors 
and the American people.31 If journalists had enough information to report on, they would not 
commit themselves to investigative journalism. Similarly, Peter Braestrup, chief of the 
Washington Post’s Saigon news bureau, claims that in order to keep public sentiments about 
the war high, Johnson and his advisors in the Pentagon consistently tried to counter any news 
that contradicted the official line that the military was making progress in Vietnam.32  
To prevent investigative journalism, the “Maximum Candor” public-affairs strategy 
was launched in the summer of 1964. In essence, Maximum Candor can be described as an 
instrument implemented to please journalists and not make them question Johnson’s war 
strategy. For example, journalists returning from the battlefield were provided with access to 
the same “comfort facilities” as higher ranking military officers had.33 That meant access to 
hot showers, televised baseball games, cold beers, and post exchanges.34 “With some luck, the 
newsmen were able to shoot some good film or produce a story at an outpost, catch a ride 
back to Saigon the same evening, get the final story on its way to the US, and have a French 
dinner downtown.”35 The way journalists were treated by the U.S. military often flabbergasted 
the French and British supporting troops.36 Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) 
also increased the number of briefings held for journalists. Information about the progress of 
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the war was made available every hour and journalists were also provided with much help 
when seeking to enter the battlefield.37   
Hallin argues that Johnson’s “news managing” plan can largely be considered a 
success, at least up to January 1968. Despite a deteriorating war, between August 1965 and 
January 1968, the number of favorable press editorial comments exceeded negative editorial 
comments eleven to three. He notes, however, that it is difficult to measure the objectivity of a 
news report. The measure is therefore scored very conservatively and he only included the 
most explicit instances of where the reporting is clearly favorable or unfavourable.38 Despite 
of this conservative assessment, the numbers clearly indicate that a majority of the editorial 
comments were positive and favorable to American intervention. Hallin points to a New York 
Times article on the Gulf of Tonkin-incident, published on August 4, 1964, as a great example 
of how the news were being managed in the early years of the war.39 By presenting pure facts, 
the article is indeed objective but it does not ask critical questions concerning the facts it 
presents. As Hallin explains, “When the president says, ‘Black is white’, you write, ‘The 
president said black is white.’”40 
Although not intentionally lying to journalists about the true picture of the war, Hallin 
writes that civilian officials in Washington contributed to keeping journalists misinformed 
throughout the mid-1960s. The few people within the administration who believed that the 
American people should be informed about the state of the war feared that their influence in 
the policy process would be jeopardized if they spoke out. In Congress, the principle of 
presidential prerogative in foreign policy was still strong and it prevented many legislators 
from criticizing President Johnson overall war-strategy.41  
 
1.2  Increase of Media Scepticism  
In March 1965, Johnson realized that American troops soon had to be implemented into the 
ground war. In order to draw public attention away from the issue of a deeper American 
involvement in the war, William M. Hammond argues that the State and the Defense 
Department de-emphasized the American role and diverted all the attention to South 
Vietnamese accomplishments.42 Max Boot provides another example of how President 
Johnson drew attention away from the conflict. When the first U.S. Marines landed in Da 
Nang, South Vietnam’s second-largest city, on March 8 1965, Johnson drew attention to his 
domestic policy rather than foreign policy by proposing a new crime control package in the 
U.S.43 
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By diverting the focus of interest, officials also aimed at turning journalists into 
counter-insurgency correspondents. Critics of the plan, among them U.S. Army General 
William C. Westmoreland, commander of the U.S. military operations in Vietnam between 
1964-1968, and Colonel Benjamin Legare (U.S. Army), were convinced that the tactic of 
downplaying the American role was bound to fail because journalists would eventually see for 
themselves that American soldiers had become active rather than passive actors on the 
battlefield. Instead, General Westmoreland advocated a plan that involved a comprehensive 
background briefing for selected newsmen on American combat operations. Fearing that the 
background briefings would produce negative news reports, the Johnson administration 
vetoed the plan.44 As the news about further American involvement in the ground war became 
known, massive complains from Congress and the media poured in, arguing that a “dangerous 
and reckless departure from accepted policy had occurred”45 and that the de-emphasizing of 
the American role only indicated that a cover-up was in progress.46 
As Hallin argues, despite major efforts made to manipulate journalists’ war 
comprehension, it is possible to identify a change in news coverage reporting during the mid-
1960s. As the war progressed, several journalists experienced that information presented at 
official military briefings often directly contradicted what they themselves had seen.47 James 
Reston, working for The New York Times, for example, argues on May 17 1966, that 
President Johnson mixed up news and truths.48   
Two offices were responsible for providing public support for the media in Vietnam, 
the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) and the MACV office, a command 
subordinate to the commander-in chief in the Pacific, Office of Information (MACOI). The 
MACOI, headed by Brigadier Winant K. Sidle, was the official voice of MACV and it 
prepared the daily military briefings that were presented at the JUSPAO. Military briefings 
consisted of daily operational reports presented by field commanders brought together at the 
MACV operations center.49 Braestrup argues that it became apparent that the Johnson 
administrations’ goal of presenting distorted information about the war began to fail as more 
and more journalists started to believe that governmental information provided at the 
JUSPAO was based on “hasty, fragmentary, inevitably inaccurate field reports of action in a 
theatre of war where there was no actual front line, moving or stationary.”50 Further, 
Braestrup claims that these ill feelings developed because information provided at the military 
briefings were too broad-based and could not be linked to larger operational themes or efforts. 
The official nightly JUSPAO briefings were soon nicknamed “Five o’clock Follies” by 
journalists. Determined to end the mocking, the embassy moved the briefings to 16.45.51 
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Inaccurate information presented at the JUSPAO briefings helped to breed a lack of both 
governmental and military credibility among journalists. An example of growing journalistic 
scepticism regarding the war’s operational strategy will be presented next. 
 
1.2.1  Tear and Nausea Gas 
According to Hammond, in late 1964 South Vietnamese commanders were planning to 
introduce tear- and nausea producing gasses to the war effort. Deployment of the gasses was 
considered a better option compared with the usage of heavy artillery and air strikes in 
situations where civilians could get killed. Even though the gasses were standard riot-control 
agents, American military public-affairs officers (PAOs) recognized early on that journalists 
would react in a negative fashion towards the use of gas. The State and Defense Department, 
however, refused to make any statement about the gasses. They believed that it would give the 
enemy, who knew that U.S. allies in Europe still remembered the usage of mustard-gas during 
World War Two, a propaganda advantage when claiming that the U.S. was involved with 
gassing innocent people52 
 After learning about an incident where a twelve-year old girl had suffered from a 
swollen face after being exposed to the gases, Peter Arnett from the television channel CNN, 
asked PAOs at the JUSPAO for an explanation for why the military accepted usage of gas that 
harmed civilians. The PAOs, following orders from Washington, declined to respond.53 The 
refusal to make a statement eventually backfired. Declining to respond to questions regarding 
U.S. involvement in the deployment of gasses, gave the impression that it was the JUSPAO 
that was being uncooperative and not Washington who had actually given the orders. 
Hammond states that when an explanation was finally given, journalists around the world 
paid little attention to it and instead preferred to interpret it as a confirmation of Peter Arnett’s 
story.54 Hammond cites two news articles mentioning Arnett’s discovery. On March 24 1965, 
the Washington Post wrote that “[t]he argument that the non-toxic gag is more merciful than 
anti-personnel weapons has some merit, but not much. Although the gas may not be poison, 
the word is, and all the propaganda resources in the world cannot explain away its 
employment as an act of Christian charity.”55 Similarly, on the same date The New York Times 
wrote that “[e]ven a temporarily disabling gas could kill the sick and the very young.”56 These 
negative news articles bluntly criticised the military. 
When refusing to answer questions, the Johnson administration created problems for 
itself. First, all the commotion regarding the use of gas, despite that it was relatively harmless, 
revealed that the U.S. had not ratified the International Protocol on Gas Warfare, a protocol 
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very important to for example Great Britain. The Johnson administration had planned to 
escalate the war in April 1965 and was afraid of loosing any support to their advance.57  
Second, Wall Street Journal reporter Philip Geyelin argues that the significance of the 
episode was not the deployment of the gas itself, but rather the uproar that followed. When 
countries and allies around the world protested, Americans were left with the impression that 
the U.S. was much more alone on the issue of Vietnam than what President Johnson had been 
willing to admit.58 The episode clearly indicates that American journalists no longer bluntly 
believed everything they were told at official military briefings or automatically accepted 
information that came from the Johnson administration. This marked a significant shift from 
writing “the President says that black is white”. 
 
1.3 Government Reaction to Increased Media Scepticism 
The State Department was alarmed by journalists’ eagerness to cover American soldiers 
engaging in ground combat. After discussing various approaches on how to handle 
journalistic access to information with PAOs, MACV and representatives from all U.S. 
agencies at a conference in March 18-20 1965, a system of voluntary media cooperation was 
settled upon.59 In broad terms, the new system meant that print journalists, no matter who they 
worked for, had to voluntarily agree to be placed under certain restrictions in order to be 
accredited and receive different kinds of benefits that accompanied this status. 
The voluntary system consisted of fourteen categories of rules that needed to be 
followed. The rules were issued by the Pentagon and were designed to protect military 
intelligence that could assist the enemy. Journalists had to agree to: 
Never to reveal future plans, operations, or air strikes; information on rules of engagement; or the 
amounts of ordnance or fuel on hand to support combat units. During an operation, unit designations, 
troop movements, and tactical deployments were to remain secret. So were the methods, activities, and 
specific locations of intelligence units; the exact number and type of casualties suffered by friendly 
forces; the number of sorties and amount of ordnance delivered outside of South Vietnam; and 
information on aircraft taking off for, en route to, or returning from target areas. The press was also to 
avoid publishing details on the number of aircraft damaged by enemy antiaircraft defenses; tactical 
specifics such as altitudes, courses, speeds, or angles of attack; anything that would tend to confirm 
planned strikes which failed to occur for any reason, including bad weather; the types of enemy 
weapons that had shot down friendly aircraft; and anything having to do with efforts to find and rescue 
downed airmen while a search was in progress.60 
 
 If a journalist ignored the rules, he/she would lose his/her accreditation.61 In a way one could 
say that the ground-rules symbolized a kind of trade-off between the press and Pentagon. 
Journalists promised not to reveal certain information and in return they received access to 
other kinds of information they needed in order to do their job. Vietnam thus became the first 
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U.S. war in which journalists were routinely accredited to accompany military forces, but not 
subjected to formal censorship.62  
Politically and military there were many reasons for choosing not to officially censor 
news reports. First, the Vietnam War was a limited war. Hallin claims that a “limited war” 
classification meant that the U.S. was only guests-participants in the war because a 
declaration of war was never issued by the U.S. Imposing censorship in an undeclared war 
where America was formally the guest of South Vietnam was politically impractical. The 
South Vietnamese government was a fully functioning and sovereign government so the 
Johnson administration could not impose rules regarding censorship as they pleased.63 If the 
South Vietnamese government decided to impose full censorship themselves it would not 
have worked because South Vietnam lacked any concept of a free press. As a result, the 
government would be able to apply strict censorship whenever an American wrote or said 
something they did not like.64 Imposing censorship would also require an enormous logistical 
effort by the military. All mail, communications, and transportation facilities would have to 
be controlled by cooperative multilingual personnel.65 
Censoring news reports would also cause major uproar amongst news bureaus and 
journalists. This became evident when journalists were given restricted access to American 
airbases at Da Nang and Bien Hoa. According to the new rules, each journalist needed a 
military escort when visiting the bases, but there were only two officers available and more 
than thirty print journalists in the area. An assembly of American public-affairs officers 
concluded that the closing of the airbases and restrictions on the press would only spark 
further uproars, and the new rules were abolished. 66 
Journalists agreed to follow the voluntary ground-rule system, but as the war 
continued to escalate it became obvious that in order to serve as a check on the government, 
the ground rules had to be violated. Morley Safer from CBS News illustrated this in a news 
report. Safer criticized a Marine operation that had gone wrong in the village of Cam Ne on 
August 3, 1965. Fred Friendly, the president of CBS News, defended Safer: “We don’t want to 
violate purely military security with reports which could endanger the life of a single soldier, 
but by the same token, we must insist upon out right to report what is actually happening 
despite the political consequences…”67 Despite journalistic violation of the ground rules, no 
censorship was implemented because it would mean that future critical news reports such as 
editorials and news analysis would have to be censored. To do so would violate the First 
Amendment and then the Congress, the public, and the overall media could start to unite in 
opposition towards Johnson and the war.68  
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1.3.1 Body Counts and Diverting Claims 
The war produced more and more American casualties while the enemy did not show any sign 
of retaliating in the near future. Fearing for an erosion of public support, Arthur Sylvester, 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for public affairs, pointed to the journalistic tendency of 
interpreting the absence of a large body count as evidence that a mission had failed.69 Fearing 
for a loss of public support, Secretary of Defense McNamara ordered in October 1965 that 
every American military unit were to produce a weekly situation report which stated that pre-
set governmental objectives had been met.70 Since detecting and fighting the enemy was 
difficult, seizing territory and measuring captured weapons and incidents of enemy defection 
was hard. In order to show some degree of progress and success, the U.S. military started to 
count killed North Vietnamese and Viet Cong soldiers. In essence, the logic behind the body-
count procedure was that if more enemy soldiers than American soldiers were killed, the U.S. 
was much closer to victory.71 Many military officers also believed that their promotion was 
determined by how many enemies their unit killed.72   
In his book My American Journey, Colin Powell, retired four-star U.S. Army general 
and the 65th Secretary of State, writes that a typical conversation between a commander and 
an operator asking for the number of enemy killed went as followed: “How many did your 
platoon get?” “I don’t know. We saw two for sure.” “Well, if you saw two, there were 
probably eight. So let’s say ten.”73 It was also reported in The New York Times that “United 
States Marines had managed to trap about 2,000 Vietcongs guerrilla with their backs to the 
sea and killed “hundreds” of them in the first major battle involving American troops in 
Vietnam.”74 Lieutenant Calley, later indicted for being responsible for a massacre at My Lai, 
remember his encounter with the body counts procedure, 
I like if I can encourage them and say, “Outstanding.” Or even, “Chalk up a body count of twelve.” It 
helps the artillery`s moral: but I couldn`t do it. I hadn’t seen a VC all that day. I knew damn well, 
Weber`s dead. A boy in the second platoon has no legs anymore. A boy in the third platoon- I had to do 
it. I wrote in the after-action report “VC body count six.75 
 
 Inaccurate numbers of killed enemy was also produced when many units were involved in the 
same battle. When an enemy was killed, every unit present reported that hit which meant that 
the killed enemy was counted several times. These false numbers were reported further up the 
chain-of-command which again resulted in false announcements to journalists. Flawed 
internal data was presented as true facts and thus contributed to the false positive picture of 
the war that military officials presented at the nightly JUSPAO briefings.76  
President Johnson himself sometimes referred to false body count numbers when he 
wanted to talk about the war’s progress.77 In late 1967 official numbers claimed that 220,000 
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enemy soldiers were killed. Later it was estimated that approximately 30 percent of the 
reported numbers were misleading claims.78  Charles Morh of The New York Times reveals his 
disgust for the body counting procedure when asserting that “a steady stream of 
misinformation” was emanating from U.S military commanders.79  
Most journalists longer viewed government-provided information a viable option 
when writing their reports and instead collected information from other sources. From 
regarding the government a provider of reliable information to accusing it of manipulating 
information reveals a paradigm-shift in media-government relation in the war. By no longer 
bluntly relying on official information while at the same time being eager to report the “true” 
picture of the war meant that the media business, in theory, were now able to serve as a check 
on the government in an unprecedented scale compared to earlier in the war. 
When using alternative sources, American journalists came to be regarded as a means 
for spreading North Vietnamese communist propaganda by the military and the Johnson 
administration, exemplified here by news reports cited in both Hammond and Wyatt. North 
Vietnamese officials had invited the Assistant Managing director of The New York Times, 
Harrison E. Salisbury, to North Vietnam and showed him towns and villages they claimed had 
been hit by American bombs.80 Salisbury published articles about his visit. The stories caused 
havoc in Congress and in the media. Walter Cronkite of CBS News claimed that Salisbury’s 
articles had widened the credibility gap between the press and the U.S. military and the 
Johnson Administration and military public affairs officers accused Salisbury of placing too 
much faith in what the North Vietnamese had told him.81 
In his articles, Salisbury had questioned whether the city of Nam Ding contained 
important military targets. According to Hammond, the city actually housed a petroleum 
storage facility, an important railroad yard, and a thermal power plant that was heavily 
guarded by the largest concentration of antiaircraft weaponry in North Vietnam.82 The 
military claimed that Salisbury never had visited the region and had only used quotations 
from North Vietnamese officials.83 Salisbury’s objectivity were questioned when news desks 
learned about the military’s claim of the reports being full of North Vietnamese propaganda.    
The Washington Post started to question whether the articles were reliable or not. Hammond 
explains that in the days that followed, New York Times editors also rejected what the stories 
alleged. They called the stories “sweeping denunciations and false conclusions”84 and argued 
that “the whole tone of this story [Salisbury’s] gives the impression that the United States is 
deliberately undertaking saturation and population bombing, and it swallows the Communist 
line almost hook, line and sinker.”85 The Salisbury-articles, however, had already influenced 
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negative sentiments towards the war back home. One of the news articles said that “ [t]he 
aims, aspirations and operations of the Northern Liberal Front are viewed by its leadership in 
terms sharply different from the picture held by many Americans.”86 Publishing articles that 
favored the North Vietnamese hurt the negative assessment that President Johnson and his 
administration wanted to portray of their enemy. 
 
1.4 Media-Military Relations 
Johnson’s news manipulation did not only damage the government’s credibility with the 
overall media, but it also sat precedence on how the media in general and the military came to 
understand one another with regards to credibility and trust. As seen earlier in the chapter, the 
U.S. military was frequently used as an instrument for building public support for the war. 
Military PAOs are first and foremost responsible for reporting military war progress and 
making assessments and recommendations. In Vietnam, military personnel also became 
involved with justifying the war politically, despite that efforts were made to divorce MACV 
from domestic policies. Both General Westmoreland and Barry Zorthian, who was in charge 
of media relations and internal communications from 1964 to 1968, made major efforts to 
downplay Johnson’s war-strategies justifications in the command’s official statements.87 
When anti-war sentiments continued to grow in the U.S., Johnson ordered General 
Westmoreland to give a speech at the National Press Club on November 21 1965.  
In his speech, General Westmoreland talked about the war in very optimistic terms. He 
claimed that “success lies within our grasp”88 and revealed his strategic plan and indicated 
that the U.S. could soon withdraw after turning more responsibility over to the South 
Vietnamese government.89 General Westmoreland continued to appraise the war-effort when 
later being interviewed and elaborated it even further on a “Meet the Press” program.90  
The war, however, was not going in the direction that General Westmoreland 
announced that it was. While the war and the war-effort was sugar-coated by the State and 
Defense Department, and President Johnson late in 1967, military leaders in North Vietnam 
believed that it was time to take action and decided to step up their operations in South 
Vietnam. Their ultimate goal was to bring the war to an end with a major offensive. In order 
to succeed, they sought to drive the Americans out of the South Vietnamese cities, infiltrate 
personnel and material into the cities, and eventually overthrow the South Vietnamese 
government.91 
 The North Vietnamese attacked on January 31, 1968. About 67,000 Viet Cong 
soldiers and North Vietnamese troops assaulted 36 South Vietnamese provincial capitals, five 
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of the six autonomous cities, and 64 of the 242 district capitals.92 In historical terms, the 
attack has later been referred to as the Tet Offensive, named after the Vietnamese lunar New 
Year celebration. Tactically and operationally, the Tet Offensive was a victory for the South 
Vietnamese and American forces.93 By the end of February, North Vietnam had suffered 
major losses in casualties. Between 45,000 and 84,000 soldiers were killed. 14,000 South 
Vietnamese and 4000 Americans lost their lives.94  
Tet, however, became a major political, psychological, diplomatic, and strategic defeat 
for the ARVN and the U.S forces. Since the American people had been told as late as 
November 1967 that victory was in sight, the attack came as a massive shock.95 For years the 
Vietnam War had been characterized as winnable and just. Suddenly the war had instead 
become brutal, inhumane, and costly.96  A New York Times article, published February 2, 
1968, reported that in the State Department, the Capitol Hill, and in the Pentagon people 
described the attack as “humiliating” and “embarrassing” to the Johnson administration and 
the South Vietnamese Government.97 
 
1.4.1 Media Reaction to the Tet Offensive 
Pictures of killed American soldiers and civilians and reports of atrocities and devastation did 
not resemble anything the American people had been exposed to before, at least not in such a 
massive scale. The result was that both journalists and the American people felt betrayed by 
the military and the Johnson administration. The reality of the war did not fit what the public 
had been told. 
Many civilians, including journalists present in Vietnam, argue that journalists did not 
do an acceptable job when reporting during Tet. Peter C. Rollins, professor eritmus of English 
and American film, writes that coverage of Tet has been described as dishonest, 
unprofessional and irresponsible98 while Hallin and Braestrup argue that many of the news 
reports that were published lacked accuracy.99 The press’s handling of an attack on the U.S. 
Embassy is a good example of inaccurate reporting. On January 31, journalists heard fire 
coming from the direction of the American embassy. When talking to military police at the 
scene, journalists were told that North Vietnamese soldiers had managed to enter the lower 
floors of the building. The U.S State Department, however, had running contact with the 
embassy and was informed by the staff that the embassy was not penetrated by the enemy.100 
In order to counter the rumours, President Johnson, once again, ordered General 
Westmoreland to hold a press conference everyday during the offensive, in order to “convey 
your confidence in our capability to blunt these enemy moves, and to reassure the public that 
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you have the situation under control.”101 At this point, the press no longer trusted information 
published by the government.102 A New York Times article, cited in Hammond, reported as 
late as February 2 1968 that guerrillas had penetrated at least the first floor of the embassy.103   
Pictures and reports that lacked context also contributed to faulty reporting. One of the 
best known pictures from the Vietnam War was captured during Tet was taken by Associated 
Press photographer Eddie Adams. He took a picture of Brigadier General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, 
the national Chief of Police, executing a Viet Cong officer in the streets of Saigon.104 The 
Viet Cong officer was believed to have killed a major and his family.105 The picture, captured 
as a photograph and on TV-film, was described as “the strongest stuff American viewers had 
ever seen.”106 Rollins accuse journalists writing about the incident of distorting the situation 
since the picture was not accompanied with any information of what had happened earlier or 
with the reason for the execution.107 
It exist multiple opinions to why news reports were so inaccurate. Braestrup explains 
that before Tet, frustrated journalists could not actually prove that President Johnson’s 
optimism was exaggerated, but when the North Vietnamese attacked, the primary reaction of 
many journalists was to indulge in retribution for prior manipulation.108 This claim is not very 
plausible because most journalists working for serious, national-wide newspapers, and TV-
networks usually have large amounts of integrity and take their profession seriously. Wyatt 
claims that overloaded phone systems made it difficult to dictate dispatches or verify 
information with sources outside Saigon109, while Major Edward L. English (U.S. Army) 
emphasis two economic aspects of the news business and a military bureaucratic obstacle his 
thesis “Towards a More Productive Military-Media Relationship”. First, because not all news 
bureaus could spend an unlimited amount of resources, meant that many journalists could not 
spend many hours a day performing investigative journalism in the field before handing in a 
news report. Most journalists covered the attack from Saigon, Ke Sanh, and Hue where the 
most dramatic scenes occurred. Scenes from the large cities were not symptomatic with the 
U.S. military counter-offensive across South Vietnam. Second, the news-business is 
competitive and hectic. In order to keep up with other news agencies, journalists had to report 
as fast as they could which, again, limited them from producing investigative and objective 
journalism.110 General Westmoreland was also left with the impression that journalists were 
hunters, only out looking for the next big scoop when arguing that: 
Chet Huntley on the NBC Evening News had the VC inside the Chancery, the defenders in the 
compound outside. There was no report on Allied casualties in Saigon, said Huntley, “but they`re 
believed to be high”. Was that kind of gratuitous speculation justified? Was the long, costly American 
effort in Vietnam to be sacrificed to the idols of sensation and competition?111 
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To learn about military movements and combats out on the battlefield, journalists had to make 
contact with Brigadier General Winant Sidle (U.S. Army) or his staff at the MACOI, who 
received information from MACV. When Tet occurred, MACOI were unable to keep up with 
all events and passing out information to journalists. English argues that this lack of military 
information forced journalists to speculate about the attack and the progress of the 
counteroffensive.112 Robin Anderson, Adrian R. Lewis, and Braestrup, however, argue that 
the passive reaction of the Johnson administration permitted both journalists and his political 
opponents to argue that the attack was a major U.S. defeat. For two months, no official 
government explanation was voiced.113 
 
1.4.2 Credibility Gap 
After Tet, journalistic scepticism towards the Johnson administration and the military had 
blossomed into a “credibility gap” and media-military relations had become very strained. 
When the true picture of the war was exposed, journalists that still attended official briefings 
no longer believed PAOs when they presented statements of war progress. After being 
exposed as “dishonest,” the press challenged and questioned every military move and 
announcement.114 Christopher Paul and James J. Kim argue that “Tet clearly exposed the 
falsehood of administration claims and pushed many reporters from scepticism to outright 
mistrust of the military”115 Major Michael P. Erdle (U.S Army) concurs when writing that 
journalists believed that they had been intentionally misled by the military.116  
Hammond argues that the credibility-gap heavily influenced how journalists wrote 
their reports after 1968. Instead of focusing solely on reporting facts about combat, they wrote 
highly critical and analytical reports. Journalists also directly criticised the military, 
emphasizing problems connected to race relations and increasing drug abuse amongst 
soldiers.117 The military was criticized and presented as dishonest and manipulative. Because 
official censorship was never present in Vietnam, the Johnson administration could not 
impose regulations on journalists’ negative reporting of the war and the military. By being 
involved with “selling the war” to journalists and the American people, the military came to 
symbolize a failed war-strategy. Braestrup argues that there had been an “unprecedented use 
of the military to achieve domestic political objectives” and media criticism was directed 
toward the military instead of the Johnson administration.118 
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1.4.3 Military Reaction to Media Coverage of the Tet Offensive 
The question of whether or not journalists’ inaccurate reporting during Tet led to increasing 
anti-war sentiments in the U.S has been extensively debated. Although recognizing that many 
news reports veered widely from reality119, Braestrup argues that there exist no evidence of a 
direct relationship between the dominant media themes in 1968 and the upsurge of anti-war 
sentiments in the U.S.120 He believes that it was President Johnson’s inability to choose the 
right policies and strategies that led to the defeat.121  
The military does not agree with Braestrup. General Westmoreland believes that “[t]he 
war still could have been brought to a favorable end following the [communist] defeat ... But 
this was not to be. Press and television had created an aura, not of victory, but defeat”. Just as 
journalists had developed distrust towards the military, the military also underwent a change 
in attitude toward the media in general. After Tet, many inside the military viewed both 
newspapers and television-stations as subversive and unpatriotic.122 They believed that the 
media had singlehandedly turned the American people against the war and American soldiers 
by publishing false and inaccurate information. In other words, a large majority of the military 
believed that it was journalists who gave people back home a reason to doubt both the 
incentive to win the war as well as the war’s moral and ethical justifications.  
According to Braestrup, this negative attitude penetrated the military from top-
management and down to captains and lieutenants. Hundred top officials who served in 
command positions in Vietnam were interviewed in a survey. Thirty-eight believed that 
newspapers coverage of the war was “on the whole tended to be irresponsible and disruptive 
of United States effort in Vietnam”, fifty-one believed the coverage was “uneven. Some good, 
but many irresponsible”, eight believed that newspapers played an important role in keeping 
the United States informed. Three did not answer or provided other answers.123 General 
Westmoreland himself also felt that unfavourable and unfair press coverage influenced 
Nixon’s decision to withdraw from the war. Rid cites a Military Review article where General 
Westmoreland argues that the mood of the Congress was, “a reflection of public attitudes, in 
turn influenced profoundly by the media- particularly by daily television reports- grew further 
away from the policy of the executive branch.”124  
Hallin claims that it was easier for policymakers or military commanders to blame 
journalists rather than to admit that they had allowed themselves to be victims of the 
Johnson’s administrations propaganda scheme.125 Douglas Porch, professor of national 
security affairs, however, argues that the absence of victory was the reason for why the 
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military projected hostility towards journalists. When victory in a war has been achieved, 
Porch claims that it will “erase the memories of a troubled relationship.”126 
Clark Dougan and Andrew Weiss argue that Tet only reinforced an already negative 
growing perception of the war and the American involvement.127 Wyatt concurs and argues 
that Tet was not synonymous with a “sudden shift in opinion among correspondents, but more 
a confirmation of characteristic and trends that had been around for a long time.”128 Opinion 
polls presented in Lewis’ book The American Culture of War support these assessments. 
News coverage, especially during and after Tet, was not the only reason why America 
changed its perception of the war. In 1965, opinion polls show that sixty-one percent of 
Americans supported the policies of President Johnson in Vietnam. In late 1967, fourty-seven 
percent of the American people were against the war and forty-four percent for.129 Johnson 
had already started to lose support before Tet and before the military lost its most valuable 
general asset: credibility.  
The negative attitude towards journalists that developed inside the U.S military was 
never put forward in a single official military document, but Thomas Rid argues that military 
animosity towards the media in general became manifested in a routine knowledge asset. He 
explains that this type of knowledge asset is a direct result from the military’s experience with 
the media in Vietnam and that military animosity towards journalists had revealed itself in the 
military’s organizational culture and tradition.130 This “blame the media-syndrome” became a 
defining feature of the U.S. military public affairs policy for the next quarter century and a 
conventional wisdom amongst commanders and soldiers who operated out on the field.
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Chapter 2 
Restrictive Public Affairs: 
the Grenada Invasion and the Persian Gulf War 
 
 
2.0 The Grenada Invasion 
On October 25 1983, the U.S. invaded the Caribbean island of Grenada. The main goals of the 
invasion, also known as “Operation Urgent Fury” (OUF), were three-folded: remove the 
revolutionary Marxist regime “The People’s Revolutionary Army” (PRA) which had taken 
control of the island; rescue the democratic elected prime minister; and rescue approximately 
one hundred American medical students who were living on Grenada.1 
The animosity of the military towards the media revealed itself before and during the 
invasion. In her monograph The Troubled Path to the Pentagons Rules on Media Access to 
the Battlefield: Grenada to Today Pascale Combelles-Siegel claims that the relationship 
between the military and the press during UOF “exploded like a bomb.”2 OUF was the first 
military operation in American history to which the media had been denied full access. It took 
two and a half days before the media were allowed to access the island.3 Five military 
justifications for advocating a news blackout can be identified. These have been divided into 
two categories: an operational strategy-category and a culture-category.  
 
2.0.1  Military Operational Strategy 
According to Marcia Block and Geoff Mungham article “The military, the media and the 
invasion of Grenada”, the military claimed that the very nature of the mission had made it 
impossible to allow journalists to access the island.4 In his book Battle Lines: Report of the 
Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Military and the Media, Peter Braestrup, a former 
war correspondent for The New York Times and The Washington Post, concurs with Block 
and Mungham. He cites Admiral Wesley McDonald’s report on the invasion to the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. McDonald argued the fact that 
[the military had to] maintain the greatest element of surprise in executing the mission to ensure 
minimum danger to US hostages … and to the servicemen involved in the initial assault dictated that the 
press be restricted until the initial objectives had been secured.5  
 
Keeping as many people as possible in the dark before the invasion was launched was 
considered a necessary means. If any information about the planned invasion were leaked to 
the media, the mission would be jeopardized. If the media reported on the forthcoming 
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invasion, the PRA would be informed and would thus be able to rearm and prepare.6 The 
invasion was so secret that the commander-to-be, Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, was 
notified only two days before it was scheduled to commence. Metcalf’s Army Deputy and 
Advisor General Norman H. Schwarzkopf was informed even later, only nineteen hours 
before the launch.7 Michael Burch, a Pentagon’s spokesperson, was informed the night before 
while Larry Speaks, the official spokesperson at the White House, and David Gergen, the 
President Reagan’s Communications Director, were not informed at all.8  
It is possible to identify three additional underlying reasons for why American military 
participation in the invasion was kept a secret. First of all, Thomas Rid argues that if official 
spokespersons had been informed of the forthcoming invasion, they would have had to lie if 
asked any questions about it. If official spokespersons were caught lying, the government 
could be accused once again of attempting to cover up an American military intervention.9 
The second underlying reason was based on the so-called “Vietnam syndrome”, a resistance 
to using American military force abroad. President Reagan believed that any American 
intervention on Grenada would cause uproar among members of the Congress and the 
American people. Many were afraid of entering into another expensive war in which 
American lives could be lost.10 Third, Block and Mungham argue that President Reagan and 
his administration did not advocate free governmental information and therefore did not push 
for full media access. President Reagan’s animosity to informing the media of the invasion 
can not be considered to be a one-off occurrence in relations between the government and 
media during his presidency. Jeffery A. Smith argues that President Reagan relied on 
“President Lincoln’s unilateral actions as a precedent for virtually unrestricted presidential 
power over matters of war and foreign policy.”11 
 Further, Smith argues that Reagan often defended his prerogative actions by quoting 
an essay written by the conservative scholar Walter Berns. Berns believe that because the U.S. 
Constitution vests legislative, executive and judicial power to Congress, the president and the 
Supreme Court, the American president is an “independent” representative of the American 
people and could therefore not be considered as limited by the law. The president receives his 
powers from the people and can subsequently use his powers prerogatively because the U.S. 
Constitution states that law is not supreme.12 In his autobiography An American Life, 
President Reagan explains that when he and his advisors decided to act up the Organization of 
Eastern Caribbean States request for U.S. military support in Grenada “[w]e didn’t ask 
anybody, we just did it.”13 
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The second reason for why the U.S. military did not want the media present on 
Grenada was because the military could not guarantee that journalists would be safe from 
harm during the combat phase.14 On October 27, a press conference was held by Defense 
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger and General John W. Vessey, Jr., Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. Braestrup argues that the main purpose of the press conference was to explain 
why journalists had not been allowed to enter Grenada. He quotes Weinberger who defended 
the restrictions, 
[t]he reasons is of course the Commanders decision, and I certainly don’t ever, wouldn’t ever dream of 
overriding Commanders’ decisions in charge of an operations like this, their conclusion was that they were not 
able to guarantee any kind of safety of anyone including of course anybody participating and that you have to 
maintain some kind of awareness of the problems going into areas where we don’t know what kind of conditions 
totally will be encountered. Where the airport was obviously heavily overloaded with all kinds of activity and we 
just didn’t have the conditions under which we thought we would be able to detach enough people to protect all 
of the newsmen, cameramen, gripmen, all of that. As soon as the Commanders notify us that it is appropriate, 
and I hope it can be as soon as tomorrow, newsmen can go in.15 
 
Third, Block and Mungham argue that there was not enough time or knowledge to 
implement a media pool into the military’s public-affairs strategy.16 The U.S. was formally 
asked to participate in the invasion at 2.45 a.m. on October 22; on the evening of October 23 
President Reagan “took a ‘tentative decision’ to invade” the island.17 Only on October 26 did, 
Captain Owen Resweber, Chief Public Affairs Officer, received orders to develop a public-
affairs plan and establish an information office on Barbados, the neighboring island.18  
 
2.0.2  Military Culture: Routine Knowledge Asset 
The fourth military justification for choosing to deny the media access was based on the 
notion that the military did not believe that they were denying journalists a right because there 
were no written military rules, doctrines, or policies dealing with journalists’ access to the 
battlefield. Block and Mungham argue that many within the military believed that it was up to 
them to decide whether or not the media were to be granted access.19  
The fifth justification is connected to Rid’s assessment of a military intergrained 
distrust of the media. Block and Mungham, and Braestrup claim that the personal perception 
of military staff of media coverage influenced the Pentagon’s decision to implement a 
restrictive public affairs-strategy.  American commanders’ perception of the media bore most 
weight. In 1983, a majority of the highest ranking commanders still blamed the media the 
Vietnam War being lost.20 According to Braestrup, General John W. Vessey Jr. (U.S. Army) 
first expressed a desire for a restrictive public-affairs strategy. Neither Admiral Wesley L. 
McDonald (U.S. Navy), who drafted the operations plan, nor the Joint Chiefs argued against 
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Vessey’s whish.21 Vice Admiral Metcalf recalls how quickly he agreed with his fellow 
commanders, 
From the time I was notified that I was to lead the Grenada operation until the first troops landed only 
39 hours elapsed. In this brief period before combat, the only consideration that I gave to the media 
occurred about six hours into the 39.  A lieutenant commander, an Atlantic Command public affairs 
officer, came to me and said: ‘There will be no press. Do you have any problems with this?’ I said I did  
not.22 
 
Not only commanders and high-ranking officers regarded the media with animosity. Block 
and Mungham cite an editorial in the Air Force publication Current News. The editorial 
argued that “[the media] seeks constantly to ridicule and undermine the traditional ideas of 
our individual citizens’ devotion to duty, honor and country” and that the media’s leadership 
is “inexorably intolerant and therefore fascistic.”23  
In their book America’s Team, Frank Aukofer, a journalist, and William Lawrence, a 
retired U.S Navy Vice Admiral, concur with Rid’s assessment of a learned military distaste 
for the media. Aukofer and Lawrence elaborate on this theory, arguing that two other factors 
exist that influenced the restrictive public-affairs strategy. First, the military personnel’s 
dislike of the media was allowed to flourish because the military has a tradition of letting only 
Public Affairs Officers (PAO) deal with media arrangements.24 Subsequently, when the 
invasion was launched there was an entire generation of military commanders “who did not 
think ‘public affairs’.”25 Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Oehl, (U.S Marine Corps) and Greg 
McLaughlin, author of the book The War Correspondent, also contend that American 
commanders had a tradition of focusing solely on the operational aspect of a military mission. 
Public-affairs strategy was not considered an important part of a mission.26 Aukofer and 
Lawrence also argue that the need for complete operational secrecy helped enhance the 
principle of excluding PAOs at the planning stage.27 If commanders had no tradition of 
including PAOs in the planning phase of a publicly known operation they would certainly not 
inform them when planning a secret operation. 
 
2.1 Press Reaction to the News Blackout in Grenada 
After the invasion became known, two significant press complaints concerning the military’s 
restrictive public-affairs strategy were voiced. The first was based on tradition. The press 
asserted they had always been present during large military operations and should therefore be 
allowed access to Grenada.28 Howard Simons, the Managing Editor of The Washington Post 
argued thus: 
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The phrase in not in the First Amendment but it’s in our tradition, it’s in our bones, it’s in our marrow. 
And I think…that all you do when you create a blackout such as this, which I say is unprecedented in 
peacetime, is to create the idea there’s a cover-up, there’s something to hide. I think the press is 
perfectly willing to take the risk of war as we’ve done since the Civil War and World War I, II, Korea, 
Vietnam. We’re not asking for anything special in the way of protection; we can take care of ourselves.  
What we want to do is to see for ourselves and not rely on Radio Havana and some vague reports 
elsewhere29 
 
The second complaint culminated in the notion that when journalists were deprived of access 
to the battlefield, the American people were also deprived of their right to know what kinds of 
actions their government was engaging in and that the First Amendment had been violated.30 
Braestrup and Combelles-Siegel write that journalists were crying out for an explanation for 
“what they saw as the administration’s refusal to acknowledge the importance of the First 
Amendment”31 and that there was a great need for press access during “wartime” situations.32 
Simons has argued similarly: 
It seems to me that the founding fathers invented the First Amendment to protect us against secret 
government. It also seems to me that every time there’s been deception in this country we’ve paid a 
terrible price for it. Also, I don’t know in my 30 years as a journalist of a single military operation 
anywhere in the world that was jeopardized by a news report. I think what distinguishes this country 
from most other countries is the First Amendment, the people’s right to know. And I’m outraged that 
there’s almost a total news blackout, even to the fact that the Federal Communications Commission 
today threatened to remove the licenses of ham radio operators who carry news reports.33 
 
The Washington-based Reporters’ Committee for Freedom of the Press (RCFP) 
contemplated a lawsuit in response to the Pentagon’s restrictive public-affairs strategy.34 The 
RCFP consisted of ten press organizations, including the American Newspaper Publishers 
Association, National Association of Broadcasters, the Associated Press and United Press 
International.35 Braestrup claims that the RCFP decided not to proceed with the lawsuit even 
though the U.S. Supreme Court had in earlier cases ruled in favor of the press when the issue 
of the First Amendment was involved.36 He cites the case of Richmond Newspapers Inc v. 
Virginia37,  
The Court held that the First Amendment encompassed not only the right to speak but also the freedom 
to listen and to receive information and ideas. The Court also noted that the First Amendment 
guaranteed the right of assembly in public places such as courthouses. The Court emphasized that 
"certain unarticulated rights" were implicit in enumerated guarantees and were often "indispensable to 
the enjoyment of rights explicitly defined 38 
 
Richmond Newspapers Inc v. Virginia did not, however, set a precedent for free press access. 
In the court’s judgement, it was also stated that “[t]he right of access to places traditionally 
open to the public, as criminal trials have long been, may be seen as assured by the amalgam 
of the First Amendment guarantees of speech and press.”39 This meant literally that if past 
battlefields traditionally been open to the U.S. public, the media could not be denied access. 
But in Vietnam, for example, there were zones which journalists were not allowed to enter.40 
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Braestrup also argues that the Supreme Court has had a tradition of barring journalists from 
places to which the public has not generally had right of access.  Pell v. Procunier (1974) 
demonstrates this tendency41, 
There are few restrictions on actions which could not be clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of 
decreased data flow. For example, the prohibition of unauthorized entry into the White House 
diminishes the citizens opportunities to gather information he might find relevant to his opinion of the 
way the country is being run, but that does not make entry into the White House a First Amendment 
right. The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information42 
 
According to Block and Mungham, the press’ First Amendment-argument lost credibility 
when a large percentage of the American people justified the news blackout because the 
invasion had been a success and they saw no need to respond to the press’ criticisms.43 
Combelles-Siegel presents several opinion polls conducted by the Roper Organization during 
and after the invasion. Although eighty-three percent of the participants in the poll believed 
that in a democracy “one of the most important liberites is to be informed of events, especially 
when soldiers’ lives are at stake”, in November and December 1983 fifty-two percent of the 
American people had no difficulty accepting restricted media access in Grenada, while sixty-
two percent agreed with the justifications given for denying access and forty-seven percent 
saw no problem in excluding the media while OUF was still active.44 According to Terry 
Nardin and Kathleen D. Pritchard fifty percent of Americans believed that the invasion had 
been undertaken to protect American lives, but seventy percent approved of the intervention.45 
The U.S. Senate had by three votes to one decided that the restrictions had to be removed as 
long as it did not place the military in any immediate danger, but the American public’s 
approval of a restrictive public-affairs strategy caused the issue to die in the Senate.46  
 
2.2 Media Access in Grenada: Pools 
The decision to keep Grenada sealed off from journalists only increased the news value. 
Hundreds of journalists, hoping to cover the invasion, travelled to Barbados. When they were 
denied access to Grenada, journalists sought to enter the island on their own. Defying the 
military’s demand for a media-free zone led to confrontation, exemplified here by an incident 
later known as the “Ed Cody Affair”. With four other journalists, Edward Cody from The 
Washington Post hired a fishing boat on Barbados and managed to reach St. George, 
Grenada’s capital. On reaching shore they were stopped by the PRA. Cody and the three other 
journalists voluntarily left the island, hoping that they could instead use the American military 
vessel Guam as a base for writing their news articles.47 In his autobiography, General 
Schwarzkopf recalls the incident while revealing his distaste for journalists, 
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[w]hen I saw two civilians sprint across the flight deck and leap into a helicopter as we prepared to 
launch the raids on Grand Anse, I ran down to the deck and told them ‘Get off. You`re interfering with 
a military operation.’ Metcalf ordered the captain of the Guam to see that they stayed off the flight deck. 
The reporters spent the rest of the afternoon sitting in the officers wardroom drinking coffee and eating 
sweet rolls. The incident showed up in The Washington Post as a story about journalists being ‘held 
incommunicado’ on the Guam48 
 
To prevent similar episodes, Vice Admiral Metcalf banned all transportation to Grenada and 
quarantined the whole island: “I established an exclusion zone around Grenada, enforced by 
destroyers and aircrafts.”49 The day after the zone had been established a couple journalists 
entered the zone in a chartered boat. Vice Admiral Metcalf ordered a fighter plane to fire 
warning shots. When the boat did not turn around, Metcalf ordered the pilot to fire a second 
warning shot and if the boat still did not change its course the pilot was authorized to sink it. 
The boat turned around after the second warning shot.50  
 The military did not allow any kind of media access to the island before the invasion’s 
goals had been reached. On October 26, these goals were indeed reached and a Joint 
Information Bureau (JIB) was established at Grantley Adams Airport on Barbados.51 
Braestrup explains that even though the military did eventually ease media restrictions, this 
not imply that they were willing to cooperate with the media. The way in which the public-
affairs system was designed serves as an example. Even though the military had established a 
JIB, it had no direct link to Vice Admiral Metcalf. To contact him “JIB officers had to do it 
through the American embassy, who rang CINCLANT (Commander In Chief, Atlantic) in 
Virginia, who in turn contacted Metcalf and back again.”52 But when the media complained 
about access there was no difficulty getting Vice Admiral Metcalf to talk: “[t]he buck stops 
with me … you’ve got to argue with me, not the Department of Defense, not anybody else but 
me.” He also accepted full responsibility for keeping the media out despite many in 
Washington advocating full media access.53 
Because PAOs had not been incorporated into the wider operational plan, the JIB was 
not able to give every journalist the opportunity to enter a media pool daily. In addition, 
transportation vehicles and other types of support equipment were lacking.54  On October 27, 
two and a half days after the invasion had been launched, the first press pool consisting of 
fifteen journalists was allowed to go on a guided tour of Grenada. At 6 am on October 28, the 
JIB registered approximately fifty journalists wanting to be given a slot in that day’s pool. By 
7.30 am 200 journalists were waiting in line. Only twenty-four journalists were chosen.55 This 
pool was escorted to the same location as the first pool had visited on October 27. The pool on 
October 29 consisted of fifty journalists56 while 182 were allowed access on October 30.57 No 
answers were given as to why a journalist from newspaper A had been chosen instead of 
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journalists from, say, magazine B or C.58 This greatly frustrated journalists. John Chancellor 
from the NBC compared Grenada with Vietnam in saying: “well, there is one thing you can 
say about the invasion of Grenada; it isn’t a living room war.”59   
The journalists in the pools were also kept under tight supervision. Only when 
escorted were they allowed to visit pre-selected locations. The pools also had little access to 
newsworthy information. For example, journalists could not interview soldiers because by the 
time the pools had eventually been granted access, most of the soldiers had already left and 
those who were still on the island were engaged in combat on the other side of the island to 
which the pools had no access.60 The third pool was allowed to see enemy prisoners but 
talking to them was strictly forbidden.61  
When returning from the pools, the journalists were, according to set military ground 
rules, obliged to brief other journalists about what they had seen and been told. McLaughlin 
writes that this reliance on other journalists for information challenged the competitive aspect 
of journalism as journalists had to rely on people who in fact were their rivals in the United 
States. Finally, on October 30 all media restrictions were removed.62 At this point most 
journalists chose to leave the island because there were no newsworthy stories to report on as 
the fighting had ceased.63 
 
2.3 Critique of Media Coverage in Grenada 
Despite being denied access to Grenada, the media were criticized for the way in which they 
chose to cover the invasion. James Shepley from The Washington Post argues that the 
military’s intransigence was usually the main issue of the Grenada invasion, not the actual 
invasion itself. The significance of events was usually lost due to the conflict between the 
media and the military.64 Braestrup describes the media as lazy and lacking imagination, 
arguing that journalists should have unveiled the various contradictions which existed 
between different official sources. Instead of expending their energy being upset because they 
had been excluded, they should have focused on trying to cover the whole story.65 For 
example, in the aftermath of the invasion it became clear that official statements had not 
reported embarrassing military mishaps. An incident involving an American bomb killing 
eleven patients at a psychiatric hospital in Port Salines was verified by the military after the 
invasion was over.66 Block and Mungham point to several incidents involving journalists 
publishing governmental information that proved to be false. For example, the quality and 
numbers of arms caches on the island and the level of danger posed to the American student 
were greatly inflated. Contrary to what U.S. officials claimed, Major Leon Cornwall, one of 
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Grenada’s military leaders, stated on October 23 that all U.S. citizens who wished to leave the 
island for whatever reason could do so the following day.67 
In his book, On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency, Martin 
Hertsgaard criticizes the American press which had visited Grenada for relying on and 
accepting official military information. He argues that the U.S. press often demonstrated the 
tendency to accept the basic truth of what its government told it. Hertsgaard firmly believes 
that if there was any kind of censorship present during the Grenada invasion, it was not 
government censorship of the press but self-censorship by the press.68 In the aftermath of the 
invasion, the U.S. press acknowledged that their reporting had not been as good as it should 
have been. Block and Mungham claim that The New York Times later noted that “some 
misinformation was the result of combat confusion and some due to selective and incomplete 
reporting.”69  
 Block and Mungham defend journalists arguing that the media alone cannot be blamed 
for producing inaccurate news reports. When good access to official information is denied, 
they argue, the media will resort to other sources. When the media are prevented from 
gathering correct information, one cannot expect them to produce correct and objective news 
reports.70 
 
2.4 The Sidle Commission 
Even though the invasion was deemed a military success, military personnel felt that they had 
been exposed to too much negative and unfavorable reporting. Vice Admiral Metcalf began to 
change his view on the media. According to Combelles-Siegel, Metcalf believed that the 
decision to keep journalists out had deprived the American public of a great story about its 
military.71 Together with Admiral Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations, he also later revealed 
that he had been impressed by the press’s responsible behaviour in its decisions not to print 
stories that could have damaged the American people’s attitude towards the invasion.72 
On November 4, 1983, the Joint Chiefs of Staff took a closer look at how the media 
had been treated during the invasion, and decided to investigate the role of the media in U.S. 
military operations.73 The Sidle Military-Media Relations Panel, headed by U.S. Army Major 
General Winant Sidle, was given the task of identifying possible ways of how military 
implementing the media into military operations safely and securely.74 The panel consisted of 
seven military officers and seven former reporters from news organizations,75 nineteen 
representatives from major newspapers, magazines, wire services and television networks, 
  33 
and three representatives from the military public affairs and information officers were also 
interviewed to gain a holistic view of the issue.76  
The Sidle Panel report was handed to the Pentagon on August 23 1984. In sum, the 
Sidle report agreed with the media; the military needed to change its attitudes and policies 
regarding media access during military operations. To provide the American people with 
information about U.S. military operations, the Sidle Panel recommended that information 
had to be provided by both the news media and the military. To achieve this, eight 
recommendations were presented. First, when a military operation was being planed, 
operational planning and public affairs should be given equal attention. Second, if there were 
a need for a media pool during a military operation, it should be as large and representative as 
possible. Third, whether to use a pre-established accreditation list should be studied in 
concurrence with each military operation. Fourth, if the media were to access a military 
operation, they would have to comply voluntarily with the security guidelines and rules that 
were issued by the military, but such rules should be kept to a minimum. Fifth, if needed, the 
media were to receive assistance from qualified military personnel. Sixth, the military should 
pay attention to the needs of the media, but such needs could not interfere with combat and 
combat-support operations. Seventh, the military should provide transportation for the media. 
The eight recommendation dealt with how the relationship between the media and military 
could be improved and four possible solutions were presented: the military and press should 
meet regularly, more media courses should be taught at military academies, news 
organizations would gain an improved understanding of the military if military officers visited 
them, and the Secretary of Defense should meet the broadcasting media to discuss challenges 
associated with electronic media.77 
Weinberg’s official response to the report was to produce a press release which he 
attached to the report. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) Michael Burch was 
assigned with implementing the recommendations for “maximum news coverage of military 
operations balanced with the need for military security.”78 The final product was presented to 
the public on October 3 1984 and a press pool, consisting of eleven people, was formed. 
Uproar ensued when it was discovered that no representative from any daily newspaper had 
been included in the pool. A revised pool plan was presented the next day; it included one 
reporter from a daily newspaper.79  
Block and Mungham argue that the Sidle recommendations would not in fact improve 
the negative relationship between the media and the military. First, since media 
representatives had contributed only as consultants, they had not been able to influence the 
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proposed recommendations. Ultimately, it would be entirely up to military personnel to 
implement the new policy. This would cause problems since many U.S. Army commanders 
despised the media.80 Second, the Pentagon had placed too much emphasis on the needs of the 
military compared to the needs of the media. This is, however, understandable because it is in 
the nature of the military to prioritize its own security. In recommending that the media had to 
abide by all military rules and guidelines, the Sidle Panel literally meant that, in the future, the 
military could censor information, restrict access to correspondents, and control transportation 
offered to the press and communications.81 Block and Mungham’s criticisms were proved 
legitimate during the Persian Gulf War. 
 
2.5 Military Public-Affairs Strategy in the Persian Gulf War 
The Persian Gulf War (1990-1991), also known as “Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm” 
was a UN-authorized military operation led by the U.S and compromising a coalition force 
consisting of thirty-four nations against Saddam Hussein’s regime. President George H. W. 
Bush went to war seeking to reach four objectives: force Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait 
which had been occupied since August 1990, restore the Kuwaiti government, secure the 
Gulf, and provide for the safety of Americans. H.W. Brands argues that President Bush had a 
fifth objective as well, making a new world order, and he sought to use the Persian Gulf War 
as a means to build support for his vision,”By linking the crisis in the Gulf to his vision of a 
new world order, Bush hoped to heighten its significance and thereby mobilize political 
support behind his anti-Saddam policy.”82 Bush’s new world order-vision sought to eradicate 
terrorism and secure world peace and justice. He eloquently claimed on September 11 1990 
before a joint session of Congress that he whished for “[a]n era in which the nations of the 
world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony.”83 Brands further 
explain that many Democrats in Congress as well as civilian Americans were not convinced 
that the road to a new and better world went through the Persian Gulf.84 To prove them wrong 
it became increasingly more important to win the war. Bush wrote in his diary that as long as 
the American people supported the war in Kuwait, his chances of creating a new world order 
increased, “But once there starts to be erosion, they’re going to do what Lyndon Johnson said: 
they painted their asses white and ran with the antelopes.”85  
 
2.5.1 Media Pools 
The Sidle Panel had proposed five recommendations that would enhance media coverage on 
the battlefield. Only one of the five recommendations was implemented into the war’s public 
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affairs strategy, the establishment of media pools. In his book, War and the Media, Philip M. 
Taylor explains that there were three different strands to the military’s public affairs-system in 
the Persian Gulf War: the JIB at the Dhahran International Hotel at the King Abdul Aziz air 
force base; the daily military press briefings in Riyadh; and the National Media Pool program 
(NMP) which was established after recommendations from the Sidle Panel.86 This chapter 
will focus on the NMP, especially the press pool. 
            Before the war started, every large news organization in Washington was sent 
“Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm Ground Rules and Guidelines for News Media”87 (See 
Appendix A). To be able to be enrolled into the pools and visit U.S. military combat units out 
on the battlefield, journalists had to agree to be placed under heavy restrictions and adhere to 
military rules. No sensitive military information could be published, access to combat units 
would consist of preselected pools of journalists, and every report written within a pool had to 
be subjected to a security review by an accompanying PAO before it was sent to the U.S.88   
Compared to earlier U.S. wars, the number of journalists covering the Persian Gulf 
War was exceptionally high. Between 1000-1600 journalists, both American and 
international, registered with the JIB.89 The total number of journalists covering the war, 
however, is hard to determine because many registered several times with different JIBs to 
gain more access.90 126 journalists were assigned to the pools during the five-week air war 
and approximately 250 journalists were pooled during the three days of ground combat. 91 In 
total, there were twenty-five pools out in the battlefield at any given time.92 
There were four different kinds of pools, one for each type of media, and they 
consisted of seven to eighteen members.93 The first pool was reserved for photographers, the 
second for television journalists. The third and smallest pool was a radio pool, while the 
largest pool was a print pool. The print pool was established by members of the ten largest 
U.S. news organizations, journalists from three wire services (Associated Press, Reuters, and 
United Press International), four news magazines (Time, Newsweek and U.S. News, and 
World Report) and four major newspapers (the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street 
Journal, and Los Angeles Times).94 Large pools would join field Army and Marine units for 
periods of up to two weeks, while the “rapid reaction” pools would travel around areas to 
cover the Air Force, Navy, and breaking news.95 
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2.6 Press Problems with the Pools: Size 
The Sidle Panel recommended that the media pools be as large and representative as possible. 
The sizes of the press pools in the Persian Gulf War were not large enough when considering 
the number of journalists seeking to cover the war. Fialka argues that there were thirty-nine 
print journalists who daily went out in the field and at least twice that number actually wanted 
to go out.96 Michael Gordon, a New York Times journalist, characterizes the NMP as 
dysfunctional.97 
The scarcity of slots was problematic for both large and small newspapers. The latter 
had spent much money to send journalists to Dhahran, but most of them were left waiting for 
their turn in the pools. Large newspapers, including The New York Times and the Washington 
Post, were frustrated because they had sent whole platoons of reporters but often only one 
journalist from each newspaper was allowed access to a pool.98 In Fialka’s book frustration 
cause by a poor combat-pool slot is exemplified by the bureau chief of The New York Times at 
the time, R.W. Apple. Apple ended up threatening Colonel Mulvey, Director of the JIB at the 
time, to arrange a better pool slot for his journalists.99 He was particularly infuriated by the 
fact that a reporter from Mirabella, a woman’s magazine, had been given a slot in the pool 
and no journalists from national newspapers had been given one that day.100 Mirabella’s 
journalist apparently spent used most of her time in the pool writing about the sex lives of 
female soldiers and the drugs used by medical units.101  
Woodward claims that the problem of limited access to specific units in the field was 
compounded by the fact that journalists themselves often became responsible for selecting 
pool journalists.102 According to military ground rules, journalists was suppose to rotate103, 
but the four different media pools developed different mechanisms for selecting pool 
members. Fialka recognizes a changing mechanism within the press pool which transformed 
from being a pure democracy to a plutocracy to a dictatorship, depending on who was running 
it.104 The system of rotation was made obsolete by the “Sacred Sixteen” (consisting of 
reporters from The New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal and other major 
U.S. newspapers and large television stations) who kept the allocated press slots to 
themselves.105 Molly Moore from the Washington Post explains in her book A Woman at War 
that small newspapers operated on small budgets and could thus not afford to send an army of 
journalists to cover the first phase of the build-up while not knowing whether a war would 
erupt or not. As a result, many small newspapers arrived just in time for the war and 
consequently felt powerless to push out big newspapers that had arrived early in the crisis. 
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The scarcity of pool slots caused fierce competition between newspapers, and journalists were 
constantly watching their backs for ambushes by disgruntled colleagues who were trying to 
steal their slots.106 
 In The Army and the Media Major Barry E. Venable (U.S. Army) argues that the 
exclusion of the press from anything but the pools or the briefing area at the JIB led to a form 
of “unofficial” censorship. English continues by claiming that the lack of access to both 
people and places ensured that correspondents could not gather any independent news.107  
As a result of military control, a great majority of the journalists wrote their reports 
based on information presented at official briefings at the JIB, from the Pentagon 
broadcasting studio, or simply tried to pump journalists returning from the pools for 
information.108 Fialka mentions that even though the guidelines clearly stated that all 
information acquired while out with a pool was to be shared with other journalists, a policy of 
“beggar thy neighbor” was often much closer to the reality.109 This necessity to share 
information goes against the very nature of the media-business. First of all, journalists from 
serious newspapers had to rely on information gathered by journalists who often had no 
knowledge about military matters or who worked for “small town papers and obscure 
magazines”, such as Mirabella.110 Rick Atkinson from the Washington Post claimed that 
information which was gathered out in the pools was not good enough: “For my purposes, 
about one in ten has anything in it that’s useful…It’s really pretty superficial stuff.”111 
Second, as in Grenada, having to rely on other journalists for information challenged the 
competitive aspect of journalism. Journalists had to rely on people who were their rivals back 
home in the United States.112 
The scarcity of pool slots also kept alive the system of journalistic dependency on the 
military for information. Because of few slots, the JIB became the main source of information 
for journalists.113 Information retrieved from briefings was revealed as inaccurate after the 
war. For example, the military had grossly exaggerated to journalists its claims of having an 
eighty percent rate on bombing missions against Scud missiles. After the war it was revealed 
that, for every bomb that had actually hit its target, there had been between seventy to 
seventy-five misses.114 
 
2.7      Press Problems with the Pools: Censorship 
The Pentagon’s “Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm Ground Rules and Guidelines for 
News Media” laid down ground rules for military censorship. Any news story written in a 
pool had to be subjected to review by the Public Affairs Office before release. The Pentagon 
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explained that news reports would be reviewed only because of security reasons and this was 
no attempt to prevent and censor criticism of the military. The reason for conducting a review 
was to avoid sensitive information about “military plans, capabilities, operations, or 
vulnerabilities” being published and picked up by Iraqi intelligence.115 There are, however, 
incidents that clearly contradict this statement. For example, the military’s sensitivity to 
negative media coverage was revealed when a story about a desert disco was published: the 
party had been organized by some of the troops and featured “DJ Scud D” and a dance called 
“The Gas Mask”. General Schwarzkopf was furious and the PAO who had cleared the story 
was heavily reprimanded.116 
Every pool was accompanied by a PAO. PAOs were not authorized to alter a story 
they thought unfit, but if they read anything they believed violated the ground rules, they 
would send it to the closest JIB. A JIB officer would discuss the story with the reporter 
concerned. If they did not reach an agreement, the story was sent to the Pentagon for final 
resolution with editors in Washington. Only five reports, 0.03 percent of all stories published 
before and during the war, had to be resolved in Washington. Of those five, only one was 
changed.117 
There seems to be a split opinion to whether the military acted unfavourably when 
imposing the review system. Many journalists in the press pool viewed the review system as a 
filter where the military could direct the reports into favourable positions.118 Malcolm 
Browne, covering the war for The New York Times, argues that the restrictions and rules made 
each pool member an unpaid employee of the Pentagon, preparing the news in the fashion that 
the Pentagon wanted.119 Edward Cody of the Washington Post annoyingly announces that 
“you turn over control of your copy to them and they don’t care whether it gets there or not. 
It’s not part of their culture. We, the newspapers, did it by buying into this stupid system of 
take-me-along.”120  
Counterclaims to this negative assessment of the review system exist. The degree to 
which journalists were censored and the rate at which reports were transmitted back to the 
news bureaux seem to depend on what kind of unit the journalists visited, their escort officers, 
and the type of Public Affairs Officer who was working at the JIB the day the report came in: 
“you could get an angel or a devil.”121 To journalists covering the war, it seemed at times as if 
the U.S. Marines and the U.S. Army were from two totally different countries.122 The Army 
represented the general attitude that prevailed at the onset of the Gulf War towards the media; 
the Army was not very cooperative and believed that journalists should not have access to the 
battlefield. Thomas Rid explains that most senior commanders understood that the American 
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people needed to know what was going on in the war, but the commanders did not want to 
deal with journalists themselves.123 What caused serious problems for the journalists was that 
it was the senior commanders and not the JIB in Dhahran who controlled the public-affairs 
assets in the units. For example, this negative attitude made it difficult for journalists to catch 
a ride on Army helicopters or vehicles, or to gain access to the troops out in the field.124  
The term “self-imposed news blackout” is highly characteristic of the Army.  Malcolm 
W. Browne reported on March 3 1991 that Major General Patrick H. Brady, Deputy 
Commanding General of the Sixth Army, had said that 
Some look on news as just another four-letter word, but I believe it is more useful to look at it as a C-
letter word; chaos, confusion, contradiction, crime, corruption, color, catastrophe. It does not hurt if you 
add some S`s: --sex, sensationalism, state secrets.125 
 
No significant attempts were made to help journalists send their stories back to 
Dhahran in time. Using a fax or e-mail was out of the question. Subsequently, the Army’s 
system of helping journalists send news stories back to Dhahran was nicknamed the “pony 
express”.126 Fialka tells of a specific incident whereby it became evident that it was the 
commanders who had the final say in how to welcome and help journalists out in the field. He 
and a colleague, Philip Shenon of The New York Times, were the only journalists who were 
close to a ground battle in which 100,000 soldiers were involved. After watching the battle 
and writing his report, Fialka needed to get to a phone. The nearest payphone was a two-hour 
drive away. Shenon, however, was not let out of the encampment area in the Saudi Desert 
because the Colonel commanding the base had decided that there was a terrorist threat 
imminent. Instead of making arrangements for the two journalists to get to the nearest phone, 
the Assistant Public Affairs Officer in the corps, Major David Cook, was more interested in 
deciding which soldiers were to empty a latrine used by his public-affairs staff. After locating 
a small military airport twenty minutes away, the journalists were finally provided with a 
driver, Lieutenant Blumenfeld. He told them that journalists were just a bunch of yuppies who 
believed that they owned the world. After reaching the military airport and the telephone, Lt. 
Blumenfeld ushered other people ahead in the line while shouting that all military personnel 
were to use the phone first since Shenon and his colleague were only journalists. Lt. 
Blumenfeld then decided that Shenon had been so rude and uncooperative that the journalists 
should be taken directly back to base. Shenon later managed to get his story through to 
Dhahran and his report was the only one describing what would later be called a historic 
Army battle.127  
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The U.S. Marines’ attitude towards journalists was the complete opposite of the U.S. 
Army’s. They welcomed journalists with open arms and the media was highly prioritized. A 
Marine officer explains their view of the media: “[w]e didn’t view the news media as a group 
of people we were supposed to schmooze. We regarded them as an environmental feature of 
the battlefield, kind of like the rain. If it rains on you, you operate wet.”128 Molly Moore, for 
example, had no difficulty getting her stories back to her office in Washington. She would 
type her story on her laptop and then take the floppy disk to the camp communications tent 
where a sergeant would send it by e-mail to a base in Jubail. In Jubail it would be faxed to 
Dhahran and copies would be passed out to waiting reporters: “The process could take 
anywhere from thirty minutes to eight hours, but it beat the courier system which with coffee 
breaks, flat tires, wrong turns, and lunch stops could take up to a full day to deliver a story to 
the pressroom in Dhahran.”129 
Rid argues that to understand the difference in the Army’s and the Marines’ attitudes 
towards journalists one must look back on history. Compared to the Army, the Marines have 
always been small in number and often lacked financial resources. In theory, what the 
Marines did could easily be done by the other three branches of the services. To survive, it 
was therefore important to ensure the American people’s support and gratitude. To do so, the 
Marines turned to the media.130 By using the media to show people the importance of the 
Marines, more people would rally to support their survival as a service. It was therefore 
important to keep an open mind towards the media on the battlefield. Before the Persian Gulf 
War was launched, the Pentagon decided that the Army and the Marines would each receive 
eighteen reporters in different pools. Despite the fact that there were 80,000 Marines 
compared to 295,000 Army soldiers in Kuwait, the Marines had managed to press the 
Pentagon to allow fifty-three reporters to accompany them out on the field when the war 
started.131 Because of the differences between the Army and the Marines, the quality of the 
news reports was very uneven. In Marine battles, the news report described the units involved, 
while in Army battles, units were referred to as being, for example, “VII Corps”.132  
 
2.8 Military Justifications for Implementing a Restrictive Public-Affairs Strategy 
It is possible to identify three reasons why the media did not receive full access. The first two 
reasons are connected to the issue of routine knowledge assets. First, both the military and the 
media had learned from previous encounters with each other. In both Vietnam and Grenada, 
the media had realized that a dependency on military information did not favor its role of 
being a check on the government. As a result, the media, both before and during the Persian 
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Gulf War, contemplated accessing the Kuwaiti and Iraqi deserts due to an ingrained distrust of 
the military and a fear of political and military cover-ups in the war. The military, for its part, 
advocated a restrictive public-affairs strategy. Many within the military still believed that 
negative media coverage had forced the U.S. to withdraw from Vietnam. In “The Changing 
Face of Battlefield Reporting” Richard H. Seinnreich writes that “[i]t seemed that the military 
public affairs operation went to war in the Persian Gulf not just against Saddam Hussein but 
also against the Saigon press corps of 1972.”133 To Seinnreich it seemed as if there were two 
adversaries that caught the military’s attention, a foreign and a national one. 
 Second, the media were not given full access because of poor military public-affairs 
planning. Poor planning can be linked to Rid’s military routine knowledge assets. In his 
strategy research project, Seeing Through the Conflict: Military-Media Relations, Lieutenant 
Colonel John B. Snyder (U.S. Army), cites Pascale Combelles-Siegel. Combelles-Siegel 
quotes Navy Captain Mike Sherman, the JIB Director in Daharan: “We were the bastard 
children of the operation.”134 According to Sherman, he did not have enough resources to run 
the JIB properly. John Fialka, a Wall Street Journal reporter, also argues that the ingrained 
hostility towards the media among military personnel caused the Pentagon to fail to arrange 
for adequate resources to accommodate all the journalists who wanted to cover the war.135 
Third, Thomas Rid, Lieutenant Colonel Marc D. Feldman (U.S. Air Force), and 
Johanna Neuman argue that the war environment in the Persian Gulf War greatly influenced 
the military’s continuing advocacy of a restricted public-affairs strategy.136 The war 
environment in the Persian Gulf War cannot be compared to earlier ones. Between 1983 and 
1990 there had been great technological advances: for example, satellite television and 
telephones had become everyday equipment for many of the journalists covering the war.  
Technological advances caused the military two main problems. First, when 
journalists were out in the field they could report on anything they saw and heard. In a matter 
of seconds, news reports could be spread around the world. General Norman Schwarzkopf, 
Commander of the Coalition Forces in the Persian Gulf War, intended to control the media to 
prevent politicians, allies and the American public starting to speculate about and second-
guess the war’s progress after reading and watching news reports.137 The prevailing attitude, 
stretching from General Schwarzkopf at the top of the command chain down to field 
commanders, was that a controlled media was an element desired in the war.138 General 
Andrew Davis, former Chief of Public Affairs of the Marines, concedes that “the way the 
press was controlled was access to the battlefield controlled.”139 Rid argues that because 
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operational security was at risk, it became extremely important to provide information in a 
controlled environment.140 As General Schwarzkopf told his closest commanders:  
You are going to be bombarded with questions by the press. I don’t want you to discuss military 
operations. Period. I do not want you to discuss your capabilities. Period. And you should teach every 
one of your officers the same thing. I don’t care what Pfc. Snuffy says, but I do care when some officer 
gets so enamored of the press that he has to shoot off his mouth. I’m telling you I’m going to deal 
absolutely brutally, brutally, with anyone I feel compromises classified information.141 
 
Schwarzkopf understood that he was being harsh, but he was also convinced that American 
newspapers and television reports had become Iraq’s best source of military intelligence.142  
By virtue of the media reporting independently from the battlefield, Saddam Hussein would 
be able to keep abreast of U.S. military progress and setbacks on the battlefield, and young 
and inexperienced journalists might reveal the positions of U.S. units either orally in reports 
from the field, or by their satellite phones transmitting electronic signals picked up by Iraqi 
satellites.143 If information about an unsuccessful U.S. air campaign were published or 
broadcast, Hussein would know that the U.S. war strategy was failing and his chances for 
winning the war increased. Aware of the Vietnam syndrome, Hussein had set up his own JIB 
at the al-Rashid Hotel in Baghdad. His intention was to have his public-affairs officers infuse 
the press with propaganda by targeting journalists who had earlier complained about the 
news-blackout policy in Grenada.144 
Major Edward L. English explains that due to new technology, the media in the 
Persian Gulf War could no longer be considered only an enemy. The media, compared to 
earlier, had become part of the battlefield.145 To prevent Iraqi propaganda from being 
disseminated in the U.S. media, it became important to portray a positive image of the war 
contrary to the one Hussein sought to portray. Projecting the image of successful U.S. military 
campaigns out on the field became an essential part of the war strategy: media pools were 
considered a prime actor in representing this image. 
 
2.9 Evaluation of Restrictive Public-Affairs Strategy in the Persian Gulf War 
In the aftermath of the war Pete Williams, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 
told The New York Times that the media had provided the American people with the best 
coverage that they ever had, and that Hussein’s public-affairs campaign did not have a 
negative effect due to the pools’ access to the battlefield and information.146 The American 
people agreed. English argues that the “American public viewed the military’s restraint of the 
press with favor and viewed the American press’ coverage of the war favourably as well.”147 
Richard Zoglin cites two surveys, a Times Mirror poll and a Time/CNN poll, both conducted 
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in January 1991. In the Times Mirror poll, almost eighty percent of the participants believed 
that media coverage of the Persian Gulf War had been good or excellent. In the Time/CNN 
poll seventy-nine percent argued that they received enough information about the war while 
eighty-eight percent answered that under the war’s circumstances they supported some 
censorship of the press. The Time/CNN findings correlate with the findings of a Pew Reseach 
Center survey where shortely after the war fifty-eight percent of the participants favored 
government censorship of news that might threaten national security and fifty-seven believed 
that the military should exercise more control over how news bureaus reported on war.148  
Zoglin believes that many Americans supported military restrictions because 
journalists has used much time arguing, protesting and complaining about the restrictions 
imposed upon them, “Whatever the validity of those complaints, the arguments over the rules 
of coverage may portray the press as a band of arrogant, self-involved whiners.”149 Zoglin 
presents the idea that when the U.S. military engages in a war that goes according to plan, a 
“rally-around-the-president” effect kicks in. The patriotic feeling that is created makes 
peoples ask themselves: “What are they first-journalists or Americans?”150 Zoglin’s idea of an 
increased feeling of patriotism correlates with a CBS poll cited in “News Viewing, 
Authoritarianism, and Attitudes Toward the Gulf War”. The poll reveals that eighty-three 
percent of the participants were “proud about what the United States is doing in the Persian 
Gulf.”151   
Although large sections of the American people had been in favor of the war, Colonel 
Barry E. Willey (U.S. Army) argues that a restrictive public-affairs strategy resulted in the 
U.S. public not having the opportunity to see what a remarkable job the military had executed 
during the war. The military had thrown away a perfect opportunity to increase American 
civilians’ sentiments about their military. When the Army won the largest tank battle in U.S. 
military history, there was only one report describing it. Only the Marines had welcomed the 
journalists. As a result their units were highlighted, thereby improving the unit’s morale and, 
more importantly, journalists were left with a positive understanding of the Marines.152  
Peter Braestrup argues that “[t]he widening chasm between the American journalists 
and the military that was created during the Vietnam War remained largely unabridged”153 
and news editors condemned the military’s public-affairs system, systematically calling the 
Persian Gulf War “the most under-covered major conflict in modern American history.”154 
Executives from major press organizations, including The New York Times, Washington Post, 
Time, Newsweek, Los Angeles Times, The Wall Street Journal and Chicago Tribune155, 
refused to continue to accept the NMP’s ground rules and demanded new guidelines for future 
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military operations. The news group believed that the guidelines did not offer any kind of 
coverage that citizens of a democracy are entitled to have.156 After negotiating with the 
Pentagon for eight months, a new agreement concerning media coverage was announced. On 
May 21 1992, the Pentagon implemented the new DoD Principles for News Media Coverage 
of DoD Operations.157 The main points of the Statement of Principles (see Appendix B) were 
that in future U.S. military operations, journalists would be placed in pools only when 
absolutely necessary. Open and independent reporting was to be the primary means of 
coverage but journalists had to abide by a clear set of military security ground rules in order to 
protect U.S. forces and operations and. Commanders were also encouraged to personally 
involve in the planning for media coverage. 
Concepts and procedures highlighted in the DoD Principles can be found in earlier 
DoD documents, but both Combelles-Siegel and Venable argue that the principles represented 
a whole new era in relations between the media and military because the document clearly 
states that pools shall no longer be the principal means of gathering information on the 
battlefield and that security reviews will be replaced with the process of security at the source, 
that military personnel is obligated to not reveal classified information when interviewed.158 
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Chapter 3 
Experimental Public-Affairs: 
 the Bosnia Intervention and the Afghanistan War 
 
 
3.0 Military Public-Affairs Strategy in the Bosnia Intervention 
On August 30 1995 NATO launched the humanitarian military campaign Operation 
Deliberate Force (ODF) to end the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to Ted 
Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, 
President Bill Clinton defended his decision to use American military force in Bosnia by 
arguing that a peaceful and stabile Europe was of fundamental interest to the U.S. Afraid that 
the Bosnian conflict would spread to other parts in Europe, the U.S. could not afford close its 
eyes and risk being dragged into the war at a later and much more critical stage of the war.1 
James Steinberg, director of policy planning at the State Department argued that "Without 
U.S. leadership in Bosnia, we would face the imminent danger of a widening war that could 
embroil our allies, undermine NATO's credibility, destabilize nearby democracies, and drive a 
wedge between the United States and Russia."2  
Journalists have been allowed to accompany military units in the past, but ODF was 
the first time ever in American history were the Pentagon and the U.S. Army named the 
procedure “embedding”.3 A total of thirty-three journalists embedded with fifteen different 
U.S. Army units. Twenty-four journalists were American, nine were British, French or 
German.4 In her strategy research project, The CNN Effect: Strategic Enabler or Operational 
Risk?, Margaret H. Belknap (U.S. Army) writes that the decision to embed journalists was a 
“’bold and innovative’ move by the Army in military-media relations.”5 As illustrated in 
previous chapters, the Army has not been known for its open or friendly public-affairs 
strategy; but during ODF, the Army struck a deal with the media. Army officials argued that 
if the media wanted access to units, they would have to spend at least two weeks with them.6  
The Army decided to embed the media because it believed that this would ultimately 
benefit the Army’s needs. First, the Army wanted to separate the military operational war 
effort from the political aspect of the mission. Major General William Nash, Commander of 
the Army’s First Armored Division, explains that his desire to separate the military effort 
from political decision-making resulted from personal experiences gained in Vietnam. He 
believes that the U.S. military was “caught in a posture of justifying the nation’s involvement 
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in Vietnam.”7 In Bosnia he wanted to show the American people that the Army was simply 
following orders assigned to it by higher authorities.      
Second, high-ranking Army commanders believed that if journalists spent 
considerable time with military units, they would learn what being a soldier meant and what 
kind of life soldiers live. For example, media embeds had to sleep in the same unheated tents 
and eat the same food as soldiers. The Army hoped that when media embeds experienced the 
everyday life of a soldier, they would write articles and produce television documentaries that 
would present the Army positively.8 Embedding journalists would also lead to Army 
accomplishments in Bosnia being noticed, unlike the tank battle in the Persian Gulf War 
mentioned in chapter 2.  
Third, Dr. Donald P. Wright and Lieutenant Colonel Terry R. Ferrell (U.S. Army) also 
argue that the Army believed that if the American people read and heard about the great job 
the Army was doing, they would support it much more than if they had been less informed 
about the military accomplishments and the sacrifices soldiers made when fighting for their 
country. Major General William Nash argue that 
We believed that public support for our conducting the mission would be immeasurably heightened by 
the stories written or broadcast by reporters who had true access to the soldiers doing the real work. We 
often allowed media representatives to be present at points of confrontation…. What a great story to 
show the American people!9 
 
Support for the Army would also create more support for the overall U.S. military 
intervention in Bosnia.10 Fourth, the media could be used as a tool to force the enemy 
opposition into compliance. Major General William Nash explains that the Army wanted to 
embed the media because their news reports could influence former enemy fractions in Bosnia 
to comply with the terms of the Dayton Peace Accord.11 When the Serbs received favorable 
comments about their compliance with the Dayton Accord, they became even more positive 
towards it. 12 
 
3.0.1 “Ricks’ Rule” 
Wall Street Journal’s Thomas E. Ricks was embedded with the U.S Army First Armored 
Division’s First Brigade whose task was to patrol one of Bosnia’s most fought-over pieces of 
terrain.13 He was welcomed in a friendly manner by the brigade’s Commander, Colonel 
Gregory Fontenot. While embedded, Ricks attended staff meetings and reconnaissance patrols 
inside Bosnia. He was also well-informed about the brigade’s sensitive operations plans. 
Richard J. Newman argues that Ricks’ level of access to information placed him in a 
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privileged position because most media embeds were not allowed to accompany their units 
while they were entering Bosnia.14  
Ground rules targeting the way in which media embeds could interview and quote 
soldiers did not exist in the first weeks of ODF.15 It was up to the commanders of the units to 
determine what media embeds could and could not publish. Washington Post journalist Rick 
Atkinson was embedded with Major General Nash in Bosnia. Major General Nash decided 
that every conversation between Atkinson and U.S. military personnel would be off the 
record.16 If Atkinson wanted to quote soldiers or commanders in his reports he had to get 
Nash’s consent before sending the reports to the bureau in Washington.17 Ricks, however, had 
only one rule to follow: never publish classified information.18 Because Fontenot had only 
placed restrictions on classified information, Ricks assumed that all other kinds of information 
were classified as “on the record”. Ricks is quoted in Newman’s article “Burned by the Press: 
A Commander’s Experience” in which Ricks says that “I think it was explicit that everything 
else was on the record because of the stuff that was off the record.”19  
Ricks’ interpretation of this rule led to his controversial article published on December 
27 1995. In “U.S. Brings to Bosnia Tactics That Tamed Wild West”, Ricks wrote an excerpt 
of a conversation that Fontenot had conducted with his soldiers. During the conversation, 
Fontenot had warned two of his Afro-American soldiers that Croats were racists and it would 
be interesting to see what kinds of situations they would encounter. Croats, according to 
Fontenot, “kill people for the color of their skins.”20 The article also claimed that Fontenot 
believed that the U.S. would be involved in Bosnia for an extensive period of time. This 
assessment contrasted with President Clinton’s claim that the U.S. would be out of Bosnia 
within a year. 
Both of Fontenot’s comments created much controversy among his military superiors. 
Fontenot was placed under investigation to determine whether he had used race to motivate 
Afro-American soldiers and whether he had shown a “gross lack of judgment” in revealing 
his personal points of view to a journalist. Fontenot was also accused of being disloyal in 
disagreeing with President Clinton’s assessment of the length of the mission.21 In the end, no 
disciplinary action was taken, but many inside the military believed that his comments had 
been the sole reason why he was not promoted to General.22    
Many Army soldiers were no longer positive to embedding journalists after witnessing 
how Ricks’ article had damaged Fontenot’s career. The Fontenot incident left a permanent 
mark on media-embedding guidelines. To prevent the Army returning to a closed and 
restrictive public-affairs strategy due to its fear of the kind of news coverage it might be 
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subjected to in the future, the Pentagon implemented new rules concerning how media 
embeds were to interview military personnel in future missions. The rules stated that media 
embeds could no longer quote military sources unless they had explicit permission. This 
particular rule was known as “Ricks’ Rule”.23 Journalists had to inform their sources of the 
way in which their quotations would be contextualized, and soldiers could also retract direct 
quotes from an article.24  
The Reporters’ Committee for Press Freedom quotes the Pentagon’s spokesman, Ken 
Bacon, when discussing “Ricks’ rule”. According to Bacon, the new guidelines were designed 
to ease the U.S. Army’s opposition to embedding. Bacon favored the rule since it was "not 
reasonable to expect ... anybody in the units to be on guard and talking on the record 24 hours 
a day in all situations." Bacon believes that the rules ensured that the military would allow 
journalists to access units and carry out their jobs.25   
 
3.1 Press Evaluation of “Ricks’ Rule” and Embedding in the Bosnia Intervention 
Rick Atkinson believes that the Army “took something of a gamble” when deciding to embed 
journalists. One of Pentagon’s justifications for embedding journalists was that the procedure 
would create support for U.S. interventions in Bosnia as well as support for the Army. But, as 
Atkinson argues, with journalists hanging around all the time, information commanders 
wanted to keep for themselves would eventually be picked up by journalists.26 Atkinson 
himself wrote a story that placed the Army in a less favorable light: 
General Nash would have preferred that the issue [that the Army was in theory responsible for 
protecting war-crimes investigators trying to get to mass graves] not come up until some time in the spring, when 
all his forces were deployed. I know this because, in his subtle fashion, he said “I would prefer that the issue not 
come up until some time in the spring, when all our forces have been deployed.”27 
 
Atkinson nevertheless went ahead with the story. It appeared in the Washington Post on 
December 27 under the headline “U.S. Cautious on Opening Roads to Area of Reported 
Massacre”, and he remembers that Major General Nash “was less than thrilled” about his 
news article.28  
When asked whether the Army should embed journalists in future operations, 
Atkinson answered affirmatively. He believed that the embedding procedure had created 
favorable news coverage of the military in general. Despite negative incidents such as the 
Fontenot case, he believes that the cost/benefit balance connected to the embedding procedure 
benefitted the Army and the First Armored. When media embeds have access to soldiers and 
commanders, they gain extensive knowledge about the military’s technical and operational 
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challenges. As the military draft had been abolished after the Vietnam War, journalistic 
knowledge about military matters was no longer as common as it used to be. Atkinson argues 
that there is a distinct lack of personal military experience among reporters. Many reporters 
cannot tell the difference between an F-16 and an M-16.29 In addition, Newman explains that 
in the post-Cold War media environment, the budgets of many news bureaus for covering the 
military have decreased.30 When journalists embed they are provided with much needed 
military knowledge. If they understand why decisions are made, embeds will accordingly 
write articles indicating that American soldiers perform their jobs with “professional 
competence, humor, and diligence.”31 Atkinson also believes that the embedding procedure 
benefitted the needs of the media.32 If journalists had not been embedded, they would not 
have been able to report on ODF in such great detail. Embedding provided the media with an 
opportunity to inform the American people about what their soldiers were engaged in. 
 Many journalists concur with Atkinson’s assessment of the embedding procedure. 
According to Newman, many journalists did not, for example, oppose the new rules imposed 
by the Pentagon.33 Newman cites a 1999 Gallup poll conducted for the Robert R. McCormick 
Tribune Foundation. Ninety-five percent of media respondents believed that “Ricks’ Rule” 
reduced the risk of revealing classified military information.34 Newman argues that if 
journalists could have reported on almost anything they wanted to during a military operation, 
the Army would refuse altogether to embed journalists in the future. “Ricks’ Rule” made 
military personnel less critical and skeptical of journalists because they could control to a 
certain degree what was written about them.  
 
3.2 Military Evaluation of Embedding in the Bosnia Intervention 
Army soldiers and commanders do not agree as to whether embedding was a success or a 
failure. A majority of Army soldiers believed that embedding had been a failure. Four years 
after Bosnia, Army soldiers still believed that a media presence on the battlefield had not 
favored the military. In the 1999 Gallup poll mentioned earlier in this chapter, more than fifty 
percent of one- and two-star officers answered that they believed that media exposure was 
“fairly risky” or “very risky”. When asked whether “Ricks’ Rule” reduced the risk of sensitive 
and classified military information being revealed, only forty-three percent of military 
respondents believed that it did so.35 
Opposition to a media presence and media embedding during military operations is 
confirmed by the way in which students at the Army War College felt about the media. 
Newman quotes Major John Suttle, Public Affairs Officer for the First Armored Division in 
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Bosnia. When participating at a 1999 seminar on the media, Suttle learned that the Fontenot 
case had influenced the way soldiers regarded the media, “’That’s immediately what they 
zeroed in on,’ he says. ‘They said, ‘why should I talk to the media after what happened to 
Fontenot? I have nothing to gain from talking to the media.’”36 Negative sentiments towards 
media embeds seem to be based on a fear that the media could ruin the careers of military 
staff. Indeed, media embeds’ news reports could affect the soldiers personally because the 
soldiers’ names could be published and could be linked to negative episodes and incidents.   
Embedding in Bosnia was considered a success by unit commanders.37 Major General 
Nash was extremely comfortable with the media in Bosnia: he found most embeds extremely 
honorable and competent.38 Unlike soldiers and officers on the ground, administrative military 
personnel in the Pentagon and high-ranking officers evaluated the embedding procedure on 
the basis of the way in which it had affected the military as a whole.  Although the Fontenot 
incident had produced some unfavorable sentiments towards the media, it was agreed that, in 
general, embedding had improved relations between the military and the media. Nash argues 
that media embeds had helped to separate military conduct and performance from the political 
aspect of the operation. By separating these two different aspects, the Army had maintained 
the American people’s support.39 In other words, the Pentagon evaluated the embedding 
procedure in the way it affected the military as a whole, and not in the way it affected 
Sergeant A’s or Private B’s careers. Nash states that the most important military public-affairs 
lesson learned in Bosnia was that the military and the media had to agree on pre-set ground 
rules before engaging in combat together. If guidelines and rules are agreed upon before an 
operation is launched, both the media and the military will be able to cooperate from a more 
positive stance. The military will not have to worry about the way in which it is presented to 
the American public, while the media will not have to worry about being restricted or denied 
access just because some commanders bear a grudge towards them.40  
 
3.3 The American Public and American Military Intervention in Bosnia 
Although experimental public-affairs strategy in the form of embedding produced higher 
favorability rates for the military, embedding did, however, not produce political capital for 
President Clinton. According to a Gallup poll, in December 1995 fifty-four percent of 
Americans disapproved of American military involvement in Bosnia while forty-one percent 
approved American involvement.41 Two possible explanations to way American involvement 
received such a low favorability rate is identified. First, Americans did not understand the 
Clinton administration’s policy in Bosnia. Only twenty-five percent believed that Clinton had 
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a clear policy and only ten percent out of the twenty-five percent believed that they 
understood that policy. Second, Americans did not believe that there were no American 
interests that had to be protected in Bosnia and thus there were no reason for getting involved 
in the operation. The report American Public Support for U.S. Military Operations from 
Mogadishu to Bagdad found that sixty-seven percent of participants in a Gallup poll 
conducted on November 27 1995, believed that there were no American interests that had to 
be protected in Bosnia, while twenty-six did believe that there were interests that needed to be 
protected.42    
 
3.4 Military Public-Affairs Strategy in the Afghanistan War 
On September 11 2001, the U.S. was attacked by terrorists. Three days later, on September 
14, President George W. Bush announced a global War on Terrorism (WoT). In his book The 
Politics of the Presidency, Joseph A. Pika argues that in America, many people have 
“expressive needs for confidence, security, reassurance, and pride in citizenship.” The 
presidency serves to fulfill these emotional and psychological needs.43  Military historian John 
Keegan argues that any president who publicly announces that he intends to fight for 
American values and punish the enemies of the U.S. will receive high levels of support.44 It 
should therefore come as no surprise that after experiencing a terrorist-attack, large segments 
of the American public supported President Bush proposed homeland defense strategy.45 
“Operation Enduring Freedom” (OEF) in Afghanistan was launched on October 7 
2001. Before the bombing began, news bureaus were pressuring for access to war information 
and military units.46 Raymondo Villarreal Jr. writes in his thesis The Role of the Department 
of Defense Embedded Reporter Program in Future Conflicts that despite external pressure, 
there was very little open and independent press reporting on the ground.47 The military 
cannot be accused of creating a news blackout because, as Villarreal explains, it adhered to 
the 2000 reauthorization of the DoD’s Principles for News Media Coverage of DoD 
Operations (Appendix B), DoD Directive 5122.5 Statement of DoD Principles for New 
Media. Directive 5122.5 states that whenever journalists cover U.S. military operations, they 
should be able to report independently and have access to information. Directive 5122.5 was 
put into practice when a few journalists were granted access to U.S. Navy ships and the U.S. 
Air Force when OEF commenced.48 Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, however, did not 
allow journalists to report independently from the battlefield during the first phase of the war. 
Journalists who wanted to embed with U.S. combat units on the ground were systematically 
denied access. 
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Villareal, James DeFrank, the Pentagon’s Director for Press Operations in OEF, and 
Christopher Paul argue that the Pentagon disregarded Directive 5122.5 because of the nature 
of the war. First, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld claimed that priority number one in 
Afghanistan was to develop relations with the Northern Alliance.49 In an interview with 
Thomas Rid, DeFrank argued that the U.S. military first of all had to establish a good 
relationship with Afghan and Pakistani tribal warlords, no easy task since the warlords were 
often not interested in cooperating with the media.  Second, the adversaries of the U.S., Al 
Qaeda and the Taliban, are non-state actors who use guerrilla tactics when fighting. Indeed, 
their tactics are similar to those of the Viet Cong in North Vietnam: they blend in with 
civilians who in turn provide them with shelter and food. Geography and a lack of stability in 
Afghanistan also contribute to the difficulty of waging war there: rugged mountains, caves, 
deserts, a lack of infrastructure, and internal wars between local warlords made it very 
difficult to fight the enemy.50 The level of difficulty meant that U.S. Special Forces had to 
stabilize areas before any conventional units could be called in. DeFrank argues that it was 
impossible to let journalists embed with the Special Forces because this would reveal their 
secret tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). If TTPs were revealed to sources outside 
the military, Special Forces would not be able to use them again.51 Reacting to constant 
pressure from news bureaus and editors that wanted their journalists to access U.S. ground 
units, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Victoria Clarke, argued that the 
media had to respect the unconventional nature of the mission and that the media could not 
automatically expect access to a military operation because they had been allowed access to 
earlier ones.52  Clarke’s argument reveals that the media and military culture were still at odds 
with one another. To keep important allies happy and secure operational goals, the military in 
Afghanistan was highly dependent on operational security. Journalists, however, craved 
openness and full access to U.S. combat units.  
 
3.4.1 Coalition Information Centers and Media Embeds 
Due to the unconventional nature of OEF, the Pentagon decided on a two-pronged public-
affairs strategy. The first part of the strategy was implemented during the initial stage of OEF. 
Because journalists could not embed with the Special Forces, they had to be briefed about the 
progress of the war to prevent a news blackout. The first step was to establish coalition 
information centers at which journalists could be briefed about the progress of the war. To 
satisfy the American public’s enormous demand for information on the WoT, journalists were 
under constant pressure. As in the Persian Gulf War, the Taliban sought to take advantage of 
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this pressure for news by using journalists as mouthpieces for its propaganda. The Taliban, for 
example, tried to present a negative image of the American war effort and intervention in 
Afghanistan by claiming that the U.S. was purposefully targeting civilians.53 To prevent the 
Taliban gaining the upper hand in the information war, the Pentagon, in collaboration with the 
State Department, launched a media-information campaign in November 2001.54  
There were two main reasons why the Pentagon decided to launch a media campaign. 
First, if rumors about Americans targeting civilians were allowed to travel from village to 
village and city to city, the U.S. would face increasing hostility from Afghan civilians. 
Second, since independent journalists were talking to civilians, they would most likely pay 
some attention to the civilians’ claims of the U.S forces targeting them and report this to the 
American people. In a worst-case scenario, many Americans could subsequently develop an 
animosity towards the U.S. military’s war -effort and the government’s intervention in the 
country. The main element in the media campaign was the “Coalition Information Centers” 
(CICs). CICs were established in Islamabad, London, and Washington. According to Rid, the 
CICs had two characteristics. First, the centers were mainly influenced by the global twenty-
four hour news cycle. Due to large geographical distances and time zones, incorrect 
information was easily spread all over the world before the Pentagon could counter Taliban 
propaganda and inaccurate information. Ari Fleischer, President Bush’s spokesman, said that 
the CICs would “operate around the clock in Washington, London and Pakistan to stop the 
Taliban from scoring propaganda points during the wee hours in Washington.”55 
Second, the CICs had to be proactive instead of reactive. Instead of constantly trying 
to counterbalance propaganda, the CICs “infused” the media with positive stories. Being 
proactive produced results. By emphasizing positive progress and the good work done in the 
country, negative stories were overshadowed. Also, U.S. allies were reassured when they saw 
that the OEF was a success. The Pentagon hoped that the allies, when reassured that they were 
part of a successful military campaign that was attaining its pre-set goals, would continue to 
contribute with capital and military support.56   
Although the military was not as actively engaged in selling the war politically as it 
had been during the Vietnam War, many people were wary of the military’s procedure of 
manipulating the American people and its allies into believing that the war was going well 
and that progress was being made. When asked about the Pentagon’s role in producing news, 
Victoria Clark claimed that the Pentagon believed that the American people both needed and 
deserved to hear from their own leaders what their country was accomplishing. She remarked 
that the CICs were not only presenting positive stories. The CICs were, according to her, 
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working to disseminate as much news and information about the war as possible, and this also 
included less positive news.57  
The second part of Pentagon’s two-pronged public-affairs plan served to cover the 
American people’s “right to know” and support the media’s efforts to act as a Fourth Estate. 
The Pentagon sought to embed journalists with military units as soon as conventional combat 
units entered the ground war. This occurred six weeks into the operation.58 To prevent that 
embeds published information that threatened military personnel security and safety, embeds 
had to follow military ground rules (Appendix C).59  
Adhering to their long-standing tradition of welcoming the media, the Marines were 
eager to have journalists to write about them and their accomplishments. Rob Colenso Jr., a 
retired Marine and Managing Editor of the magazine Marine Corps Time, explained in a New 
York Times article that “when they [the military] are making history, they want it known that 
marines are making it.”60 Marine units subsequently became the first ones to have journalists 
present while engaged in actual combat. On November 25, without informing the Pentagon, 
three print journalists, a television cameraman, and a photographer were invited to attend 
classified briefings onboard the vessel USS Peleliu during “Operation Swift Freedom” (OSF). 
The Peleliu was the lead ship of the attack force. More than 9,000 Marines and Navy sailors 
were distributed between the force’s six ships.61 The journalists onboard, however, worked 
under very “basic” conditions, encountering logistic restraints and military restrictions that 
independent journalists did not have to consider. Despite these obstacles, embeds onboard 
USS Peleliu produced news reports that were unmatched by independent journalists in terms 
of quality and information.62 Since the Marines embedded only a few journalists, the 
Pentagon was heavily criticized by chiefs of news bureaus who argued that Victoria Clarke 
should have activated the NMPS and allowed more journalists to access units during OSF.63  
After witnessing media embedding during OSF, the Army component’s Chief Public 
Affairs Officer, Colonel Rick Thomas, asserted in an interview with Thomas Rid that it 
seemed as if both the Marines and the journalists had benefited from the embedding system.64 
In late December, the Pentagon, with Army commanders consent, secretly invited a few 
journalists to embed with Army units. When the media embeds finally reached their units, 
most of the fighting in that area had already ceased. Instead, the media embeds were left to 
cover the everyday life of a Special Force A-Team, which, as Thomas Rid explains, was quite 
sensational and newsworthy in itself since this had been unimaginable earlier in the war.65 
Sean Naylor, an experienced Army Times journalist, argues that the Army had deliberately 
chosen the units because it knew that they were not going to be engaged in any combat when 
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the media embeds were scheduled to be there.66 Naylor does not provide any answer why the 
Army did not want embeds to see real action. However, one possible explanation for the 
Army choosing to embed journalists during a quiet period is that the Army has always been 
much more skeptical of the media than other service branches have been, and it needed to test 
the media and what type of coverage they produced before allowing them to cover real 
combat.  
A third attempt to embed journalists took place during Operation Anaconda (OA), 
March 1-18 2002. The goal of OA was to encircle and squeeze the estimated 2,000 remaining 
Al-Qaeda and Taliban soldiers who were hiding in the heavily fortified Ahah-i-kot Valley. In 
the aftermath, OA has been called the largest reported American ground battle since 
Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Six journalists were embedded with the 101st Airborn 
Division’s 3rd Brigade in Bagram.67 By allowing embeds to witness and cover real combat, 
the 101st Airborn Division’s 3rd Brigade made history. Naylor argues that he believes that OA 
was the first time in modern history that the military knew that there was going to be heavy 
combat, but nevertheless allowed journalists to embed.68  
 
3.5 Press Evaluation of Embedding in the Afghanistan War 
The Pentagon’s policy of restricting access to units during the first stage of the war was taken 
to court by publisher Larry Flynt, famed for his magazine, Hustler. On October 30 2001, 
Flynt sent two requests to Victoria Clarke: first, he advocated his journalists being embedded 
with ground combat units; second, he requested they be given free access to all U.S. military 
operations in Afghanistan. As with all other requests concerning embedding with ground 
combat units during the first stage of the war, Flynt’s requests were refused due to the nature 
of the war. He was told that there were other aspects of the war that his journalists could 
cover, such as air strikes, humanitarian missions as well as interviewing soldiers. Flynt and 
his publishing company L.F.P., Inc filed a lawsuit against Secretary of Defense Donald H. 
Rumsfeld and the DoD on November 16, 2001. Mr. Flynt argued that both the refusal to allow 
his journalists to embed and Directive 5122.5 were unconstitutional because this violated his 
historical and constitutional rights of access to the battlefield. According to Flynt, journalists 
had the right to “go in [to battle] with the military” and he believed that the military was 
obliged to accommodate the press because the press is considered a check on government. 
Refusing to allow his journalists to embed deprived them of their First Amendment rights.  
Both the District Count and the Court of Appeal dismissed the case. As illustrated in 
Grenada, the case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia had shown that the press had a 
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constitutional right to access a courtroom while in session simply because the press, in the 
past, had always been granted that access. There is, however, no historical precedent of 
allowing the media access to U.S. battlefields. Even if there were such a precedent, both 
courts argued that Directive 5122.5 did not violate the First Amendment because Richmond 
Newspapers stated that a trial judge may impose reasonable limitations on access to a trial. 
Such limitations could for example be based on the need to maintain a quiet and orderly 
setting. Directive 5122.5 does not impose many limitations on the press. According to the 
Directive, open and independent reporting is to be the principal means when covering U.S. 
military operations, and field commanders should permit journalists to ride on military 
vehicles when possible.69 Due to the nature of the war and the Pentagon’s emphasis on 
operational security and secrecy, it was not considered possible to embed journalists during 
the first stage of OEF. Journalists seeking to cover the war had thus no choice but to wait until 
the Special Forces had accomplished their goals and conventional combat units could be 
implemented into the war effort.   
The clash between the media and military culture becomes especially evident when 
examining how both independent and press embedded journalists experienced OEF. Many 
journalists heavily criticized the policy of not embedding journalists with the U.S. Special 
Forces. Michael Getler, ombudsman for the Washington Post, argued that the military should 
have made an effort to embed one or two reporters with the Special Forces right from the 
beginning.70 Peter Baker, of Washington Post, had his own personal encounter with the 
military’s policy of restricting journalistic access. When covering the battle of Shahikot in 
eastern Afghanistan, his convoy was shelled by enemy attackers. Although they sought 
protection at a nearby American base, U.S. Special Forces refused to take the convoy in and 
left them to spend the night out in the car outside the base where they could possibly be 
attacked by enemy fighters once more. In his article, “On Their Own”, Baker wrote: 
So goes the relationship between the U.S. armed forces and the war correspondents covering the action 
in Afghanistan. More so than during any major war in American history, journalists here have been left 
to their own devices, left literally and figuratively to take their chances in freezing cars outside the 
protection of the U.S. military cocoon. The Pentagon's secrecy policy has not only severely restricted 
access to unfiltered information about the prosecution of the war against the Taliban and al Qaeda, it has 
helped create an especially risky environment for the working press.71 
 
By May 2002, eight journalists had died in Afghanistan since the beginning of the war. This 
figure represents more journalistic war casualties than in any of the United States’ military 
operations of the 1990s combined. Baker admits that it is impossible to speculate whether 
more journalists would have survived in Afghanistan if the U.S. military had been more 
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cooperative with the media. But he argues that the lack of an alternative forced journalists to 
travel on their own into perilous areas and engage in volatile situations.72 
 Being accepted as press embeds was a tiresome process for journalists. Michael 
Gordon of The New York Times described military public affairs and the embedding system as 
appallingly bad. First, getting out in the field as press embeds was problematic for journalists. 
Embeds were not allowed to cover military units independently: they were sent out in groups. 
On arriving in Afghanistan, Mr. Gordon’s intention was to embed, but he was systematically 
told that his group was to be embedded with ground forces but that this would not occur that 
week, but maybe next week and so on. Feeling that he was wasting his time by waiting and 
being restricted by the Pentagon, he decided to go to Tora Bora independently. There he 
risked his life when caught in the crossfire of Afghan warlords.73  
Access to information was limited both for embeds and journalists covering the war 
independently. The American historian Anthony R. DiMaggio argues that “in retrospect, it 
seems clear that the mainstream press was prohibited from, and refused to, engage in in-depth, 
on-the-ground reporting in Afghanistan.”74 Carol Morello, an embedded Washington Post 
journalist, encountered great difficulty writing relevant news articles about the war since she 
was only shuttled back and forth between less important stories, only covering church 
services and promotion ceremonies. When embedded with Charlie Company for a night, the 
most exciting thing that happened, according to her, was that a camel appeared and stuck its 
nose in a foxhole.75 Similarly, when her unit was stationed at Camp Rhino near Kandahar, 
they were informed about an incoming convoy of injured American and Afghan soldiers, but 
they were systematically denied access to the soldiers:  
A photographer says ‘Can I go take pictures?’ He’s told no. One of the print reporters says, ‘Can we at 
least go stand there and watch?’ We’re told no. The public affairs officer says, ‘What, you want to go 
see dead Americans?’ We said, ‘No, we think this is our job.’ We said, ‘Can we talk to the pilots who 
flew them back?’ ‘No.’ ‘Can we talk to any of the medics when they’re done?’ ‘Well, they’re too tired.’ 
‘Can we talk to any of the Afghans who have minor injuries?’ ‘No, we don’t have a translator.’76 
 
For Morello, the incident at Camp Rhino became a metaphor for what her pool’s entire trip 
was about: an incredible amount of press restriction.77 The very term “embedded” also caused 
friction between the military and the press. In Morello’s view, being a press embed meant 
spending weeks, and sometimes even months with a unit. Despite going out with a group of 
reporters, and being referred to as “embedded” by the Public Affairs Officer, they spent only 
four or five days with the unit, and barely got to know the soldiers or interview them.78  
 Gordon wrote about the military strategic effort in the war. Due to his choice of topic 
his sources should ideally have been Americans, but he did not manage to develop a 
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relationship with the American military despite repeated efforts to do so.79 Similarly, Baker, 
in the six months he had covered the war, had never spoken to an American soldier. “Friends 
back home were shocked to learn this. ‘I just assumed 50 percent of your information came 
from Americans,’ said one, a reporter who follows the news closely. More like zero 
percent.”80 Susan Glasser of the Washington Post felt that the American military was a sort of 
shadowy presence and she did not speak to a military official until March 2002 of OA.81  
This policy of not embedding journalists from the beginning of the war influenced 
what the American people knew about the war. If they only received information that was 
presented at military briefings they would, according to Baker, never know about civilian 
casualties, mistaken raids, or military setbacks of any kind. To illustrate how the people’s 
right to information was amputated, he comments on an incident of an Afghan source telling 
him two days after a battle that the first American casualty had died from friendly fire. The 
Pentagon did not share this information with the American people until weeks afterwards.82   
 
3.6 Public Opinion Polls 
 A USA Today/Gallup poll, conducted on March 14-15 2009, poll shows that at the beginning 
of November 2001, eighty-nine percent of the poll’s participants believed that it had not been 
a mistake to send military forces to Afghanistan. By the beginning of January 2002, the 
number of people advocating the war had increased to ninety-three percent. People who 
believed that sending military forces to Afghanistan was a mistake decreased from nine 
percent to six percent.83 
The poll show that journalists’ complaints of being prevented from reporting and not 
being able to provide Americans with enough information about the war do not correlate to 
Americans’ own perceptions of the war. That ninety-three percent believed in January 2002 
that it was not a mistake to send American forces to Afghanistan leads this research paper to 
assume that the Pentagon’s two-pronged public-affairs strategy did indeed provide the 
American public with enough information about the war. This assumption is based on the 
indicator that such a large percentage of people were able to make an overall assessment of 
American military engagement. If a large majority of Americans had felt that they were not 
provided with enough information about the war, a much larger drop in Bush’s favorability 
rate should have been detected by the polls as President Bush was the Commander-in-Chief, 
superior to the Pentagon which had imposed the two-fold public-affairs strategy.   
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3.7 Military Evaluation of Embedding in Afghanistan 
When discussing the success of the embedding system as it unfolded in OEF, it is possible to 
identify a clear gap between the perceptions of the military versus those of the media and 
embedded press journalists. In The Media and the War on Terrorism, Stephen Hess argues 
that the Pentagon was happy with the way the operation was covered. When asked how well 
she thought the press had covered the war three months into it, Victoria Clarke replied:  “In 
general, I think the press has done an extraordinarily good job of covering a very difficult, 
very unconventional war” and “[t]hey [the journalists] take a shot at us when we deserve it. 
Then I think that there have been some in particular that have been extraordinarily intrepid in 
how they’ve gone about covering it.”84 Similarly, Melanie R. Reeder, a U.S. Army Public 
Affairs Officer at the rank of Colonel, stated in an article in Military Review that the success 
experienced in embedding journalists in OA afterwards helped blaze a trail for later 
embedded-media programs.85  
Although there seems to be a general understanding among military personnel that the 
system of embedding had worked reasonably well in OEF, the Pentagon recognized that they 
had not met all of the media’s needs in OEF, such as early access to newsworthy information 
and locations.86 Victoria Clarke even publicly apologized in a letter to the Pentagon Bureau 
Chiefs for the shortcomings in their preparedness to support journalists attempting to cover 
the war during the early stages.87  
 The military’s appraisal of the embedding system can be explained by examining how 
the system benefitted the military. First, the hardship the ground-force soldiers encountered 
out on the field and their working efforts were documented and presented in a positive manner 
to the American public back home. Second, the military benefitted strategically in allowing 
journalists to embed with units. By letting journalists see for themselves what was happening 
on the ground, journalists could be used as “instruments” to counter propaganda issued by the 
Taliban. In an interview conducted by Rid, Captain Terry McCreary, the JCS Chairman’s 
Special Assistant for Public Affairs, said that “[y]ou raid a camp, there wouldn’t be any press 
with you, you do an operation, you leave, the enemy comes back, the press come in, and 
everybody tells them you murdered innocent people, you slaughtered them, and that becomes 
a story for the next 48 hours until you can fix it.”88 News articles written by media embeds 
would be much more efficient in countering false enemy propaganda than denying false 
accusations at official military briefings.  
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Chapter 4 
Strategic Public-Affairs Strategy: 
The Iraq War and the Pentagon’s Embedded Media Program 
 
 
4.0 Executive and Military Justifications for Implementing the Embedded Media 
Program 
Many considered the Iraq war to be a war of President Bush’s own choosing.1 On September 
7 2002, President Bush announced that Saddam Hussein’s top priority was to acquire nuclear 
power and develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Bush advocated that the U.S. had to 
stop Hussein before he acquired nuclear arms and managed to alter “the strategic balance in 
the oil-rich Persian Gulf War.”2 
Joseph A. Pika argues that whenever a country is engaging or plan to engage in a war, 
the president “must rally public support for the extraordinary effort and personal losses that 
will surely follow.”3 Seeking to garner support for a war “of his own choosing”, President 
George W. Bush and his administration regarded the media as a critical actor. Negative media 
coverage could turn both large sections of the American people and the rest of the world 
against President Bush and his political objectives and goals. Although sixty-two percent of 
participants in a Pew Research Center survey supported military action in Iraq in late August 
2002, the Bush administration implemented a new military public-affairs strategy, the 
Embedded Media Program (EMP) to secure public support.4 An invasion of Iraq would 
alianate many allies since an invasion would mean that the Bush adminstartion broke various 
international agreements, for example the Kyoto Protocol on the environemnt, the 1972 Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty and the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.5 The EMP 
was developed by Victoria Clarke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, and was 
publicly announced by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld on February 10 2003. The program 
was designed to dominate media coverage, counter enemy propaganda, and maintain high 
U.S. and international support in future military operations.6 The program gave journalists full 
access to military combat units. When stationed at the frontlines journalists would be able to 
provide detailed coverage of military progress. And military progress would foster political 
capital.  
When discussing why the Pentagon did not demonstrate much opposition to 
implementing the Bush administration’s new public-affairs strategy in Iraq, Bill Katovsky 
quotes Michael Corleone in the movie Godfather, Part Two: “Keep your friends close and 
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your enemies closer.”7 This quote correlates to the explanation of Lieutenant Colonel Terry R. 
Ferrell (U.S Army). He argues that the idea of embedding journalists started within the U.S. 
Army. On August 1 2003, General Peter J. Schoomaker, the Army’s new Chief of Staff, 
identified seventeen areas that had to be improved if the U.S. Army were to continue to 
participate in the WoT and the planned invasion of Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).8 
Strategic communications was identified as one of the main areas in which improvements had 
to be made.9 Ferrell argues that 
This would not be strategic communications in the form of a means for talking to forces deployed 
around the world, but instead communications that told the Army story, intertwined with the strategic 
communications efforts of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff.10 
 
The need to tell the Army’s version during OIF stemmed from the fact that the Navy, the 
Marines, and the Air Force were to participate only in the invasion phase of the war, while the 
Army would also participate in the second phase of the war, a stabilization and peacekeeping 
phase known as Phase IV.11 Since the Army would spend considerably more time in Iraq, it 
would be given more coverage than any of the other three service branches.  
The EMP ensured that media embeds would have access to information about all 
aspects of Army operations and military operations during OIF. By allowing its former enemy 
(the media) to access combat units, the military could use media coverage to its own 
advantage on two different counts. First, in his book, War and Media Operations, Thomas 
Rid argues that all four service branches feared that if OIF failed they would be heavily 
criticized on returning to the U.S. The military had become “the bad guy” after the Vietnam 
War, and it sought to prevent this from happening a second time. Military personnel therefore 
appreciated Secretary Rumsfeld’s decision to implement the EMP because it would act as a 
vehicle to educate the U.S. public about the job the military was doing.12 With the EMP 
activated, people who were reading about the war or watching news reports from Iraq would 
be able to say: “OK, I like this war, I hate this war, I take the choice - but I really feel that 
these troops are doing a damn fine job because they are doing what their country asks of 
them.”13 If journalists encountered soldiers in combat they would be able to separate the job 
that the military was doing from the actions and political decisions taken by the President.  
Second, the Pentagon also hoped that the EMP would mend relations between the 
military and the media. In “Security at the Source: Embedding journalists as a superior 
strategy to military censorship”, Heinz Brandenburg states that when journalists are 
embedded and given access to war information, this enhances their understanding and 
appreciation of the tactical and operational aspects of the military campaign.14 Liz Marlantes 
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writes in her article, “The other boots on the ground: embedded press”, that when media 
embeds witness the great work the military does, they will develop a greater respect for 
soldiers.15 David Carr, writing for The New York Times, also states that when soldiers and 
media embeds have to share equipment and support one another out on the battlefield, 
friendships develop between the units and embeds.16 Soldiers and commanding officers would 
also observe the dedication and professionalism of the media embeds and thus see them in a 
more favorable light. Chris Hanson, professor of journalism at the University of Maryland and 
a former Pentagon reporter, concurs with Carr. He argues in Marlantes’ article that the EMP 
may lead to a decrease in the mutual stereotyping that has been problematic for decades.17 As 
discussed earlier in chapters two and three, the media and the military represent two very 
different cultures. Because the two cultures are so at odds with one another, it is important 
that both the military and the media possess some knowledge of the other’s culture. 
Knowledge may create understanding, and understanding may create respect. 
 
4.1 Embedded Media Program in Operation Iraqi Freedom 
When OIF was launched on March 20 2003, the EMP was activated. For the first time in 
American war history, the media had access to all four U.S. service branches - to the Army, 
Air Force, Navy and the Marines - and could report live from all combat operations. 
Journalists wanting to cover OIF from Iraq had to register with the Coalition Press 
Information Center in Kuwait. 2,870 registered, but only 558 were embedded with U.S. 
military ground units or at air bases. By March 20, 408 journalists had been embedded with 
ground units.18 Journalists who chose not to embed were named “unilaterals”.19 Bill Katovsky 
and Timothy Carlson explain that to obtain a balanced view of what was happening as the war 
progressed, many large news organizations chose to embed journalists as well as send 
unilaterals to Iraq. In the aftermath of the invasion it was estimated that over 2,100 journalists 
had covered OIF as unilaterals.20 They had full access to the battlefield, but not to American 
military combat units. They were highly discouraged by the military from entering Iraq 
because they or their vehicles could be misidentified as enemies, they could be kidnapped and 
killed by the adversary or they could be trapped between lines of fire.21 
 
4.1.1 Ground Rules 
While implementing EMP as the new military public-affairs strategy, Secretary Rumsfeld also 
issued Public Affairs (PA) Guidance on Embedding Media During Possible Future 
Operations/Deployments in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility (see Appendix 
  63 
D).22 The document highly reflected the Bush administrations’ desire of using the media as an 
actor to garner support, stating that “media coverage of any future operation will, to a large 
extent, shape public perception of the national security environment now and in the years 
ahead. This holds true for the U.S. public; the public in allied countries whose opinions can 
affect the durability of our coalition.” The document also provided Public Affairs Officers 
(PAO) and Commanders with guidance and procedures for embedding the media, while 
media embeds were provided with detailed ground rules. Journalists who wanted to embed 
had to sign a contract with the Pentagon in which they agreed to follow government 
regulations and ground rules.23  
The rules may seem reasonable. The Pentagon decided which units would receive 
media embeds, the Commanders of the units chose how many media embeds their units would 
receive, while the news organizations were responsible for selecting which journalists were to 
embed. Media embeds would have long-term and minimally restricted access to U.S. air, 
ground and naval forces, but any violations of the ground rules would result in immediate 
disembedding. Geraldo Riviera was one of approximately twenty-four journalists who were 
disembedded after breaking such rules, as he had outlined in the sand his unit’s movements 
and locations while reporting live.24 Media embeds were allowed to confirm casualties, 
release information and the locations of military targets that had been under attack, but they 
could not report on the specific numbers of troops in units below corps level, or release 
information regarding future operations. Media embeds were only subject to military 
censorship when they reported on specific matters such as troop movements, battle 
preparations and material capabilities, and all interviews with military personnel would be on 
the record. 25  
 
4.1.2 Media Boot Camp 
In the weeks prior to OIF, the Pentagon organized boot camps for journalists wishing to 
embed. Journalists who opted to attend boot camp had two choices. First, they could attend a 
week-long boot camp on the continental U.S. prior to departure. In his research paper, 
Embedding Success into the Military-Media Relationship, Commander Jose L. Rodriguez 
(U.S. Naval Reserve) writes that the boot camps were held at four different locations in the 
United States: at Fort Benning in Georgia, Fort Dix in New Jersey, and at Quantico Marine 
Corp Base and Norfolk Naval Station in Virginia.26 Attendance was not mandatory, but many 
journalists chose to sign up because they hoped that participation would improve their 
chances of being embedded.27 Rodriguez cites Alicia C. Shepard in stating that the boot 
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camps “weeded out those who mistakenly thought that covering a war would be a heck of an 
adventure. After barely surviving pretended war, some opted to not experience the real 
thing.”28 The U.S. boot camps thus served as a tool for separating the journalists who were 
mentally and physically fit to cover OIF from those who were not. 
The survey Assessment of the Media Embedding Program, conducted by the Institute 
for Defense Analyses, states that before the boot camps were activated, the Pentagon judged 
that the camps would benefit the military as well as the media because they were based on the 
philosophy of “train as you fight.”29 If media embeds acquired a knowledge of basic warfare, 
it would be much easier to assimilate them into combat units as well as make them less 
dependent on the soldiers.30 Journalists were therefore familiarized with different situations 
they might encounter in Iraq: they learned basic safety awareness, and how to react if they 
were taken captive by the enemy or if they were exposed to nuclear, biological, or chemical 
attacks. They also learned to handle direct fire, minefields, and learned the fundamentals of 
cruise missiles.31 Assessment of the Media Embedded Program also argues that journalists 
socializing with their units before departure would be able to observe deployment 
preparations and thus acquire a greater and more comprehensive understanding of what kinds 
of lives commanders and soldiers live.32 
From early November 2002, journalists could also attend military exercises and 
simulations in desert terrain in Iraq’s neighboring countries. Between December and January, 
more than eighty-five journalists trained with their military units for three to five days.33 In an 
interview with Thomas Rid, Colonel Thomas, Chief Spokesperson for the Combined Force 
Land Component Command34, stated that the joint military exercises emerged as very useful 
for both media embeds and military units. First, soldiers became used to having journalists 
constantly around them and media embeds learned what it meant to operate in a desert 
environment with the use of state-of-the-art technological equipment. This phase of 
accustomization made it easier to build a relationship based on trust and cooperation.35 
Second, the joint exercises also helped to overcome logistical problems. By analyzing the 
number of journalists who attended the joint exercises, the military could estimate, for 
example, how many journalists would need protective masks and suits against chemical and 
biological weapons out on the battlefield. If the military did not have enough masks and suits 
to equip the journalists, they could not be embedded due to security reasons.36 Mike 
Birmingham, Chief Public Affairs Officer for the U.S. Army’s 3rd Infantry Division, mentions 
in Rid’s book that when training, the U.S. Army’s 3rd Infantry Division decided that despite 
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paragraph 2CI of the PAG stating that media embeds had to drive with their units, the embeds 
drove in separate Humvees because this would produce better pictures and sound.37  
 
4.2 Offensive Public-Affairs Strategy in OIF: Media Embeds as Force Multipliers  
In addition to using the EMP as a device to separate political decisions from military 
operations and improve relations between the military and the media, embedded journalists 
also became part of the military’s operational war strategy in OIF. American war strategy is 
highly influenced by the military historian and strategist Carl Von Clausewitz’s theories of 
warfare. Thomas Rid argues that this became especially apparent during OIF.38 He explains 
that Clausewitz had a psychological approach to warfare: to him, war operations should not 
concentrate on destroying the enemy’s forces and cities; instead, war is to be regarded as an 
instrument that can be used to compel the enemy to carry out desired actions.39 To compel the 
adversary, one must locate the adversary’s “center of gravity”.40 According to Rid, this 
approach is replicated in one of the DoD’s highest-order joint doctrines, the Doctrine for Joint 
Operations (JP 3-0). Rid uses the official DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated to 
explain what a “center of gravity” means. This dictionary defines a center of gravity as “those 
characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its 
freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.”41  
As shown in chapter three, technological advances have greatly changed the way in 
which the media cover a war. For example, new satellite-phone technology meant that the 
media could report directly from the battlefield without any assistance from the military. 
During OIF, the military took advantage of the media’s ability to report independently. Rid 
argues that in order to reach the mission’s operational objective, i.e. forcing Hussein to 
surrender, the military incorporated the media into its offensive public-affairs strategy.42 Both 
JP 3-0, and the Army’s public-affairs field manual on tactics, techniques and procedures, FM 
3-61.1, states that the press and its reporting can be deliberately used to communicate 
messages to the enemy.43 In addition, FM 3-61.1 is the first public-affairs manual stating that 
public affairs could and should be used offensively.44 The New York Times article, “Little 
Resistance Encountered as Troops Reach Baghdad”, serves as example of the way in which 
media embeds can be used as instruments to transmit information to the adversary. The article 
informed Hussein that his army had been severely weakened, and that the remnants of one of 
his Republican Guard division had been destroyed by U.S. Marines.45 When the media report 
words and images that describe U.S. military capabilities and strength, the adversary may be 
scared into not taking certain actions because he fears the consequences. When media embeds 
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are present at major battles, they publish information which reveals, for example, how many 
U.S. soldiers are engaged in the operation, what kinds of weapons are used and which parts of 
Iraq the U.S. controls.46 On April 15 2003, The New York Times published an article 
headlined “Military; Pentagon Asserts the Main Fighting is Finished in Iraq”. The article 
reported that 
As part of the ongoing operations to secure the country, military officials said today that the Fourth 
Infantry Division, which has the Army's most advanced Abrams tanks, would be assigned control over 
northern Iraq. The Third Armored Cavalry Regiment, a force that includes tanks, attack helicopters and 
reconnaissance helicopters, will be assigned to protect the western flanks.47 
 
If Hussein or the supporters of his regime read or learned about the contents of the article, 
about the strength of the army they were fighting, their fighting spirit might be weakened and 
the mission of the U.S. forces might be eased. The embedded media thus served as a force 
multiplier.  
 
4.3 Defensive Public-Affairs Strategy in OIF: Media Embeds as a Tool of Persuasion 
Incorporated into Clausewitz’s center-of-gravity theory is the idea that military and political 
spheres cannot be viewed in isolation because the two spheres have an impact on one another 
in a war. Clausewitz calls the relationship that exists between the people, their government 
and their military the “remarkable trinity”, and he views the media as the connective factor in 
this trinity.48 Each segment of the trinity is critical to a military operation’s success.49 
Subsequently, Rid argues that the media forms part of Washington’s decision-making process 
because they act as the Fourth Estate and inform the people about the war’s progress, 
successes, and mishaps.50 Robin Brown’s interpretation of this theory is that military activity 
can only be considered a narrow contributing factor in a more complex picture dominated by 
the much broader political perspective.51 Brown argues that since the U.S. government is 
elected by the people, public support is necessary if a government seeks to enter into a war 
over an extensive period of time. If the public does not support a government-sponsored 
military intervention, usage of military power abroad will be severely limited in a democratic 
country.52 This was illustrated in the later stages of the Vietnam War during which the 
people’s protests forced the Nixon administration to eventually withdraw from South 
Vietnam. Because it is the public that decides whether or not their country is to engage in a 
war, the American people can be identified as America’s own center of gravity in OIF. 
The EMP helped to protect the American center of gravity in OIF on three different 
counts. Because the media influence people’s opinions about and perceptions of a war, it was 
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imperative that the media had access to U.S. combat units. Many consider OIF an illegitimate 
invasion because the U.S. and the “coalition of the willing”53 invaded Iraq on false premises. 
Prior to the invasion, many questioned the Bush administration’s claims that Iraq had nearly 
developed a nuclear program and that Iraq had links to Al Qaeda. Due to the controversial 
nature of the invasion, from a political perspective it was even more critical that the media 
write favorably about the invasion. Robin Brown argues that if the media had been prevented 
from accessing information or were subject to military censorship, they might start 
speculating about the war and its progress. Speculation about and incorrect assessments of the 
war could shape people’s and politicians’ attitudes to a war counter-productively: “Given that 
the modern political class is highly sensitive to media commentary, there is recognition that 
shaping how war is presented and analyzed is an inescapable requirement.”54 
Second, the EMP also sought to shield the American people from enemy propaganda. 
Rid explains that many inside the Pentagon believed that the adversaries of the U.S. were 
becoming much better at producing war propaganda targeting the U.S. public. Since the 
American media can be used to transmit propaganda, it is important to give the media the 
opportunity to assess for themselves the state of affairs.  Rid cites B. Whitman’s The Birth of 
Embedding as a Pentagon War Policy, in which Whitman argues that the Pentagon’s media 
operators hoped that media embeds would act as credible and objective observers who would 
inform people about the progress of the war.55 If no journalists witnessed battles or informed 
the American people of the outcomes, Iraqi propaganda would have to be contested solely by 
the American military. If the military addressed Iraqi propaganda, this would mean that Iraqi 
and American statements would contrast with one another and people would thus have to 
judge for themselves whom to believe and support.56 The DoD’s Joint Information 
Operations doctrine (JP 3-13) spells out that “public affairs is the first-line defense against the 
adversary’s propaganda and disinformation”, and that public affairs helps to defeat the 
enemy’s effort to diminish the nation’s will and morale.57 
Anthony R. DiMaggio58 and Raymundo Villarreal Jr. concur with Rid in that 
adversaries can take advantage of the media’s influencing power: “It seemed certain that the 
US must not allow Saddam’s information minister, known as ‘Bagdad Bob,’ to get the better 
of the media at a crucial period where world opinion would be critical.”59 Paul and Kim cite 
Victoria Clarke as an example in arguing that the American media have significant power to 
influence public opinion. Victoria Clarke advocates that it has been important to let people see 
for themselves what was happening in Iraq through the news media. Because the media have 
developed a tradition of not trusting the military it is, according to Clarke, more fruitful to 
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have media embeds educating the people about the progress of a war war, rather than let 
military officers present assessments of an operation at military briefings.60 Credibility 
guarantees that a message has momentum.61 
Third, Bill Katovsky, Scott Althaus, Kevin Coe, and Carolyn A. Lin argue that the 
EMP would enhance Americans’ group identity and support for the war. Bill Katovsky claims 
that when journalists were allowed to cover the invasion independently, the EMP 
demonstrated that the U.S. favored democratic values such as freedom of speech. Freedom of 
speech contrasted with the Bush administration’s characterization of Hussein, “the dark 
tyranny and disinformation of Saddam’s government.”62 If Americans witnessed U.S. soldiers 
fighting for America and her values and beliefs, a feeling of common identity would be 
produced. A strong group identity would again produce patriotism and support for the war. 
Althaus and Coe writes that group identities create patriotism because people  
Think of themselves first and foremost as members of the in-group—that is, as Americans. 
Consequently, when asked to formulate opinions about the war, citizens may tend to offer support 
because they see support as consistent with the needs of the group.63 
 
When people are exposed to media coverage highlighting American participation and 
successes, Lin argues, a “manufactured consent” is created. This consent will help “advance 
elite capitalistic economic interests—on weighty issues of foreign policy such as war.”64 
Althaus and Coe also stress that if media coverage decreases, many people will find it 
difficult to feel personally connected to the soldiers. People will then judge the war 
independently, resulting in a decline in support for the war.65  
A steady decrease in media embeds in Iraq between March and June 2003 supports 
Althaus and Coe’s claim. On March 20, 408 journalists were embedded. Dooley cites two 
surveys that were conducted by FOX News/Opinion Dynamics Poll. The first survey was 
conducted on March 25-26. Respondents were asked to rate how well they thought the war 
was progressing. Thirty-seven percent of those polled believed that the war was going “very 
well”, forty-six percent believed that it was going “quite well”, nine percent answered “not 
very well”, two percent said “not at all well” while six percent were “not sure”.66 On April 21-
22 2003, respondents were once again asked to rate how the war was going. Eleven percent 
believed that the war was going “very well”, thirty-one percent said “quite well”, twenty-eight 
percent said “not very well”, twenty-seven percent answered “not at all well” and three 
percent were “not sure”.67 This decrease demonstrated by the surveys in the war’s rate of 
favorability is consistent with the overall decrease in media embeds. For example, on March 
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20, 101 journalists were embedded with navy units, on April 9 only twenty-seven were still 
embedded, while the last embed left Iraq on April 16.68 
On May 1 2003, President Bush visited the U.S. aircraft carrier USS Abraham 
Lincoln.69 While onboard he gave a speech saying that “major combat operations in Iraq have 
ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed.”70 By May 2, the 
number of embeds had decreased to 108 and by June 6 only nineteen journalists were still 
embedded.71 Having journalists embedded for an extensive period of time is expensive and 
many news bureaus could not afford to have journalists in Iraq when the number and the 
newsworthiness of the battles decreased. Ferrell and Dooley argue that when media embeds 
retreated from Iraq, a great void was left in the news coverage of the continuing OIF.72 Due to 
media embeds leaving their units, the Pentagon lost a “critical piece of its information 
operations campaign.”73  
 
4.4 Criticism of the EMP 
When the invasion phase was over, many sought to evaluate whether the EMP had benefitted 
the media, the military, as well as the American people and their craving for information 
about OIF. There has been extensive debate concerning what type of coverage the media 
embeds produced and whether the coverage deprived the American people of the total picture 
of the war.  
Most critics of the EMP share the same concern: that the program severely limited the 
way media embeds covered OIF. Their arguments center on the terms “in bed” and 
“Stockholm Syndrome”74. Raymundo Villarreal Jr. provides a very good explanation why 
these terms have been applied by critics. He writes that the premise behind these two terms is 
that when a journalist is constantly interacting with the soldiers in his/her unit, as well as 
having to rely on the military for food, protection, shelter, and acceptance, the journalist loses 
his or her journalistic impartiality and can no longer function as a “Fourth Estate”.75 Andrew 
Lindner explains that the term “Stockholm Syndrome” has been used largely to describe the 
way in which journalists adopt a military identity and consider themselves one of “a band of 
brothers.”76  
In an interview with Barbra Bedway, Chris Hedges, a veteran reporter, argues that the 
EMP made the war easier to see, but harder to understand. When journalists are embedded 
with military units, they see the war through military eyes. The result, according to Hedges, is 
that embedded news reports become distorted and very biased.77 Judith Sylvester and Suzanne 
Huffman confirm Hedges’ claim in arguing in Reporting from the Front that a majority of the 
  70 
media embeds that they had talked to during their study said that they had found it difficult to 
maintain their journalistic objectivity.78 Similarly, Orange County Register columnist Gordon 
Dillow says that when he was embedded with Alpha Company, First Battalion, 5th Marine 
regiment, he could not look anybody in the eye and claim that he was being completely 
objective. While arguing that he does not understand that anyone can claim that he or she 
were writing objectively, he also states that it is not really the media embeds’ job to be 
objective: it is the task of editors to ensure that media embeds’ news reports are presented in 
an objective setting.79  
Journalists Morley Safer and Andy Rooney are also concerned about the lack of 
objectivity that they believed the EMP produced. Lieutenant Colonel Oehl cites Peter 
Johnson’s article, “Reporters Go Along With Military Upbeat Stories Play Well At Home, 
But Critics See Skewed View of War.”  In Johnson’s article, Andy Rooney states that “It’s 
very difficult to write anything critical about a guy you’re going to have breakfast with the 
next morning.”80 Similarly, journalist Robert Jensen, quoted in Colonel Glenn T. Starnes’ 
strategy research paper Leveraging the Media: The Embedded Media Program in Operation 
Iraqi Freedom, argues that media embeds identified too closely with their units. He believes 
that the EMP prevented media embeds from telling the whole story because the program 
authorized the military to control their movements.81  
In Embedded: Weapons of Mass Deception, Danny Schechter fiercely argues that the 
embed program has compromised people’s right to know. He argues that in Iraq there was a 
high-powered media campaign aiming only at promoting the war on Iraq and seeking to shape 
the views of the American people. The EMP, according to him, relied on a media-savvy 
political strategy to sell the administration’s priorities and policies: “There is an intimate link 
between the media, the war and the Bush Administration that even many activists are unaware 
of.”82 
Raymundo Villarreal Jr. points out that many of the critics who argue that embeds are 
“in bed” with the military, also used the catchphrase “soda straw” when describing what kinds 
of news the media embeds produced. “Soda-straw” news is described in Villarreal’s thesis as 
news reports that were high in visual appeal and dramatic detail, but which lacked context, 
perspective or scrutiny. When news reports were interpreted at the various news desks, it was 
difficult to place the news into the wider context of the operation because media embeds 
reported only on slices of the war.83 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was aware of this 
problem and cautioned that an embed’s view could not be regarded as the complete picture of 
the war.84 During the first week of the invasion, he addressed the issue of the embedded news 
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reports and publicly announced that the media’s mood swings as well as their reporting could 
be regarded as somewhat disorienting because they did not reflect the wider picture.85  
Both right-wing and left-wing advocates were concerned about what kind of reporting 
the EMP produced. Twelve Republican congressmen voiced their concerns about the media 
embeds’ “inappropriate” questions that could reduce the military’s fighting spirit: in a letter 
they asked Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to explain why he had not imposed censorship. A 
liberal group, Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, argues that because embeds focused only 
on their own units, no one was presenting the administration with tough questions about Iraqi 
civilian casualties as well as the motives for invading Iraq.86 
 
4.5 Evaluation of the EMP by Press Embeds 
Andrew Jacobs from The New York Times spent five days at one of Pentagon’s media boot 
camps.87 For him the stay there was “alternately enlightening, entertaining, horrifying and 
physically exhausting.” In an article, Jacobs states that he quickly became aware of the 
Pentagon’s underlying motivation for inviting journalists to the boot camps and the 
implementation of the EMP.  
First, Jacobs learned how to react and behave when covering a war because media 
embeds could not become a burden to the units to which they were attached. In his own 
words: “nothing impeded victory like a bleeding reporter.” Second, Jacobs also contends that 
journalists who attended the boot camps could lose their objectivity while embedded: 
All that marching, commiserating and drinking with the Marines makes for warm and fuzzy feelings on 
both sides. By the end of the training, seen-it-all reporters were raving about military rations and the on-
the-record interaction with commanders and lieutenants, who turned out to be genial hosts.88 
 
To Jacobs it became obvious that the close relationship that the boot camps and EMP fostered 
would help the Pentagon to send out positive stories about the military and the war effort.   
Michael Gordon, chief military correspondent for The New York Times, and Peter 
Baker, a Washington Post media embed, argue that Jacobs’ assertion that one lost one’s 
objectivity did not occur. Gordon was embedded with the Land War Command in Iraq. In an 
interview with Paul McLeary, he argues that the EMP can be considered a success and he 
does not agree with critics of the program. He admits that there have been incidents of embeds 
using pronouns such as “we” and “us” when reporting on the unit they were attached to, but 
these are exceptions rather than a general pattern.89 Baker argues that when filing news, most 
serious news journalists will and should consciously block out the relationship they have 
developed with their unit because they should know that if they do not, they will not be able 
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to produce objective news reports.90 The EMP simply enables journalists to get closer to their 
sources, something every journalist seeks to do “whether it's a campaign correspondent 
drinking with political consultants in the hotel bar in Manchester, New Hampshire, or a crime 
reporter hanging out at the precinct house with the cops.” Further, he thinks it ludicrous that 
people, and especially journalists, argue that the EMP jeopardized true news reporting, “We 
beg, and beg and beg for years to get access. Then we finally get it and we go, ‘Oh, this is a 
bad thing!’ How is that bad? There’s nothing bad about it. All it means is that we have to take 
our responsibilities more seriously.”91  
Gordon and Baker’s argumentation gains legitimacy when looking at two empirical 
example from the field. While out with his unit, William Branigin of the Washington Post 
learned that a part of his unit, the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division, which was stationed some 
distance from him, had detected an unidentified vehicle approaching them at full speed. Due 
to the threat of suicide bombers, units were not allowed to go near unidentified vehicles or let 
any vehicles come near them. The platoon leader had not paid attention to his surroundings 
and did not have enough time to fire any warning shots before directly targeting the fast-
approaching vehicle. After firing five or six rounds at the vehicle itself, it was discovered that 
the vehicle was packed with Iraqi civilians. The platoon leader who had fired the deadly shots 
was a twenty-three year old lieutenant. Branigin felt deeply sorry for him because he had to 
carry the burden of having killed innocent civilians for the rest of his life. Branigin reported 
the incident to the Washington Post, but the Pentagon had already published a version which 
differed greatly from his.92 An U.S. military spokesman stated that seven civilians had been 
killed in the incident and that the unit had fired warning shots at the vehicle, but these were 
ignored.93 When Branigin returned to the scene he found ten dead on the spot and was told 
that the eleventh had died from injuries at an American field hospital. Apparently, the 
Pentagon’s initial, lower figures came from the platoon leader before the bodies had been 
removed from the vehicle. Branigin refused to change his story.94  
Second, in his book In the Company of Soldiers, Rick Atkinson, a Washington Post 
journalist embeded with 101 Airborn Divison, recalles an episode where New York Times 
embed Jim Dwyer’s article about Major General David H. Petraeus, commander of the 101st 
Airborne Division, caused much fury. Dwyer’s article portrayled Major General Petraeus as 
being eager to win the war singlehandedly, and the article were not friendly greeted by 
Petraeus.95 Branigin’s and Dwyer’s stories serve as a counterclaim to critics’ denunciation of 
the EMP as a tool for producing biased news reports. If media embeds were “in bed” with 
their units, Branigin would, for example, have succumbed to the information that the 
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Pentagon released about the incident. Despite the fact that he sympathized with the lieutenant 
who had fired the deadly shots, and knew that his story would place his unit in a bad light, and 
that it would compromise his relationship with the unit’s commander, he refused to change his 
story. By adhering to what he had observed, Branigin and his report stand as an example of 
the way in which journalists managed to write objective and professional news reports despite 
being embedded.  
 
4.6 Military Evaluation of the EMP  
The EMP was deemed a success by the military. In his research project, Army Cultural 
Change and Effective Media Relations, Colonel Daniel L. Baggio (U.S. Army) concludes that 
the EMP will and should remain a cornerstone of the military’s public-affairs strategy.96 Brian 
Whitman, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, concurs. He argues 
that media embeds have done a phenomenal job covering the invasion phase from their very 
unique perspective.97 He also stated that an important lesson learned from the EMP was that 
the military and media can work together in a fashion allowing both parties to accomplish 
their professional goals.98 
In an interview with Columbia Journalism Review, Lieutenant Larry Cox, the 
Pentagon’s press Desk Chief, responded to the “soda-straw” criticism voiced by many critics. 
He argued that if the EMP had been responsible for all of the news coverage, it would not 
have been a success because the news would be so one-dimensional. But the American public 
were not deprived of the complete war picture because the media embeds’ narrow and direct 
reporting was balanced by stories published by unilaterals.99 When questioned about the 
media embeds’ reporting, one anonymous commander stated in Assessment of the DoD 
Embedded Media Program that embeds’ reports were generally accurate and fair and he did 
not know of any report that had been biased because of the embed’s relationship with his or 
her unit.100 Likewise, PAO Colonel Guy Shields (U.S Army) claims that if anyone believes 
that media embeds cannot report objectively, this would be just like saying that a soldier who 
is trained to kill cannot be a peacekeeper. Disciplined soldiers can do anything professionally, 
and journalists can bond with their units and still do their jobs professionally.101    
General Tommy Franks states that he is a big fan of the EMP and deems it a success. 
To him, the EMP’s success indicates that the U.S. has taken a step forward to fully 
implementing the First Amendment in practice. If people are to be informed about what their 
military is engaged in, it is necessary to have journalists at the frontlines because this is where 
battles are fought.102 General Richard Mayer also argues that because the U.S. public were 
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provided with a close-up view of the military units and their accomplishments, the EMP 
helped to eliminate some of the cynicism towards the U.S. military that had previously existed 
within the media environment.103  
Colonel Guy Shield and PAO Sergeant Major Carol Sobel argue that the EMP reduced 
the workload of PAOs.104 When unilaterals were caught in crossfire they called American 
PAOs and demanded that they come and rescue them:  
The first time anything goes wrong they call us and say “Come save me.” And we get some of them 
back. Then the second night - the same damn thing - and some of the same damn people.” “Come help 
us,” they begged. I said, “I just talked to you last night!” They would go, “We-hu, we thought it would 
be safer today.” I responded, “Are you people crazy? No story is worth dying for!” After the second 
night, I said no more.105 
 
If the EMP had not been activated and journalists had been placed in pools, many journalists 
would probably have covered the invasion independently due to the negative experiences 
linked to the use of pools in the past. If most journalists had chosen to cover the war 
independently, the PAOs would have been occupied with assisting journalists out in the field. 
The EMP ensured that 408 journalists did not need assistance from military PAOs. 
Even though the EMP was deemed a success by both military units and the Pentagon, 
there were incidents of media embeds and their reporting becoming a liability for the military. 
First, ground rule 4.A states that all interviews with service members will be on the record, 
meaning everything soldiers say to journalists is eligible for publication. Raymundo Villarreal 
Jr. cites an article written by embedded New York Times journalist Dexter Filkins on March 
29 2003.106 In Filkins’s article, “Either Take a Shot or Take a Chance”, Marine sharpshooter, 
Sergeant Eric Schrumpf, explains how Iraqi insurgents often used women and children as 
human shields when firing at American soldiers and how difficult it was to assess whether or 
not to shoot back when Marine lives and security are at stake: “In the heat of a firefight a shot 
not taken in one set of circumstances may suddenly present itself as a life-or-death necessity”. 
Schrumpf recalls an incident in which an Iraqi woman was shot because she was standing 
near an Iraqi soldier. “I’m sorry, but the chick was in the way”, Schrumpf told Filkins.107 The 
military was greatly criticized by both the American and the international press. 108  
Second, Colonel Glenn T. Starnes (U.S. Marine Corps) and Colonel Daniel L. Baggio 
(U.S. Army) both argue that problems occur when media embeds’ news reports reach the 
news desks back home in the United States. Colonel Starnes cites Rachel Smolkin’s Media 
Mood Swings. She explains that when the Pentagon fails to place embedded news reports into 
a larger strategic context, it is often up to unqualified people at news desks to interpret the 
information. If the EMP is to be activated in future military operations, Smolkin argues, it is 
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imperative that the Pentagon develop a system that places news reports into the correct 
strategic context.109 Colonel D. Baggio recalls an incident in which a media embed’s news 
report was interpreted out of context. The following took place in Fallujah on November 13 
2004:   
A Marine shot an apparently helpless Iraqi insurgent in a building while a NBC television crew 
recorded it. There was more to the story. It turns out that these same Marines encountered similar 
situations the day before, evidenced by the following: “Some of the tactics said to be used by the 
insurgents included playing dead and attacking, surrendering and attacking, and rigging dead or 
wounded with bombs. In the November 13th incident, the US Marine apparently believed the insurgent 
was playing dead.” There was justification in the eyes of the U.S. Marines, who redeemed the young 
Marine in the end, as he was determined innocent. But the damage was done, leaving an indelible stain. 
Television, radio, newspapers and magazines around the world carried the story in an unfavourable 
perspective […] The consequence was that countless positive accomplishments were negated by one 
regrettable now-public event that was not readily explained.110  
 
To prevent similar incidents in future military operations, he argues that the media should 
receive pre-operational briefings and explanations of specific tactics, techniques and 
procedures used when clearing buildings. He is not suggesting that the military should 
suppress or censor the media, but instead help them to understanding the context of an 
action.111  
 
4.6.1 After-Action Reports and Lessons Learned  
Military after-action and lessons-learned reports also deemed the EMP a success. Rid argues 
that such military unanimity in praise of military-media relations is unprecedented in recent 
American history.112 In May 2003, the U.S. 1st Marine Division filed its report entitled 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Lessons Learned.113 The report concludes that the EMP can 
be considered a success on three different counts. First, media embeds reduced the Iraqis’ 
ability to conduct a successful propaganda campaign. While having unprecedented access to 
the battlefield, the media embeds had been able to document the Fedayeen’s114 disregard of 
the Laws of War115 and the Geneva Convention.116  
Second, the EMP enhanced relations between the media and the Marines. After having 
personally experienced what being a soldier in a war meant,, media embeds exercised much 
more caution when reporting on wounded and killed U.S. soldiers. Being embedded also 
implied that journalists had the opportunity to clarify their understanding of an event with 
soldiers and commanders before releasing the story. Because soldiers and journalists were 
constantly interacting with each other, a bond of trust developed which led to soldiers in news 
reports being presented in a much more personal and humanistic way than earlier: “To the 
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viewers and readers, the 1st Marine Division was not an anonymous killing machine, it was an 
18 year-old Marine from Anywhere, USA.”117  
Third, media embeds served as links between soldiers and their loved ones. By reading 
news articles and watching reports made by media embeds, soldiers’ families were updated 
daily. In addition, soldiers used the journalists’ equipment to communicate with their families 
back home. According to the report, this culminated in better morale among both Marines and 
their families.   
On page 35 in the lessons learned report it is stated that news reports written by 
embeds were highly influenced by the kinds of accomplishments the 1st Division’s units 
achieved. Because the 1st Division’s units had attained all their pre-set goals, the units were 
given favorable news coverage. But the report questioned what type of coverage the units 
would have received if the Coalition had lost a battalion in a chemical attack. It states that 
 
we need to pause and remember that we were both good and lucky. We achieved victory quickly and we 
were successful in keeping our casualties low. We took great pains to limit collateral damage and this 
paid off in the court of public opinion.118    
 
Because future military operations might not be equally successful, the report states that it is 
important to remember that the media had on several occasions jumped on “the bandwagon of 
doom and gloom”, and would probably do so again.119 Because future military operations will 
face different media environments, the 1st Division argues that embedding media in OIF can 
be considered only a limited success and that EMP should not be implemented as a standard 
procedure. A thorough risk/benefit analysis would be needed before embedding the media in 
future combat operations.120 That even the 1st Division of the Marines, a fraction of a branch 
that is famous for its open public-affairs strategy, advocates a risk/benefit analysis may lead 
one to assume that future military operations will probably continue to experience a clash 
between the cultures of the media and the military.   
An After Action Report Operation Iraqi Freedom was released by the Third Infantry 
Division (Mechanized) in July 2003. First, the report highlights two points justifying why 
joint training before departure should be the norm in future operations. The first point said 
that such joint training helped both the military and the media to develop TTPs that would 
work as well as possible in the field.121 Joint exercises also improved military-media relations. 
Both commanders and soldiers felt more at ease after spending time with media embeds 
before the launch date of operations. Being comfortable around media embeds resulted in the 
military having more trust in journalists.122 Due to this positive experience, the report argues 
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that, in future military operations, the embed program should be activated as early as possible 
to build a trusting relationship.123  
Second, embeds acquired a realistic understanding of combat operations. They were 
also more optimistic in their reporting than were unilaterals who attended only briefings at the 
Pentagon, at CENTCOM in Qatar or at the Coalition Forces Land Component Command 
(CFLCC) in Kuwait. Coverage of a scheduled pause during a sandstorm near An Najaf 
illustrates how important it was for the Third Infantry Division to have media embeds 
attached to its units. The unit 3ID grasped the opportunity to refit and refuel while the 
sandstorm was at its most extreme. Unilaterals were not aware that the sandstorm made it 
impossible for the unit to proceed with their scheduled plan, and started to suggest that the 
military was in a “quagmire”, and that the invasion plan was flawed because the unit had 
retreated. In reality, this pause had in fact been just that - a pause. Media embeds countered 
this negative assessment in their news report.124 
 
4.7 Content Analyse of Print-News Articles 
At the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association in Montreal, Canada, 
Andrew Lindner presented his paper Among the Troops: Seeing the Iraq War Through Three 
Journalistic Vantage Points, the first systematic documentation of the substantive content of 
the news coverage during OIF.  Lindner conducted a content analysis of 742 print news 
articles written by 156 journalists from the major combat period of the war. The articles were 
divided into three categories based on what type of journalist had written them: media 
embeds, unilateral journalists and journalists who had reported only from Baghdad.  
First, the content analysis revealed that ninety-three percent of articles written by 
media embeds had soldiers as their main sources, compared to 42.8 percent of unilateral 
articles and 24.4 percent of articles written by journalists based in Baghdad. This is hardly 
surprising as media embeds spent most of their time with military units. Second, thirty-seven 
percent of all articles written by media embeds were what one might call human-interest 
stories, focusing on soldiers’ experiences, biographies and feelings. Only 1.4 percent of 
unilateral articles focused on this topic while no journalists based in Baghdad covered it. 
Third, unilaterals and journalists based in Baghdad were much more adept at reporting on 
bombings than embeds. 45.7 percent of articles written by reporters stationed in Baghdad and 
41.4 percent of unilateral coverage covered bombing, while only 22.6 percent of media 
embeds covered the issue. Fourth, 49.6 percent of articles written by journalists based in 
Baghdad mentioned civilian casualties while 29.7 percent of unilateral coverage and 11.5 
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percent of coverage by media embeds mentioned the same topic. Lindner explains that the 
percentages concerning this topic are so diverging because seventy-five percent of articles 
written by unilaterals and journalists in Baghdad used civilians as sources, while only 22.3 
percent of the media embeds used civilians as sources. Fifth, articles covering Iraqi human-
interest stories appeared in 43.4 percent of unilateral and Baghdad-based articles, while only 
8.5 percent of media embeds wrote about them. Sixth, only 11.5 percent of articles written by 
embeds mention any of the at least 2,100 civilian deaths (as of August 11, 2006), while thirty  
percent of unilaterals and  nearly fifty percent of Baghdad-based articles mention this. 
 Lindner’s content analysis clearly reveals that media embeds were much more likely 
to report on issues that only affected their own units and they did not pay much attention to 
other topics such as civilian casualties or culture-related issues. It is also revealed that people 
who read only news articles written by media embeds were not presented with the whole 
picture of the war. Critics who argue that media embeds were in fact “in bed” with the units 
thus seem to support Lindner findings. But, as Linder concludes, one cannot blame media 
embeds for covering only small fractions of OIF because the EMP is designed to maximize 
the media embeds’ interaction with the units. Likewise, EMP minimizes the media embeds’ 
opportunity to see what is happening at places other than where they are stationed.125 
 
4.8 Pew Research Center: Working Conditions and Public Opinion 
The Project for Excellence in Journalism (PEJ) is a non-partisan and non-political project, 
and one of eight projects that make up the Pew Research Center in Washington D.C. From 
September 28 to November 7 2007, the PEJ conducted a survey whose main goal was to get a 
sense of the conditions that journalists faced when covering the Iraq war between 2003 and 
2007. 111 journalists from twenty-nine different news organizations (including newspapers, 
wire services, magazines, radio, and network and cable television) took part in the survey. 
More than eighty-five percent of those who took part had at some point embedded with U.S. 
troops: all responses were anonymous.   
Participants were asked to rate what kinds of advantages and limitations the EMP had 
imposed on media embeds. Sixty percent of the participants believed that the EMP had 
provided them with an advantage to access places and meet military personnel that they 
would not have had if they had covered the invasion as unilaterals. Twenty-five percent also 
answered that the EMP had enhanced journalists’ insight into U.S. troops and what kind of 
lives soldiers live. When discussing what kinds of limitations the EMP created, thirty percent 
believed that the U.S. military could restrict journalists’ access. The survey does not explain 
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why the thirty percent who stated this believed that the U.S. could impose restrictions. 
Fourteen percent stated that the EMP had prevented them from writing news reports about 
civilian Iraqis.  
That some media embeds found it problematic to engage with Iraqi civilians is 
reconfirmed by the participants who were asked to rate the topic that had been given the 
poorest coverage. Sixty-two percent answered that ordinary Iraqis had received too little 
coverage. When asked what topic they felt had been given the best coverage, an 
overwhelming majority of eighty-two percent placed the reporting of American units at the 
top. A majority of the participants do not agree with critics’ claims of biased news reports by 
media embeds. Seventy percent answered that they believed embedded media coverage 
produced an accurate picture of what was happening in Iraq. Only fifteen percent believed 
that media embeds made the situation look better than it was. 126 
The PEJ survey cites a second survey by the Pew Research Center. a public-opinion 
survey conducted on August 24-27 2007. Question five in the survey asked:  “In general, do 
you think news reports are making the situation in Iraq seem worse than it really is or better 
than it really is, or are reports showing the situation about the way it really is?” In October 
2003, thirty-eight percent believed that the news reports made OIF look worse, fourteen 
percent thought that they made it look better, thirty-six percent believed that the war was 
presented accurately, and twelve percent did not know.  
 
4.9 The Institute for Defense Analyses: Military-Media Relations and News-Bureau 
Chiefs 
One month after the fall of Baghdad, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Public Affairs requested that the Institute for Defense Analyses conduct an independent 
survey of the EMP. The survey, Assessment of the DoD Embedded Media Program, found 
that embeds were generally very impressed with the quality, professionalism, and dedication 
of the military units. Being embedded with a unit for a longish period of time had increased 
their respect for the members of the unit and the military as a profession.127 
Due to past experiences with the military, many news-bureau chiefs had initially been 
sceptical of the program. Bureau chiefs were worried that their journalists would lose their 
objectivity or that military commanders would try to manipulate and control what kind of 
coverage their units were given.128 However, after the invasion phase had been completed, 
most bureau chiefs were very pleased with the coverage that the media embeds had produced. 
In the survey, an anonymous bureau chief stated that “The American public had a first hand 
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view—good, bad, and ugly—right in their living room. They got to see the war from the 
perspective of so many different soldiers. There was no effort by the military to hide anything 
or the media to sensationalize anything—just an effort to provide the facts.”129 A second 
anonymous bureau chief stated that the program had not just been about the military doing the 
media a favor by letting them in, but it had also been good for America because American 
citizens have the right to see how “American dollars and blood are being expended.”130 
The preconceived notion and fear of a hostile and uncooperative military had been 
shattered. Compared to earlier military operations, the attitude of the Pentagon and the units 
had been positive, and the level of support they offered had been high. Responding to the 
soda-straw criticism, bureau chiefs stated that it was primarily their responsibility, and not the 
military’s, to provide a broad view of OIF, and they had not expected media embeds to 
provide a complete picture of the war because they could not know anything about what was 
happening elsewhere in Iraq. The media embeds wrote about their specific unit and not about 
what happened at other locations in Iraq.131 The Institute of Defense Analyses concluded that 
the trust and confidence that had developed between commanders and media embeds had 
been a critical factor in the EMP’s success. Commanders had appreciated the media embeds’ 
reports and contributions and had treated them as a part of their teams.132  
One general assessment stated by the news-bureau chiefs that participated in the 
survey was that if EMP were activated during the next U.S. military operation, it should not 
be the only reporting method. It was successful because it supplemented other types of media 
coverage.133
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Chapter 5 
Analysis 
 
5.0 Media Culture vs. Military Culture 
A clash of cultures between the media and the military has made it difficult for them to agree 
upon the level of media access during military operations. The very nature of the two sets of 
institutions contrasts starkly. In order to carry out their jobs, the media and the military 
depend on different levels of openness and access.1 Frank Aukofer explains that military 
commanders are trained and drilled in the area of “operational security”, which is based on 
the premise that an adversary can analyze published information and accurately assess the 
U.S. military’s capabilities or intentions and the locations of stationed U.S troops. Information 
is a key to military success: operational secrecy is necessary if operational strategy and tactics 
are to succeed.2 As Rear Admiral Steven Pietropapli argues: “At the core, if it comes down to 
operational security or press access, you’re exactly right: military officers will always choose 
operational security.”3  
The media does not share the military’s need for operational security. To survive in a 
competitive business while acting as a check on the government and educating the American 
people about governmental actions during wartime, it is necessary for the media to have 
complete access to information. Almost like a law of nature, the media will always crave open 
access and no censorship while the military is heavily dependent on secrecy and operational 
security. This clash of cultures has highly influenced the media’s access to the battlefield 
since the Vietnam War.  
 
5.1 Military Culture Influences Public-Affairs Strategy. 
The decision to implement a restrictive public-affairs strategy secured military operational 
strategy and security during both the Grenada Invasion and the Persian Gulf War. Although 
this restrictive public-affairs strategy varied in the level of journalistic access, the Grenada 
Invasion and the Persian Gulf War share one key feature: the nature of the operations implied 
that operational strategy and security would be at risk if journalists were allowed to cover the 
war independently. Operational security and the strategic imperative in Grenada depended on 
the element of surprise, so media coverage of any kind would have jeopardized the operation, 
compromised the invasion’s initial objectives, and placed American soldiers’ and 
commanders’ lives in danger. By imposing a news blackout lasting two-and-a-half days, the 
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military was able to control journalists’ access to military units as well as their access to the 
battlefield. 
Technological advances led to journalists covering the Persian Gulf War being better 
equipped to report independently than journalists had been in 1983. The Pentagon regarded 
equipment such as portable satellite telephones and television sets as endangering both the 
operation and military personnel stationed out in the Kuwaiti desert. Indeed, electronic signals 
from satellite phones could be picked up by Iraqi satellites and used as intelligence. Because 
the Iraqi military would most likely assume that journalists were reporting from locations at 
which American combat units were positioned, independent media coverage would place 
soldiers and commanders in great danger. News coverage revealing sensitive information 
would also provide Hussein and his regime with valuable information that could harm the 
overall operation. For example, information which revealed low levels of supplies and 
technical difficulties would help to boost Hussein’s war efforts and fighting spirit.  
The procedure of allowing journalists to access the battlefield in pools allowed the 
military in Grenada and in the Persian Gulf War to control both the press’s access to the 
battlefield and its level of interaction with military units. In contrast to Grenada, press pools in 
the Persian Gulf War facilitated a higher degree of press access to the battlefield and military 
personnel and thus increased the level of danger for the military, but censorship by public-
affairs officers and the Joint Information Bureau in Dhahran ensured that journalists complied 
with Operation Desert Shield/Ground Rules and Guidelines for News Media and thus reduced 
the risk of journalists reporting on sensitive information. 
 An experimental public-affairs strategy secured military operational strategy and 
security in Bosnia and Afghanistan. Unlike restrictive public-affairs strategy, which judges 
media coverage to be a liability to an operation’s strategy and security, this experimental 
public-affairs strategy turned public-affairs into an operational strategic advantage. In both the 
Bosnia intervention and the Afghanistan War, public-affairs strategy was implemented into 
the broader operational strategy. In Bosnia, press embeds and news coverage were used as 
instruments to pressure former enemy fractions into complying with the Dayton Peace 
Accord. Instead of regarding journalists as undesirable actors on the battlefield, the press was 
turned into a force multiplier. From a military viewpoint, embedding in Bosnia and “Ricks’ 
Rule” demonstrate the necessity of establishing and implementing pre-set ground rules in 
public-affairs strategy before combat is entered into. With no pre-set ground rules, it was up 
to each press embed to evaluate what constituted a threat to operational strategy and security. 
The combination of a competitive news business and the revoking of the draft in 1973 
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resulted in many journalists not always being adequately competent to evaluate what 
constituted a threat and what did not.  
Like in Bosnia, the Pentagon decided upon an untraditional public-affairs strategy in 
the Afghanistan War. Unlike in the Bosnia intervention, journalists covering the Afghanistan 
War did not help the military to reach its pre-set goals. Similar to the Grenada Invasion and 
the Persian Gulf War, the nature of the Afghanistan War influenced the Pentagon’s choice of 
public-affairs strategy. Embedding journalists in the first six weeks of the war would have 
jeopardized the Special Forces’ operations. From a military point of view, the Coalition 
Information Centers, operating twenty-four hours a day, served as a successful 
counterpropaganda instrument. The centers’ reactive and proactive approach prevented the 
Taliban’s propaganda from spreading to civilian Afghans. If Taliban propaganda reached 
civilian Afghans, more people might join the Taliban and thus make the operation more 
difficult and more dangerous for the U.S. military. Pre-stated ground rules for press embeds in 
Afghanistan secured operational security to a much greater degree than “Ricks’ Rule” had in 
Bosnia. 
Strategic public-affairs strategy in the invasion phase of the Iraq War, in the form of 
the Embedded Media Program (EMP), turned press embeds into potential threats to both 
operational security and the security of units because press embeds had access to classified 
information. In Iraq, journalists participating in the EMP were not subject to military 
censorship, and they could easily report on topics which public affairs officers would regard 
as too sensitive to be published. Indeed, there were several incidents of journalists reporting 
live who accidentally revealed their unit’s position or future plans. Like in the Persian Gulf 
War, the Hussein regime anno 2003 could again use American media coverage as intelligence 
sources and subsequently be able to eradicate American units by plotting in the units’ location 
coordinates into missile computers. But the risk of embeds revealing dangerous information 
was very low because when journalists were attached to their units day-and-night for months 
at a time, they would also be placed in harm’s way if they reported on sensitive information 
such as their unit’s location. A fear of being killed would make most journalists more 
sympathetic to following the Public Affairs Guidance on Embedding Media. 
Unlike the restrictive and experimental public-affairs strategies, offensive public-
affairs strategy in Iraq turned media embeds into participants in the war. Because the EMP 
ensured that journalists saw and experienced everything their units saw and experienced, news 
reports describing American military progress or successful combat operations were used as 
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facets in a game of psychological warfare whose main goal was to coerce Hussein into taking 
decisions which were favorable to the U.S. military. 
Embedded journalists were also considered an advantage in terms of war morale. After 
action- and lessons learned reports presented in chapter 4 showed that journalists helped boost 
soldiers’ confidence in themselves and in the mission they were deployed to. First, being 
interviewed in a newspaper or magazine helped to build up soldiers’ confidence in 
themselves. When portrayed as self-sacrificing young Americans prepared to go to war for the 
country they loved, for example, many soldiers gained extra courage and fought with much 
more devotion. Second, journalists helped soldiers and commanders stay in touch with their 
families and friends. By using journalists’ computers and satellite telephones, many soldiers 
heard encouraging words from home. Being reminded about loved ones back home made 
soldiers more determined to swiftly reach Operation Iraqi Freedom’s goals so they could 
return home as quickly as possible. Compared to the two other public-affairs strategies 
examined then, strategic public-affairs strategy not only ensured the military’s need for 
security in the invasion phase of the Iraq War, but also made the operation’s goals easier to 
reach as the strategy used embedded journalists’news reports in their operational strategy as 
well a mean to keep soldiers’ morale high. 
 
5.2 The Press’s Ability to Serve as a Check on the Government During Times of 
Military Engagement 
A restrictive public-affairs strategy hindered the press from serving as a check on the 
government. The news blackout in Grenada is the most severe restriction ever imposed on the 
press in post-Vietnam military operations. The combination of not being provided with any 
information and being physically denied access to the island forced journalists to work under 
conditions found only in dictatorships. The procedure of allowing journalists to access the 
battlefield only in pools made journalists in both Grenada and the Persian Gulf War highly 
dependent on military personnel for information. In Grenada and the Persian Gulf War, pool 
restrictions varied, but both operations share a common feature: being dependent on only one 
type of source combined with not being allowed to gather information independently 
culminated in a lack of objective news reports and much inaccurate reporting. Pools can thus 
be regarded as an instrument for controlling news coverage. 
An inability to crosscheck information prevented the press from serving as a check on 
the government during both the Grenada Invasion and the Persian Gulf War. The true picture 
of American military’s engagement, operations, and the level of success of the war were 
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hidden from the American people as the military controlled the level of access to the 
battlefield and the type of information the media were allowed to report on. In Grenada, pools 
were escorted to the same locations, and were thus actively hindered in gathering any new 
information. In addition, journalists were not allowed to interview American soldiers, enemy 
prisoners, or the rescued medical students. The official claim that no planes were allowed to 
leave Grenada and that the American medical students therefore had to be rescued serves as 
one of the most striking cases of Americans being misinformed and presented with inaccurate 
information. In the aftermath of the war, it was revealed that the students were in no real 
danger and could have left the island on their own without much difficulty. One of President 
Reagan’s three justifications for invading Grenada was thus proved illegitimate. In the Persian 
Gulf War, the sizes of the press pools and military censorship made journalists dependent on 
military information provided at briefings at the JIB. News stories based on information 
received at such briefings reported that U.S. bombing missions against Scud missiles had an 
eighty percent success rate: in fact, for every bomb that actually hit its target, there had been 
between seventy to seventy-five misses.  
 During the Grenada Invasion and the Persian Gulf War, the American people accepted 
media restrictions. In November and December 1983, fifty-two percent of respondents in the 
Roper Organization poll answered that they had no difficulty accepting restricted media 
access in Grenada. In the Persian Gulf War, the gap between the press’ claim of little and 
insufficient information and the American peoples’ perception of overall media restrictions 
was even greater. In January 1991, eighty-eight percent of the participants in the Time survey 
answered that due to the Persian Gulf War’s circumstances, they supported some censorship 
of the press and seventy-nine percent argued that they had been given enough information 
about the war. The public’s support for media restrictions can be linked to Scott Althaus’s, 
Kevin Coe’s, and Carolyn A. Lin’s arguments that news reports which highlight military 
accomplishments and progress create patriotism and support for a war. Especially in the 
Persian Gulf War, pools and censorship contributed to highly glorified news reports of 
military accomplishments. As Douglas Porch argues, when victory in a war has been 
achieved, it will “erase the memories of a troubled relationship” and Americans forget how 
the Johnson administration deceived them in the Vietnam War. 4 
Restrictive public-affairs strategy challenged the very essence of the media business. 
The size of the pools in both Grenada and the Persian Gulf War made journalists from 
competing newspapers and magazines dependent upon each other. Sharing valuable 
information with competing news bureaus would never have taken place during peacetime. To 
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get more readers and earn more money, an exclusive story is needed. Having to rely on 
information collected by competitors meant that journalists could never be certain that the 
information in their possession was correct or of the quality one expects to find in 
professional, objective news reports. According to the Washington Post, in nine of ten cases 
information which was collected by pools was too superficial to be published.   
Compared to restrictive public-affairs strategy, experimental public-affairs strategy 
provided journalists with greater access to U.S. military units. DoD Principles for News 
Media Coverage of DoD Operations Statement of Principles: News Coverage of Combat and 
the reathorization of it in 2000, DoD Directive 5122.5 Statement of DoD Principles for New 
Media presented in chapter 3, recognized the media’s constitutional right to cover military 
operations as well as improved the media’s access to the battlefield and their working 
conditions considerably. 
 Easier access to information did not, however, provide the American people with a 
true and complete picture of the way in which units experienced the two operations. In both 
Bosnia and Afghanistan, the American people’s knowledge about the operations and military 
units was compromised when the press was prevented from writing objective news reports. 
Both during and after Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia, the American people were 
exposed to a false picture of the war. In Operation Deliberate Force, the procedure which 
allowed commanders to decide what kind of information was eligible for publication left the 
American people with various impressions of U.S. soldiers, commanders and the operation 
itself. For example, a reader of newspaper “A” would be provided with more or less 
information then a reader of newspaper “B” or “C”.  
In addition, the implementation of “Ricks’ Rule” prevented journalists from reporting 
objectively in Bosnia. Because the rule made it easier for journalists to come into contact with 
military personnel and gather information, many did not condemn the rule. A critical reader, 
however, might argue that “Ricks’ Rule” created a false picture of the war and the military 
and that the rule severely limited the press’s ability to serve as a check on the government. It 
is understandable and very much accepted that the press is not allowed to publish sensitive 
and classified information, but when press embeds were for example actively prevented from 
describing how soldiers experienced the operation and the military’s assessment of the level 
of success, the American people were not provided with a clear picture of the intervention and 
the Clinton administration could have, in theory, kept the U.S. involved in a operation that a 
majority of Americans did not want their country to participate in. In practice, “Ricks’ Rule” 
authorized informal military censorship. 
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Furthermore, the Pentagon’s two-pronged public-affairs strategy in Afghanistan 
provided the American people with much information about the war and combat operations, 
but this information was neither sufficient nor objective. Being denied access to units for six 
weeks forced journalists to rely on information published by the Coalition Information 
Centers. Although the Centers on occasions released information that was not positive, they 
took advantage of journalists’ dependence on military information in the first six weeks. By 
systematically emphasizing positive incidents and accomplishments, the Pentagon managed 
news coverage: the Centers’ proactive strategy literally undermined the whole notion of 
having free and independent press. When the first American died from friendly fire, the 
American people were not informed about the incident until a week later, and the Pentagon 
thus exploited many Americans faith in their leaders telling them the whole truth of how the 
war was progressing. Clarke’s statement that the American people needed and deserved to 
hear from their leaders what their country was accomplishing seems to be a dichotomy in that 
the Pentagon had established a system that systematically highlighted positive aspects of the 
war effort over negative ones. By not revealing the true picture of the war to journalists, and 
subsequently not allowing the American people to determine for themselves whether or not 
their country was to further engage in the war, the essence of a democracy, the people’s 
opinion, was greatly weakened.  
Embedding in Afghanistan did not ensure the press’ need for information about the 
War on Terror. To journalists, the embedding procedure created an “incredible amount of 
press restriction.” First, the military and journalists did not agree as to what embedding 
actually meant. Directive 5122.5 states that independent reporting is to be the principle means 
employed whenever journalists cover U.S. military operations. But in Afghanistan, press 
embeds were not allowed to cover military units independently: they were sent out in groups. 
To journalists, embedding meant spending much time with military units and becoming 
personally acquainted with soldiers and commanders. However, on only three separate 
occasions did embeds spend a considerable time with units. Even when journalists were 
allowed to embed with units for a short period of time - for four to five days - embeds were 
prevented from talking to American and Afghan soldiers. 
 Second, the number of journalists that were allowed to embed was too low to cover 
large-scale operations. In Operation Swift Freedom, five media embeds were supposed to 
cover 9,000 soldiers from the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marines. The journalists onboard the USS 
Peleliu produced informative news reports, but as they had to cover 1,800 soldiers each, it 
was difficult gain a complete picture of the operation. That the Pentagon secretly invited just a 
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few lucky journalists to embed with Army units demonstrates the level of power the Pentagon 
possessed over the media. In terms of the media’s perspective, embedding in Afghanistan 
reveals how important it is to have pre-established ground rules which clearly state the 
media’s rights when covering a war. Similar to “Ricks’ Rule”, the ground rules in 
Afghanistan made the media wholly subordinate to the military during military operations. 
As with the case of restrictive public-affairs, the USA Today/Gallup poll reveals that 
even though journalists and press embeds believed that the American people were not 
informed adequately about the Afghanistan War, the American people did not have any 
problem making up their minds as to whether American military engagement in Afghanistan 
was a mistake after having American forces stationed in the country for two months. An 
alternative interpretation of the results from the polls is that the Coaltition Inforamantion 
Centers’s preemptive approach actually worked. Whenever positive stories about military 
engagement in Afghanistan were systematically highlighted, Americans’ perceptions of the 
war were influenced. As the Vietnam War had shown, as long as people are exposed to 
positive war information, public support for the war will remain high.   
Strategic public-affairs strategy in Iraq provided embedded journalists with access to 
information on an unprecedented scale. Sixty percent of journalists participating in the Pew 
Research Center survey believed that the EMP had provided them with an unprecedented 
opportunity to access places and meet military personnel they otherwise would not have had if 
they had covered the invasion as unilaterals. Because the press embeds of The New York 
Times and the Washington Post were aware of the possibility that they could lose their 
objectivity and, indeed, actively refused to adhere to the Pentagon’s official version of events, 
they only served as a check on the Bush administration in terms of the way in which the war 
was progressing. Because media embeds only covered how the war was progressing and how 
their units experienced the invasion, they could not, for example, produce investigative 
reports about whether or not Hussein had actually acquired the nuclear arms the Bush 
administration claimed he had or report on how civilian Iraqis experienced the invasion.  
Although press embeds were not able to cover all aspects of the invasion and thus did 
not serve as a complete check on the government, strategic public-affairs strategy in the form 
of the EMP gave journalists the opportunity to see for themselves whether or not the invasion 
phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom was successful in terms of combat success. As one 
anonymous bureau chief stated in a survey conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses, 
the EMP allows the American people to see how “American dollars and blood are being 
expended.” An evaluation of combat achievements is the first marker as to whether an 
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operation is successful or not. It is therefore crucial that journalists are provided with access 
to units and the battlefield. If journalists had not been embedded with units and the invasion 
had failed, the Bush administration would, as the examination of earlier public-affairs 
strategies has revealed, have had no significant problem with de-emphasizing lost battles, 
combat and soldiers killed by friendly fire. If the invasion turned out to be a major failure and 
journalists were not actively engaging with soldiers and commanders on the battlefield, a 
credibility gap, similar to the one that developed in the Vietnam War, could emerge if 
President Bush sought to carry on with the war of his own choosing.  
News reports written by press embeds did not provide the American people with a 
complete picture of the war.  Andrew Lindner’s paper Among the Troops: Seeing the Iraq 
War Through Three Journalistic Vantage Points reveals that news reports written by press 
embeds were largely biased and did not contribute to a broad and encompassing picture of the 
invasion. Of 742 printed news articles, 690.6 had soldiers as their main source. 274.5 articles 
focused on how soldiers experienced the war, while only eighty-five mentioned civilian 
casualties. This lack of emphasis on the Iraqi civilian aspect of the invasion is reconfirmed by 
a Project for Excellence in Journalism survey. Of 111 journalists (of whom ninety-four had 
been embedded), ninety-one responded that American units had received the best coverage 
while 68.8 believed that ordinary Iraqis had received too little coverage.  
The research-paper’s hypothesis is then fully tested and proved partly right in its 
assumption. Strategic public-affairs strategy did not jeopardize military operational strategy 
and security, but the press were not able serve as a complete check on the government 
because press embeds were attached to the military units at all times and were thus not able to 
engage in investigative journalism during the invasion phase of the Iraq War. Embedded 
journalists were, however, able to serve as a check in terms of war-progress to a much more 
satisfying degree than what restrictive and experimental public-affairs strategy had previously 
allowed. Because press embeds were attached to the units, strategic public-affairs strategy did 
not provide Americans with a total picture of the war. But that U.S. military units received 
more coverage than what Iraqi civilians did can, however, not be used as a criticism of the 
EMP. The EMP was designed to give journalists detailed and high-quality news reports about 
units and their participation in the invasion, not provide a broad and comprehensive account 
of the whole invasion. A week into the invasion, the American people were informed by 
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld that the EMP was not designed to reflect the broader picture. 
Editors participating in the Institute for Defense Analyses survey acknowledged that they, and 
not the military, were responsible for providing the American people with a broad view of the 
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invasion phase in OIF. If newspapers and television stations wants to be considered 
professional and objective media actors, it is the editors and managers that are ultimately 
responsible for exposing their readers and viewers to multiple points of views. The number of 
unilaterals in Iraq exceeded the number of media embeds. But because the research-paper has 
not been able to locate any surveys that focus on how unilateral news reports influenced the 
American people’s perception of the Iraq war, it is impossible for this paper to provide an 
answer to whether the combination unilateral-press embed news reports actually provided the 
American people with an encompassing picture of the war. 
 
5.3 The Pentagon and Commanders Influence Public-Affairs Strategy 
A disastrous public-affairs strategy in Vietnam and a tarnished military reputation gave way 
to a new military way of perceiving news coverage of military operations. A characteristic 
shared by the Persian Gulf War, the Bosnia intervention, the Afghanistan war, and the 
invasion phase of the Iraq War is that in addition to securing operational strategy and security, 
the Pentagon and commanders, in varying degrees, have used public-affairs strategies as an 
instrument to improve the U.S military’s reputation and separate military engagement from 
political goals and incentives. In comparison to the Pentagon and U.S. Marine commanders, 
U.S. Army commanders have been slower to recognize and value the advantages media 
coverage provides. The Persian Gulf War served as a turning point in terms of how U.S. 
Army commanders regarded media coverage and since the Bosnia Intervention, U.S. Army 
commanders have embraced media coverage. Army commanders have thus served as a 
negative as well as a positive influential factor.   
 First, setting aside the need for operational security, military public-affairs strategy 
serves as an indicator of how the Pentagon and commanders have experienced media 
coverage. The Pentagon and commanders have gone through a learning process in terms of 
how they regard media coverage and journalists. Whenever a military operation has been 
successful, and as long as the nature of the operation has allowed it, journalists have been 
given increased access to the battlefield and combat units in the subsequent operation. After 
learning that news coverage can present military accomplishments favorably, each new 
public-affairs strategy has become more accommodating that the preceding one and ground 
rules, staring with the DoD Principles for News Media Coverage of DoD Operations in 1992, 
have gradually emphasized a military obligation of providing adequate journalistic access and 
support journalists on the battlefield.  
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A major lesson learned in the Grenada Invasion was that if journalists were placed 
under heavy restrictions, the military would not receive the praise they believed they deserved 
and were instead turned into “the bad guys” as they had been after the Vietnam War. When 
restricted, journalists emphasized the negative traits in military organization instead of 
focusing on the operation’s progress. A desire for positive media coverage combined with a 
new war environment produced a less restrictive public-affairs strategy in the Persian Gulf 
War. The National Media Pool program was designed to allow journalists to witness and 
report on media accomplishments and bravery. The program did secure some positive 
coverage, but journalistic access to the battlefield was considered inadequate, leading to the 
old and highly unflattering characterization of the military as protectionist and uncooperative 
being sustained. The U.S. Army’s routine knowledge assets in combination with insufficient 
resources and a lack of attention on public affairs during the planning stage of the war 
produced difficult working conditions for journalists, resulting ultimately in less coverage 
than had been anticipated and wished for. After the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. Marines’ use 
of news coverage became a source of inspiration. Media coverage had increased soldiers’ 
morale, combat was given much coverage, and journalists had formed a positive image of the 
Marines.  
Unlike previous military operations, U.S. Army commanders invited journalists to 
embed with units in Bosnia, hoping that it would create a more professional picture of Army 
soldiers. A continuance of using public-affairs strategy to improve military reputation can be 
identified in the Afghanistan War, during which commanders played a more prominent role in 
securing positive news coverage than the Pentagon. U.S. Marine commanders, adhering to 
their tradition of welcoming journalists, allowed five journalists to embed during Operation 
Swift Freedom without securing the Pentagon’s consent. Despite a negative encounter with 
media coverage in Bosnia, U.S. Army finally broke its old pattern of animosity toward the 
media in the Afghanistan War. Army commanders learned that journalists, despite being 
placed under restrictions, produced positive and engaging news reports about military 
participation and professionalism when they had a first-hand view of what it was like to be a 
soldier at war.  
Drawing on experiences made in Bosnia and Afghanistan, U.S. Army commanders in 
Iraq were the first ones to recognize the importance of using news coverage as an instrument 
for separating military engagement from the political aspect of the controversial invasion. The 
Pentagon’s ground rules for the Embedded Media Program secured journalists close and 
personal access to military units. The Pentagon’s initiative to allow journalists to experience 
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military life at boot camps before deployment enhanced both journalists’ understanding and 
the military’s respect for and knowledge about their former wartime enemy. Journalists 
engaging with soldiers for twenty-four hours a day for long periods of time wrote positive and 
gripping stories and news reports about the hardships of being a soldier at war and what kinds 
of sacrifices soldiers made to secure American victory. Providing journalists with full access 
to units in Iraq led to the military’s once tarnished and battered reputation being transformed 
into a highly positive and praiseworthy reputation.  
Second, the Pentagon and commanders have supported journalistic presence on the 
battlefield when media-military relations have been strained. After Operation Deliberate 
Force in Bosnia, the Pentagon, supported by commanders, sought to prevent Army soldiers 
from reverting to their old habit of perceiving news coverage as a mere liability. When 
Thomas E. Ricks’ less flattering article was published, the Army witnessed that the attitude of 
military staff to media coverage relapsed and once again became more negative. But unlike 
soldiers who often saw no point in talking to journalists, the Pentagon and commanders 
evaluated a journalistic presence based on the way in which this had affected the military as a 
whole. Media coverage had helped to separate military activities from American political 
involvement and, except for Fontenot’s racist comment, coverage had mostly presented 
soldiers as professional and very dedicated. Although the Pentagon’s implementation of 
“Ricks’ Rule” favored soldiers more than it did journalists, the rule prevented hostile routine 
knowledge assets from taking root among military personnel. 
 
5.4 Presidents Influence Public-Affairs Strategy 
In his famed book Democracy in America Alexis de Tocqueville argues that foreign policy is 
the Achilles heel of any democracy and that defects of democratic institutions will be revealed 
when foreign affairs are conducted.5 Since the days of President George Washington, 
presidents have met many Americans psychological needs.6 Americans have especially turned 
to their president for comfort and reassurance in times of crisis demanding military 
engagement. Public opinion polls and surveys reviewed in this research paper have revealed 
that in the four cases where presidents have used American security as a justification for 
military activity, Americans have supported the military operation in question. In the Grenada 
Invasion, the Persian Gulf War, the Afghanistan War, and the Iraq War, Americans did not 
object to the various public-affairs strategies advocated by presidents and implemented by the 
Pentagon, despite that the strategies, to various degrees, have violated the American 
Constitution’s principle of a free American press. Patriotism and the American people’s 
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reliance upon their Commander-in Chief thus serve as two Achilles heels in American 
democracy. The Bosnia Intervention, for example, did not receive as high favourability rate as 
the Grenada Invasion, the Persian Gulf War, the Afghanistan War, and the Iraq War. As 
revealed in the Gallup poll American Public Support for U.S. Military Operations from 
Mogadishu to Bagdad presented in chapter 3, Americans did not believe that American 
interests were threatened in the Bosnia-Herzegovina civil war and thus did not support 
American military participation in Operation Deliberate Force. The average favorability rate 
of the Grenada Invasion, the Persian Gulf War, the Afghanistan War, and the Iraq War is 
seventy percent while only forty-one percent supported American military activity in Bosnia.7 
These diverging numbers indicate that when Americans believe that their security or interests 
are threatened, the majority turns to the highest ranking military officer in the U.S and will 
not object to media restrictions on the battlefield. 
Because Americans “rally-around-the-flag” when security is threatened, presidents 
have been able to use patriotic war environments for their own political advantages. A shared 
characteristic of President Bush Sr. and President Bush Jr’s presidencies during wartime is 
their use of military public-affairs strategies to build support for their own political agendas as 
well as the operation in question. A restrictive public-affairs strategy in the Persian Gulf War 
was deemed desirable by Bush Sr. on two counts, both linked to his desire to build a “new 
world order”. First, if the Persian Gulf War was to be used as means to attract more public 
support for his presidency and his future political goals, the media had to be prevented from 
reporting on sensitive war information that could be used to the Iraqis’ advantage. Also, if 
Americans learned about less successful or failed operations, this might first of all influence 
their overall opinion of the war Bush was waging in their name. Second, an unsuccessful war 
could also make Americans question Bush’s presidency and his political skills. For Bush, 
losing the war or being forced to withdraw from it would result in the loss of much needed 
political foreign-affairs capital. Without political capital, his vision of a “new world order” 
would never come to fruition. 
President Bush Jr. used strategic public-affairs strategy as a means to sell the Iraq War. 
Bush’s decision to go to war against Saddam Hussein was part of a larger political agenda: he 
claimed he was going to war to eradicate terrorism, especially terrorism directed at the United 
States.  Many others believed that securing America’s oil supply was equally the reason, and 
that the Bush administration’s other justifications for invading Iraq were rather dubious. 
Whether Bush went to war in Iraq to secure U.S. access to oil is true or not, there is no doubt 
that strategic public-affairs strategy, as Johnson’s Maximum Candor strategy in the Vietnam 
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War, was designed to dominate media coverage, counter enemy propaganda in the invasion 
phase and secure public support. Bush’s attempt to secure public support during Operation 
Iraqi Freedom can be considered a success when considering the war’s favorability rates in 
late March and late April 2003. Media embeds published detailed news reports describing 
military progress and soldiers’ heroic war efforts and professionalism, thereby creating a 
patriotic mood in the United States. 
The second category of the way in which presidents have influenced public-affairs 
strategy is represented by President Reagan, who allowed his own presidential style to 
influence the military’s public-affairs strategy in the Grenada Invasion. His unilateral view of 
a prerogative war president combined with his distaste for free governmental information did 
not directly influence military public-affairs strategy during the Grenada Invasion as 
Johnson’s Maximum Candor had done in Vietnam: rather he sought to ensure that General 
John W. Vessey Jr., Admiral Wesley L. McDonald, and Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III 
were given free hands when planning the invasion. A Commander-in-Chief who disliked a 
free stream of information and advocated prerogative rights during wartime combined with 
the military’s desire for little media coverage produced an extremely restrictive public affairs 
strategy during the Grenada Invasion. 
 
5.5 Concluding Remarks 
Because of the media-military culture clash, Americans have to choose between a free and 
independent press, which is one of the cornerstones in a democracy, and military success. 
Between 1983 and 2001, Americans have chosen the latter. During the invasion phase of the 
Iraq War, however, they did not have to choose between the two options as the Embedding 
Media Program allowed the military to fulfill its role as protector of American security and 
embedded journalists were partly, but still at a satisfactory level, able to fulfill its role as a 
protector of American democratic values. Because battlefield environments change from 
operation to operation, however, there is no guarantee that Americans will never again have to 
choose. If Americans stay true to their tradition of supporting their President and 
Commander-in-Chief during times of crisis demanding military engagement, the press will 
most likely continue to serve the position of the underdog, once again fighting for democratic 
values which large sections of the population of the best known proponent of democratic 
values in the world do not seem to value at times of military engagement. 
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Appendix A 
 
OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM GROUND  
RULES AND GUIDELINES FOR NEWS MEDIA 
 
 
The following information should not be reported because its publication or broadcast could 
jeopardize operations and endanger lives:  
 
1. For U.S. or coalition units, specific numerical information on troop strength, aircraft, 
weapons systems, on-hand equipment or supplies (e.g., artillery, tanks, radars, missiles, 
trucks, water), including amounts of ammunition or fuel moved by or on hand in support and 
combat units. Unit size may be described in general terms,  such  as  “company-size,” 
 “multibattalion,”  “multidivision,“ “naval task force” and “carrier battle group.” Number or 
amount of equipment and supplies may be described in general terms, such as “large,” 
“small” or “many.”  
 
2. Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations or strikes, including 
postponed or cancelled operations.  
 
3. Information, photography and imagery that would reveal the specific location of military 
forces or show the level of security at military installations or encampments. Locations maybe 
described as follows: all Navy embark stories can identify the ship upon which embarked as a 
dateline and will state that the report is coming from the “Persian Gulf,” “Red Sea” 
or “North Arabian Sea.” Stories written in Saudi Arabia maybe datelined 
“Eastern Saudi Arabia,” “Near the Kuwaiti border,” etc. For specific countries outside Saudi 
Arabia, stories will state that the report is coming from the Persian Gulf region unless that 
country has acknowledged its participation.  
 
4.  Rules of engagement details. 
 
5.  Information on intelligence collection activities, including targets, methods and results.  
 
6. During an operation, specific information on friendly force troop movements, tactical 
deployments and dispositions that would jeopardize operational security or lives. This would 
include designations, names of operations and size of friendly forces involved, until released 
by CENTCOM.  
 
7. Identification of mission aircraft points of origin, other than as land- or carrier-based.  
 
8.  Information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of enemy camouflage, 
cover, deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection or security 
measures.  
 
9. Specific identifying information on missing or downed aircraft or ships while search and 
rescue operations are planned or under way.  
 
10. Special operations forces’ methods, unique equipment or tactics.  
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11.  Specific  operating  methods  and  tactics,  (e.g.,  air  angles  of  attack  or  speeds,  or 
 naval  tactics  and  evasive maneuvers). General terms, such as “low” or “fast,” may be used.  
 
12. Information on operational or support vulnerabilities that could be used against U.S. 
forces, such as details of major battle damage or major personnel losses of specific U.S. or 
coalition units, until that information no longer  provides  tactical  advantage  to  the  enemy 
 and  is,  therefore,  released  by  CENTCOM.  Damage and casualties may 
be described as “light,” “moderate” or “heavy.” 
 
News media personnel must carry and support any personal and professional gear they take 
with them, including protective cases for professional equipment, batteries, cables, converters, 
etc.  
 
Night Operations—Light discipline restrictions will be followed. The only approved light 
source is a flashlight with a red lens. No visible light source, including flash or television 
lights, will be used when operating with forces at night unless specifically approved by the 
on-scene commander.  
 
Because  of  host-nation  requirements,  you  must  stay  with  your  public  affairs  escort 
 while  on  Saudi  bases. At other U.S. tactical or field locations and encampments, a public 
affairs escort maybe required because of security, safely and mission requirements as 
determined by the host commander.  
 
Casualty  information,  because  of  concern  of  the  notification  of  the  next  of  kin,  is 
 extremely  sensitive. By executive directive, next of kin of all military fatalities must be 
notified in person by a uniformed member of the appropriate service. There have been 
instances in which the next of kin have first learned of the death or wounding of a loved one 
though the news media. The problem is particularly difficult for visual media. Casualty 
photographs showing a recognizable face, name tag or other identifying feature or item should 
not be used before the next of kin have been notified. The anguish that sudden recognition at 
home can cause far outweighs the news value of the photograph, film or videotape. News 
coverage of casualties in medical centers will be in strict compliance with the instructions of 
doctors and medical officers.  
 
To the extent that individuals in the news media seek access to the U.S. area of operation, the 
following rule applies: Prior to or upon commencement of hostilities, media pools will be 
established to provide initial combat coverage of U.S. forces. U.S. news media personnel 
present in Saudi Arabia will be given the opportunity to join CENTCOM media pools, 
providing they agree to pool their products. News media personnel  who  are  not  members 
 of  the  official  CENTCOM  media  pools  will  not  be  permitted  into  forward areas, 
Reporters are strongly discouraged from attempting to link up on their own with combat units. 
U.S.  commanders  will  maintain  extremely  tight  security  throughout  the  operational  area 
 and  will  exclude from  the  area  of  operation  all  unauthorized  individuals.  
 
For news media personnel participating in designated CENTVOM media pools:  
 
1.  Upon  registering  with  the  JIB,  news  media  should  contact  their  respective  pool 
 coordinator  for  an explanation  of  pool  operations.  
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2. In the event of hostilities, pool products will be subject to review before release to 
determine if they contain  sensitive  information  about  military  plans,  capabilities, 
 operation  or  vulnerabilities  (see  attached ground rules) that would jeopardize the outcome 
of an operation or the safety of U.S. or coalition forces. Material  will  be  examined  solely 
 for  its  conformance  to  the  attached  ground  rules,  not  for  its  potential  to express 
criticism or cause embarrassment. The public affairs escort officer on scene will review pool 
reports, discuss ground rule problems with the reporter, and in the limited circumstances when 
no agreement can be reached with a reporter about disputed materials, immediately send the 
disputed materials to JIB Dhahran for review by the JIB Director and the appropriate news 
media representative. If no agreement can be reached, the  issue  will  be  immediately 
 forwarded  to  OASD(PA)  for  review  with  the  appropriate  bureau  chief.  The ultimate 
decision on publication will be made by the originating reporter’s news organization.  
 
3. Correspondents may not carry a personnel weapon. 
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Appendix B 
 
DoD Principles for News Media Coverage of DoD Operations 
 
 
The following principles have been adopted by representatives of major American news 
media and the Pentagon to be followed in any future combat situation involving American 
troops.  
 
1. Open and independent reporting will be the principal means of coverage of U.S. 
military operations.  
 
2. Pools are not to serve as the standard for covering U.S. military operations. But pools 
may sometimes provide the only feasible means of early access to a military operation. 
Pools should be as large as possible and disbanded at the earliest opportunity- within 
24-36 hours when possible. The arrival of early-access pools will not cancel the 
principle of independent coverage for journalists already in the area. 
 
3. Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be appropriate for specific events, 
such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is limited. 
 
4. Journalists in a combat zone will be credentialed by the U.S. military and will be 
required to abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect U.S. 
forces and their operations. Violations of the ground rules can result in suspension of 
the credentials and expulsion from the combat zone of the journalists involved. News 
organizations will make their best effort to assign experienced journalists to combat 
operations and to make them familiar with U.S. military operations.  
 
5. Journalists will be provided access to all major military units. Special Operations 
restrictions may limit access in some cases 
 
6. Military public affairs officers should act as liaisons but should not interfere with the 
reporting process.  
 
7. Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders will permit journalists to ride 
on military vehicles and aircrafts whenever feasible. The military will be responsible 
for the transportation of pools.  
 
8. Consistent with its capabilities, the military will supply PAOs with facilities to enable 
timely, secure compatible transmission of pool material and will make these facilities 
available whenever possible for filing independent coverage. In cases when 
government facilities are unavailable, journalists will, as always, file by any other 
means available. The military will not ban communications systems operated by news 
organizations, but electromagnetic operational security in battlefield situations may 
require limited restrictions on the use of such systems. 
 
9. These principle will apply as well to the operations of the standing DOD National 
Media Pool System. 
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Appendix C 
Ground Rules Agreement; Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan 
The following is a listing of ground rules which have been developed to protect members of 
the Armed Services from the release of information which could potentially threaten their 
security or safety during ongoing operations. 
These ground rules recognize the inherent Constitutional right of the media to cover military 
operations and are in no way intended to prevent release of derogatory, embarrassing, 
negative or non-complimentary information. During an operation or exercise, specific 
information on friendly force troop movements, tactical deployments and dispositions that 
would jeopardize operational security or lives will not be released. This would include unit 
designations, names of operations, and size of friendly forces involved, until released by 
USCENTCOM or its designated release authority. Acceptance of these ground rules is an 
agreement between you and the granting commands. You agree to follow the ground rules and 
the command will provide support, access to military members, information and other 
privileges. Violation of ground rules, however, may result in the revocation of your 
credentials. 
News media personnel must carry and support any personal and professional gear they take 
with them, including protective cases for professional equipment, batteries, cables, converters, 
etc. Media members should be physically fit and prepared to withstand the rigorous 
conditions required to operate in a desert environment. 
1. All interviews with soldiers will be on the record. Security at the interview source is the 
policy. Interviews with pilots and aircrew members are authorized upon completion of 
missions; however, release of information must conform to media ground rules. 
2. Print or broadcast stories will be datelined by general geographical description such as 
northern Arabian Peninsula, Northern Arabian Gulf, etc. No specific locations will be used 
when filing stories. 
3. Because of host-nation requirements, media must stay with public affairs escorts while on 
host nation bases. At other U.S. tactical or field locations and encampments, a public affairs 
escort may be required because of security, safety and mission requirements as determined by 
the host commander. Media will remain with military escorts at all times until released, and 
follow instructions regarding their activities. 
4. Media will not carry personal weapons. 
5. External Media Coverage of Detainees: 
5A. Group or wide area photo/video coverage of detainees in and about detainee facilities 
may be permitted by the camp commander, subject to security requirements and the following 
restrictions: 
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5B. Media coverage, including photo/video coverage, will not identify detainees by name or 
by image. (i.e., close up images of individual face(s) that would allow individuals to be 
identified will not be permitted.). 
5C. Coverage may show groups of detainees, but only in compliance with the restrictions in 
Para. 5B. 
5D. Coverage of detainees in transit is not permitted, including ground and air movement 
between detention facilities, or movement between detention facilities and transportation 
(buses, ferries, planes, etc). 
6. Coverage of detainee interrogations or interviews is not permitted. Media interviews with 
detainees are not permitted. 
7. Media will not capture imagery of deployed Special Operations Forces (SOF) without prior 
approval through USCENTCOM in co-ordination with USSOCOM. 
8. The following categories of information are not releasable since their publication or 
broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives. 
a. For U.S. or coalition units, specific numerical information on troop strength, equipment or 
critical supplies (e.g. artillery, tanks, landing craft, radar, trucks, water etc.). 
b. Specific number of aircraft in units below wing level, or identification of mission aircraft 
points of origin, other than land or carrier based. Number and type of aircraft may be 
described in very general terms such as "large flight," "small flight," "many," "few," 
"fighters," "fixed wing," etc. 
c. Names of military installations or specific geographic locations of military units in the 
USCENTCOM area of responsibility, unless specifically released by the Department of 
Defense. 
d. Information regarding future operations, current operations or strikes including postponed 
or cancelled operations, or information regarding security precautions at military installations 
or encampments. 
e. Photography that would show level of security at military installations or encampments, 
especially aerial and satellite photography which would reveal the name or specific location 
of military units or installations. 
f. Details of rules of engagement. 
g. Information on intelligence collection activities including targets, methods and results. 
h. Information on special operations units, unique operations methodology or tactics, for 
example, air operations, angles of attack, and speeds; naval tactical or evasive maneuvers, etc. 
General terms such as "low" or "fast" may be used. 
i. Information on effectiveness of enemy electronic warfare. 
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j. Information on effectiveness of enemy camouflage and cover. 
k. Additional guidelines may be necessary to protect tactical security. 
9. The following categories of information are releasable. 
a. Arrival of U.S. military units in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility when officially 
announced. Mode of travel (sea or air), dates of departure and home station. 
b. Approximate friendly force strength figures. 
c. Non-sensitive, unclassified information regarding U.S. air, ground and sea operations, past 
and present. 
d. Size of friendly force participating in an action or operation will be disclosed using general 
terms such as "multi-battalion." Specific force or unit identification may be released when it 
no longer warrants security protection. 
e. Generic description of origin of air operations, such as "land-based." 
f. Date, time or location of previous conventional military missions and actions as well as 
mission results. 
g. Types of ordnance expended in general terms. 
h. Number of aerial combat or reconnaissance missions or sorties flown in USCENTCOM's 
area of operation. 
i. Type of forces involved (e.g., air defence, infantry, armour, Marines). 
j. Weather and climate conditions. 
k Allied participation by type of operation (ships, aircraft, ground units, etc.), after approval 
of host nation government. 
l. Conventional operation code names. 
m. Names and hometowns of U.S. military units or individuals. 
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Appendix D 
 
Excerpt of Public Affairs (PA) Guidance on Embedding Media During 
Possible Future Operations/Deployments in the U.S. Central Command 
(CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR) 
 
 
2. POLICY.  
 
2.A. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) POLICY ON MEDIA COVERAGE  
OF FUTURE MILITARY OPERATIONS IS THAT MEDIA WILL HAVE LONG-TERM,  
MINIMALLY RESTRICTIVE ACCESS TO U.S. AIR, GROUND AND NAVAL  
FORCES THROUGH EMBEDDING. MEDIA COVERAGE OF ANY FUTURE  
OPERATION WILL, TO A LARGE EXTENT, SHAPE PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF  
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT NOW AND IN THE YEARS AHEAD.  
THIS HOLDS TRUE FOR THE U.S. PUBLIC; THE PUBLIC IN ALLIED  
COUNTRIES WHOSE OPINION CAN AFFECT THE DURABILITY OF OUR  
COALITION; AND PUBLICS IN COUNTRIES WHERE WE CONDUCT OPERATIONS,  
WHOSE PERCEPTIONS OF US CAN AFFECT THE COST AND DURATION OF OUR  
INVOLVEMENT. OUR ULTIMATE STRATEGIC SUCCESS IN BRINGING PEACE  
AND SECURITY TO THIS REGION WILL COME IN OUR LONG-TERM  
COMMITMENT TO SUPPORTING OUR DEMOCRATIC IDEALS. WE NEED TO TELL  
THE FACTUAL STORY - GOOD OR BAD - BEFORE OTHERS SEED THE MEDIA  
WITH DISINFORMATION AND DISTORTIONS, AS THEY MOST CERTAINLY WILL  
CONTINUE TO DO. OUR PEOPLE IN THE FIELD NEED TO TELL OUR STORY  
– ONLY COMMANDERS CAN ENSURE THE MEDIA GET TO THE STORY  
ALONGSIDE THE TROOPS. WE MUST ORGANIZE FOR AND FACILITATE  
ACCESS OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA TO OUR FORCES,  
INCLUDING THOSE FORCES ENGAGED IN GROUND OPERATIONS, WITH THE  
GOAL OF DOING SO RIGHT FROM THE START. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, WE  
WILL EMBED MEDIA WITH OUR UNITS. THESE EMBEDDED MEDIA WILL  
LIVE, WORK AND TRAVEL AS PART OF THE UNITS WITH WHICH THEY ARE  
EMBEDDED TO FACILITATE MAXIMUM, IN-DEPTH COVERAGE OF U.S. FORCES  
IN COMBAT AND RELATED OPERATIONS. COMMANDERS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
OFFICERS MUST WORK TOGETHER TO BALANCE THE NEED FOR MEDIA 
ACCESS WITH THE NEED FOR OPERATIONAL SECURITY.  
 
2.C. A MEDIA EMBED IS DEFINED AS A MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE 
REMAINING WITH A UNIT ON AN EXTENDED BASIS - PERHAPS A PERIOD OF 
WEEKS OR EVEN MONTHS. COMMANDERS WILL PROVIDE BILLETING, 
RATIONS AND MEDICAL ATTENTION, IF NEEDED, TO THE EMBEDDED MEDIA 
COMMENSURATE WITH THAT PROVIDED TO MEMBERS OF THE UNIT, AS WELL 
AS ACCESS TO MILITARY TRANSPORTATION AND ASSISTANCE WITH 
COMMUNICATIONS FILING/TRANSMITTING MEDIA PRODUCTS, IF REQUIRED. 
 
2.C.1. EMBEDDED MEDIA ARE NOT AUTHORIZED USE OF THEIR OWN 
VEHICLES WHILE TRAVELING IN AN EMBEDDED STATUS. 
 
2.C.4. NO COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT FOR USE BY MEDIA IN THE 
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CONDUCT OF THEIR DUTIES WILL BE SPECIFICALLY PROHIBITED. 
HOWEVER, UNIT COMMANDERS MAY IMPOSE TEMPORARY RESTRICTIONS ON 
ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSIONS FOR OPERATIONAL SECURITY REASONS. 
MEDIA WILL SEEK APPROVAL TO USE ELECTRONIC DEVICES IN A 
COMBAT/HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT, UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED BY THE 
UNIT COMMANDER OR HIS/HER DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE. THE USE OF 
COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT WILL BE DISCUSSED IN FULL WHEN THE 
MEDIA ARRIVE AT THEIR ASSIGNED UNIT. 
 
3. PROCEDURES.  
 
3.A. THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
PUBLIC AFFAIRS (OASD(PA) IS THE CENTRAL AGENCY FOR MANAGING AND  
VETTING MEDIA EMBEDS TO INCLUDE ALLOCATING EMBED SLOTS TO MEDIA  
ORGANIZATIONS. EMBED AUTHORITY MAY BE DELEGATED TO SUBORDINATE  
ELEMENTS AFTER THE COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES AND AT THE  
DISCRETION OF OASD(PA). EMBED OPPORTUNITIES WILL BE ASSIGNED TO  
MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS, NOT TO INDIVIDUAL REPORTERS. THE DECISION  
AS TO WHICH MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE WILL FILL ASSIGNED EMBED SLOTS  
WILL BE MADE BY THE DESIGNATED POC FOR EACH NEWS ORGANIZATION.  
 
3.C. UNIT COMMANDERS SHOULD ALSO EXPRESS, THROUGH THEIR CHAIN  
OF COMMAND AND PA CHANNELS TO OASD(PA), THEIR DESIRE AND  
CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT ADDITIONAL MEDIA EMBEDS BEYOND THOSE  
ASSIGNED.   
 
3.F. EMBEDDED MEDIA OPERATE AS PART OF THEIR ASSIGNED UNIT. AN  
ESCORT MAY BE ASSIGNED AT THE DISCRETION OF THE UNIT COMMANDER.  
THE ABSENCE OF A PA ESCORT IS NOT A REASON TO PRECLUDE MEDIA  
ACCESS TO OPERATIONS.  
 
3.G. COMMANDERS WILL ENSURE THE MEDIA ARE PROVIDED WITH EVERY  
OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE ACTUAL COMBAT OPERATIONS. THE PERSONAL  
SAFETY OF CORRESPONDENTS IS NOT A REASON TO EXCLUDE THEM FROM  
COMBAT AREAS.  
 
3.P. MEDIA WILL DEPLOY WITH THE NECESSARY EQUIPMENT TO COLLECT  
AND TRANSMIT THEIR STORIES.  
 
4. GROUND RULES.  
 
FOR THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF U.S. FORCES AND EMBEDDED MEDIA, 
MEDIA WILL ADHERE TO ESTABLISHED GROUND RULES. GROUND RULES WILL 
BE AGREED TO IN ADVANCE AND SIGNED BY MEDIA PRIOR TO EMBEDDING. 
VIOLATION OF THE GROUND RULES MAY RESULT IN THE IMMEDIATE 
TERMINATION OF THE EMBED AND REMOVAL FROM THE AOR. THESE 
GROUND RULES RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT OF THE MEDIA TO COVER MILITARY 
OPERATIONS AND ARE IN NO WAY INTENDED TO PREVENT RELEASE OF 
DEROGATORY, EMBARRASSING, NEGATIVE OR UNCOMPLIMENTARY 
INFORMATION. ANY MODIFICATION TO THE STANDARD GROUND RULES WILL 
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BE FORWARDED THROUGH THE PA CHANNELS TO CENTCOM/PA FOR 
APPROVAL. STANDARD GROUND RULES ARE:  
 
4.A. ALL INTERVIEWS WITH SERVICE MEMBERS WILL BE ON THE RECORD.  
SECURITY AT THE SOURCE IS THE POLICY. INTERVIEWS WITH PILOTS  
AND AIRCREW MEMBERS ARE AUTHORIZED UPON COMPLETION OF MISSIONS;  
HOWEVER, RELEASE OF INFORMATION MUST CONFORM TO THESE MEDIA 
GROUND RULES.  
 
4.B. PRINT OR BROADCAST STORIES WILL BE DATELINED ACCORDING TO  
LOCAL GROUND RULES. LOCAL GROUND RULES WILL BE COORDINATED  
THROUGH COMMAND CHANNELS WITH CENTCOM.  
4.C. MEDIA EMBEDDED WITH U.S. FORCES ARE NOT PERMITTED TO CARRY  
PERSONAL FIREARMS.  
 
4.D. LIGHT DISCIPLINE RESTRICTIONS WILL BE FOLLOWED. VISIBLE  
LIGHT SOURCES, INCLUDING FLASH OR TELEVISION LIGHTS, FLASH  
CAMERAS WILL NOT BE USED WHEN OPERATING WITH FORCES AT NIGHT  
UNLESS SPECIFICALLY APPROVED IN ADVANCE BY THE ON-SCENE  
COMMANDER.  
 
REGARDING OTHER EQUIPMENT OR CRITICAL  
SUPPLIES (E.G. ARTILLERY, TANKS, LANDING CRAFT, RADARS, TRUCKS,  
WATER, ETC.). 
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List of Acronyms  
 
 
CENTCOM –       U.S. Central Commands 
CIC –                    Coalition Information Center  
CINCLANT –       Commander In Chief, Atlantic  
EMP –                   Embedded Media Program 
JIB –                     Joint Information Bureau 
JP 3-0 –                 Doctrine for Joint Operations 
JUSPAO –            Joint United States Public Affairs Office 
MACOI –             Military Assistance Office of Information 
MACV –               Military Assistance Command Vietnam 
NMP –                  National Media Pool program 
OA –                     Operation Anaconda 
ODF –                   Operation Deliberate Force 
OEF –                   Operation Enduring Freedom 
OIF –                    Operation Iraqi Freedom 
OSF –                   Operation Swift Freedom 
OUF –                  Operation Urgent Fury  
PAO –                  Public Affairs Officer 
PEJ –                    Project for Excellence in Journalism 
PRA –                  The Peoples Revolutionary Army 
RCFP –                Reporters’ Committee for Freedom of the Press 
TTP –                   Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 
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